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PRESENTED BY 
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PRINCETON * NEW JERSEY 


Jos. Schneider 
.2/ M24 1926 
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B 655 
The meaning of the rationes 


Library of Che Theological Seminary 
McKeough, Michael John, 


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THE MEANING OF 
THE RATIONES SEMINALES 
IN ST. AUGUSTINE 


ae THE 


vd 
Rev. Micuaet J. McKeovuanu, O. Prarm. M.A. 
St. Norbert’s College 
West De Pere, Wis. 


DISSERTATION 


Submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy of the 
Catholic University of America in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 


WasHiIncton, D. C. 
1926 


Nihil Obstat: 


VERY REV. IGNATIUS SMITH, O.P., Ph.D. 
Censor Deputatus 


Imprimatur: 


~ MOST REV... MICHAEL J. CURLEY, D.D. 
Archbishop of Baltimore 


Imprimi potest: 


RT. REV. B. H. PENNINGS, O Praem, Abbot 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


introauction: “A Statementiof the Question. <2.) ie oes eels 


le 


II. 


IIT. 


IV. 


PIUMMARIEVINGINIC ita tr Cher yee Wier CRY DUN a Na (7. Menges 4 (cs ote econ RR 
EMBL NATAL OLPANICUBUING Citit eso eee pia hd Uk Sate eee eke dU mae wletclelde’s 
ZL DOE MlOsOphy Ol vA UGUSEINIG a a4 eis. cincicleldjekicss os pb kio e's ay cae 


3. Augustine’s Interest in Genesis.............. 00 0c cece cece 


The Theory of the Rationes Seminales......................05. 
1) Before the Lime om Augustine 1.066 PA ys ek a ie bs wires 
PMA LLEN DG) IMG OLA UIPUBEINIG Scots cle cact.e oie vgs See sielele mdse clasp ao 


The Nature of the Rationes Seminales...................0..000- 
1. The Use of the Terms MPa era. te ea NSA coe e wiatlhia os Sofa 
2. The Physical Form of the Rationes Seminales................ 
3. The Potentiality of the Rationes Seminales................... 


4. The Manner in which Future Beings are Contained in Them... 


The Origin and Development of the Rationes Seminales.......... 
1. Augustine’s Conception of Creation. ...............0.000 00 ee 
Re) CRORUIVOU ICE aie ein era mle i endl nleig ir ess wivie's ' 
B. The Form in which Things were Created................. 
2. The Development of the Rationes Seminales................. 
A. Natural Development and Divine Administration.......... 
Sa AEC TCE Pe Vee lye aac (es eT 
3. The Time and Order of the Appearance of Original Forms..... 
A. Ihe Origin and Appearance of Man.......5...00 0605 ce ale dae es 


Peete AtING ONC: UeVOUIION c .cct li sias bie%s <a Sa be ce 8 cd ei eh 4 Sid bee 
MOV AIGET Gs VOLIEMITILSIIN oes ole ha te aie Wafers! aia + oha's.'y! ols uteleratony «ranma 
2. Comparison with Augustine’s Theory..................e0000- 


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INTRODUCTION 


Evolution is generally accepted as a fact by the scientist 
of today. Descent with modification as a process of nature 
is taken for granted. There are indeed theories, intended 
to explain the evolutionary process, which are admitted as 
working hypotheses, but what they call the “fact” of Evo- 
lution must not be disputed. Bateson wrote in 1915 that 
“we have got to recognize that there has been an evolution, 
that somehow or other, the forms of life have arisen from 
fewer forms,’”? and Dr. G. H. Parker, of Harvard Univer- 
sity, puts it even more strongly: “It is this strength of the 
modern position that has placed every biologist on the side 
of evolution. In other words, practically all biologists to- 
day accept without any reservation, descent with modifica- 
tion as a process of nature. They no longer question this 
view. This statement cannot be emphasized too strongly.’’? 
Sir Bertram Windle notes that the same attitude is taken 
by the writers of textbooks. “In all the manuals,” he says, 
“we find it (Evolution) set down as a dogma of scientific 
faith.’”"?> Occasionally an authoritative voice is heard in 
protest,? but it does little to disturb the calm security of 
the evolutionary protagonists. 


But while they are unanimous in proclaiming descent 
with modification to be a fact, nevertheless they differ 
widely in explaining the causes and factors of that process. 
Parker says: “‘At the same time that these biologists accept 
descent with modification as an actual occurrence in nature, 
they are most skeptical and reserved about what may be 


* Bateson: Heredity, in Annual Report of Smithsonian Institute, 
1OTb cps a72. 

* Parker: What Evolution Is, p. 62. 

* Windle: Evolution, A Recent French Criticism, in The Catholic 
World, vol. CXXII, p. 66. 

*Prof. M. Vialleton: Membres et Ceintures des Vertebrés 
Tétrapodes. Critique Morphologique du Transformisme. This is 
the severest condemnation of the ordinary proofs for Transformism 
that has appeared in recent times. Cfr. no. 3 supra. 


v 


called the driving force behind descent.”*> He enumerates 
three principal theories that have been put forth as expla- 
nations of evolution, v.g., Lamarckism, Darwinism and the 
Mutation Theory. He warns his readers against the error 
of condemning evolution itself because of the disagreement 
in its explanation. ‘Because biologists have not yet dis- 
covered how evolution takes place,” he writes, “is no reason 
for denying evolution itself.”* Bateson vehemently rejects 
Darwinism but stoutly maintains his belief in Evolution. 
It is evident that a distinction must be made between the 
fact of evolution as a process of nature and the explana- 
tions of that process. 

Among Catholic scholars the number nO accept Evolu- 
tion as a fact is limited. There are some who accept it as 
a working hypothesis. However, the anti-Christian atti- 
tude of many of the earlier defenders of the theory who 
used it to bolster up their materialistic philosophies, caused 
many Christian thinkers to reject it in any form. In their 
anxiety to safeguard the cherished principles of the exist- 
ence of God, the creation of all things and the essential 
distinction between man and the lower animals, they would 
have nothing to do with a doctrine that seemed to call these 
truths into question. Catholics in general reflected this 
attitude of their leaders, and to some extent the spirit of 
antagonism towards evolutionism remains dominant even 
today. There is, however, a growing tendency to look upon 
the question as a scientific problem rather than a theologi- 
cal one and to judge it upon the merits of the proofs alleged 
in its support. 

On the other hand there have been leaders who saw the 
possibility of reconciling Evolutionism with the principles 
of faith. They rejected of course the materialistic and 
mechanistic theories and proposed in their stead what they 
called Theistic Evolution. As early as 1877, Knabenbauer, 
the celebrated Jesuit theologian, asserted: ‘There is no 
objection, as far as faith is concerned, to assuming the 
descent of all plants and animal species from a few types.’ 


_—_— 





* Parker: 1 c. no. 2 supra. 
* Parker: Op. ‘cit.,, p: 68. 


"Knabenbauer: Glaube und Deszendenztheorie, in Stimmen aus 
Maria Laach, XIII, p. 75. 


vi 


Other eminent scholars, like Mivart, Zahm, Wasmann, 
openly championed the cause of theistic evolutionism. 
These men argued that, neither from the scientific nor from 
the philosophic point of view, was there any contradiction 
between this theory, so understood, and Catholic faith. The 
-Seriptural account does not determine the form in which 
created things came into existence, nor the number of the 
original forms. Moreover, by the principle of St. Thomas 
that “‘the potency of a cause is the greater, the more remote 
the effects to which it extends,’® they contended that it 
would be a greater manifestation of God’s wisdom and 
power, if the world were created by a single act of His 
-divine will and developed to its present form by powers 
and laws implanted in it at the beginning by the Creator.°® 

To give their views greater authority, these Catholic 
defenders of evolutionism turned to the Fathers and the 
Schoolmen for principles or opinions that would confirm 
their own positions. They realized that any doctrine must 
stand or fall by its conformity or lack of conformity .with 
the fundamental principles laid down by St. Augustine and 
St. Thomas Aquinas. A well developed cosmological sys- | 
tem had been bequeathed to us by these holy doctors. It 
was the norm by which the new evolutionism must be meas- 
ured. The first important attempt along this line was made 
by St. George Mivart, in his book, “The Genesis of Species,” 
published in 1871. In an effort to show that Christian 
thinkers were perfectly free to accept the general evolution 
theory, he quotes freely from St. Augustine and St. Thomas 
and refers to Suarez, Cornelius a Lapide and other Catholic 
writers. His arguments were ably defended and amplified 
in this country by Doctor J. A. Zahm, C.S.C., in his two 
books, “Bible, Science and Faith,’ and “Evolution and 
Dogma,” both published in the nineties. To the quotations 
from Augustine, and Thomas, Zahm added others from the 
Greek Fathers, Basil and Gregory of Nyssa. Their exam- 
ple was followed by many other scholars, non-Catholic as 
well as Catholic.’° 


* Sum. C. Gentes, III, c. LXXVII. 

°Cfr. art. Evolution, Cath. Ency., vol. V. 

* Osborn: From the Greeks to Darwin, p. 69 seq., also Husslein: 
Evolution and Social Progress, p. 95. 


Vil 


Of those scholars of the past, whose authority was most 
frequently invoked, St. Augustine was given the first place. 
This was due to the fact that the Bishop of Hippo was 
commonly acknowledged to be the greatest of the Fathers 
and his opinions consequently would have the most weight. 
Secondly, Augustine had gone into the question of the origin 
and development of things far more thoroughly and exten- 
sively than any other writer. In the de Genesi ad Litteram 
and to a lesser extent in his other works, he has given us a 
penetrating and exhaustive study of the meaning of Gene- 
sis and its interpretation according to the scientific knowl- 
edge of his time. Thirdly, Augustine’s thought seemed to 
fit in with modern evolutionary doctrine better than that 
of the others. For these reasons he became the great mas- 
ter of the Christian defenders of evolutionism. But his 
support was not to be retained without a struggle. The 
interpretations of Mivart and especially those of Zahm 
were challenged and a controversy over the cosmological 
theories of the great Father was started that has not yet 
been settled. A series of articles appeared in the Irish 
Ecclesiastical Record of 1899,'! in which the question of 
St. Augustine and Evolution was argued pro and con by 
Father Patrick F. Coakley, O.S.A., and Father Philip Bur- 
ton, C.M. The latter denies the correctness of Doctor 
Zahm’s interpretations and seeks to show that Augustine’s 
theories are directly opposed to evolutionism in the modern 
sense. Father Coakley undertakes to defend the aforesaid 
interpretation and quotes many Augustinian authorities in 
its defense. Since that time numerous other articles and 
references concerning this problem have appeared; none of 
them, however, authoritative or thorough enough to be 
regarded as decisive. | 

The appearance in 1922 of Canon Dorlodot’s “Darwinism 
and Catholic Thought” gave new impetus to the contro- 
versy. The Canon takes a very decided stand on the side 
of evolution and invokes the authority of the Fathers, 
especially Augustine, to support absolute natural evolution. 
His high position and the scholarly character of his work 
immediately attracted the attention of Catholic scholars 





“Irish Eee. Ree., 4-S, vol. V, Jan.-Jun., 1899. 


Vlll 


everywhere and many criticisms, some approving, others 
condemning, appeared in current periodicals..2 In 1924 
Father Henry Woods, S.J., of the University of Santa Clara, 
California, published his work, entitled “Augustine and 
Evolution.” While the author does not say so, it is quite 
evidently intended to counteract the influence of Dorlodot’s 
book. Father Woods argues that there is nothing in Au- 
gustine’s doctrine that in any way favors evolutionism. In 
fact he seeks to prove that Augustine’s theories are directly 
opposed to any evolutionary scheme. His treatment repre- 
sents serious thought and has been favorably reviewed by 
a number of scholarly critics. Nothing of importance has 
been added to the dispute since the publication of this study. 
The several magazine articles that have appeared have but 
reviewed the arguments already put forth. 

A study of these various efforts to settle the controversy 
reveals that the pivotal point around which the whole ques- 
tion turns, is the meaning of the Rationes Seminales. Au- 
gustine clearly says that God did not create living beings 
as they are but potentially, in their rationes seminales, 
which in the course of time became actual. From Mivart 
to Woods, the question has been: What did Augustine mean 
by these rationes seminales? What was the manner of 
their existence and how did they become actual? Those 
who have sought to enlist his support for evolutionism have 
contended that these were active powers, capable of develop- 
ing into real beings by the operation of natural laws, with- 
out the special intervention of the Creator. Their oppo- 
nents, Burton, Woods, et al., assert that these potentialities 
were passive only, capable of receiving forms, but requiring 
the direct action of God to bring the form into existence. 
Here lies the crux of the problem. Were the rationes semi- 
nales active powers, able to produce effects of themselves, 
supported only by the divine concursus; or, were they pas- 
sive only, incapable of effecting anything, without the direct 
action of God? All hinges about this question. 


In view of the scholarly studies that have already ap- 
peared it might seem that the field had been poo UB Ay 


uae especially the articles by Fathers Hornsby and Tig 
S.J., in the American Ecclesiastical Review. 


1x 


gone over and that nothing new, of importance, could be 
added to it. However, a careful review of the available 
matter has convinced the writer otherwise. The only ex- 
tended study that has this particular problem for its pur- 
pose is that of Father Woods; the others either treat of the 
general attitude of the Church towards evolutionism, and 
only mention Augustine to support their thesis, as, for 
instance, the works of Mivart, Zahm, Wasmann, Dorlodot, 
etc., or they are general studies of the philosophy or 
theology of St. Augustine, that touch only incidentally this 
particular problem. Such studies are necessarily brief and 
inadequate. Dorlodot’s work is scholarly but his enthusi- 
asm for evolutionism leads him to conclusions which must 
be questioned. Father Woods goes to the other extreme. 
and presents an interpretation with which the writer cannot 
agree. A middle way between these two extremes has been 
suggested by certain French writers but none of them has 
developed the subject in a satisfactory manner.** For 
these reasons the writer with the sanction of the Depart- 
ment of Philosophy of the Catholic University undertook 
to make a more thorough study of Augustine’s cosmological 
system than has hitherto been attempted and to present a 
clear explanation of the disputed rationes seminales in 
modern terminology. ; 

As has been stated before, the crux of the whole question 
lies in the meaning of these rationes seminales. This, then, 
is the precise and definite purpose of this study, to deter- 
mine the meaning of the terms, as conceived by Augustine 
and by doing so to arrive at a knowledge of his theories 
regarding the origin and development of living things. 
Thamiry points out that the bishop uses this idea of the 
rationes seminales to explain intellectual and moral develop- 
ment also, but this use does not interest us here. We are 
concerned only with its application to the problems of 
Cosmology. Naturally, the solution of these problems has 
a direct bearing on the question of Augustine and Evolu- 
tion. The present study, however, is not in any way an 
investigation of the theory of evolution. It holds no brief 
for or against that doctrine. In the final chapter an effort 


“ Cfr. the works of Thamiry and Boyer in the gen. bibliography. 


is made to decide how far Augustine can justly be invoked 
to support the general theory of descent with modification, | 
but it is not intended thereby to prove or disprove the 
theory itself. Neither does the writer intend to explain the 
use of the theory of the rationes seminales by any other 
authors, before or after the time of Augustine. Whenever 
references are made to them it is solely for the purpose of 
shedding light on the main issue. The general plan fol- 
lowed has been to present the various phases of the problem 
in their logical order and then to find for each a solution 
in the original text of Augustine himself. Reference is 
then made to other authors, particularly St. Thomas, for a 
confirmation of the interpretation offered. Opposing opin- 
ions, especially those of modern authors, are next studied 
and if possible answered. St. Thomas is of course the great 
interpreter of St. Augustine, and consequently, wherever 
possible, his interpretation of any given statement from 
Augustine is given precedence over all others. The attitude 
of St. Thomas towards the theory of the rationes seminales 
has itself been a source of dispute among commentators. 
It is not proposed to settle that question here. Special at- 
tention has been given to the opinions of Dorlodot and 
Woods, since they are the most recent statements on the 
subject. Throughout the discussion the argument from 
authority is made secondary to the argument based on 
Augustine’s own statements. 


To accomplish the purposes of this study the work has 
been divided into five chapters. The first is general. Its 
purpose is to show the influences that contributed to the 
formation of Augustine’s thought, the general outlines of 
his philosophy and the particular interest which he had in 
the problem of Genesis. A few helpful suggestions in 
finding and understanding the prolific doctor’s cosmological 
theories are likewise given. Since Augustine was not the 
first to use the theory of the rationes seminales but merely 
adapted it to his needs after it had undergone a long period 
of development, the second chapted is devoted to a study 
of this development. The question of the nature of rationes 
seminales is separated from that concerning their origin 
and development. In the third chapter, the first part of the 


XI 


-problem is studied. It involves an investigation into Augus- 
tine’s use of the terms rationes seminales, of their physical 
nature, the important question as to their powers, whether 
active or passive, and the manner in which future beings 
are contained in them. The fourth chapter deals with the 
origin of the rationes seminales, St. Augustine’s concept of 
creation and the manner in which things came into exist- 
ence, his teaching regarding divine administration and the 
operation of secondary causes and the nature of miracles 
likewise comes in here. <A study is also made of the order 
postulated by Augustine for the appearance of things on 
this earth. A very important part of this chapter is the 
section, dealing with man, his origin and appearance upon 
this earth. The fifth and last chapter of the book is entitled 
Augustine and Evolution. By applying the conclusions 
arrived at in the two previous chapters, a solution is found 
for the question: Was Augustine an evolutionist? This is 
in some respects the most important part of the book. While 
the controversy has centered around the meaning of the 
rationes seminales, the purpose has been to determine 
whether Augustine’s authority could be called upon to sup- 
port the theory of evolution or not. To many the answer 
given may seem to lack definiteness, but since evolutionism 
in its modern aspects dates back only to the time of La- 
marck, it can hardly be expected that Augustine could have 
taken a definite attitude toward it sixteen’ centuries ago. 

In a study of this kind there is a natural tendency to 
read into an author one’s own preconceived notions. The 
contradictory opinions attributed to St. Augustine amply 
demonstrate this truth. The writer has sought earnestly 
to avoid this tendency. He has never been an enthusiast 
for or against evolutionism and does not begin this study 
with the hope of proving any pet theory. It-is with the 
hope of shedding some light on the teachings of a great 
saint and scholar and to advance a step nearer to the solu- 
tion of a vexed question that he undertakes the work. 

The texts from St. Augustine, quoted throughout this 
work, unless otherwise designated, are from the Benedic- 
tine Edition (Paris, 1679-1690), reedited and included in 


Xil 


the Migne Patrologiae Cursus Completus, vols. XXXII- 
XLVII. Comparisons have been made with the Corpus 
scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum, published in Vienna, 
but in no case have essential differences been noted. The 
texts from St. Thomas have been derived from various edi- 
tions and these are indicated in the bibliography. 


xiii 


CHAPTER I 
ST. AUGUSTINE 


1. THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE 


The Roman Empire, at the time of St. Augustine; pre- 
sents a spectacle of confusion. The disintegration which 
was to result in the complete dissolution of the political 
organization of the Caesars had already set in. Corruption, 
dissension and disloyalty had weakened it from within and 
from without the barbarian masses from the North were 
disputing its sway. In 410, the undisciplined forces of 
Alaric were clamoring at the gates of Rome and the Van- 
dals were surging around the walls of Hippo when its great 
bishop breathed his last in August, 430 A. D. Pagan licen- 
tiousness was making its last stand against the Christian 
principles of self-denial and pagan culture was about to 
succumb to the crude civilization of the Goths. 

Christianity had been victorious in its struggle for recog- 
nition. Heresy, however, was rife and the leaders in the 
Church were devoting their energies and talents to clarify- 
ing and defending her doctrines. The Eastern Fathers 
with their genius for metaphysical speculation attempted 
to express these doctrines in terms of philosophical exact- 
ness, while the more practical-minded Western thinkers 
studied them in the light of Apostolic tradition and faith. 
It was reserved for the brilliant mind of Augustine to com- 
bine the two and produce a body of thought that was to 
leave a permanent mark upon the development of~ the 
Church. | 

The struggle between new and old ideas quite naturally 
extended to the field of philosophy. The schools of Alex- 
andria had witnessed the first attempts to effect a recon- 
ciliation between the philosophies of the Greeks and the 
teaching of Christ. The distinction between Philosophy 
and Theology was not yet realized. The self-sufficiency of 


1 


reason was pitted against the necessity of revelation in 
arriving at truth. “The third century saw the rise of Neo- 
Platonism, the final utterance of the speculative genius of 
Greece.”! That utterance is important for our study be- 
cause of the influence which it was to have in the formation 
of Augustine, at the end of the following century. The 
founder of this system of thought, Plotinus, was from Alex- 
andria, but he wrote his Hnneads at Rome. In it he attempts 
to harmonize the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle and Zeno. 
Penetrating the whole system is a spirit of oriental mysti- 
cism. Christian writers used it to support their doctrine 
of a spiritual world, and some of them adopted it almost 
in its entirety. 

Of special interest to us because of its similarity to Au- 
gustine’s doctrine of the rationes seminales is the teaching 
regarding the World-Soul which emanates from the Nous 
and which is the activating principle of the world. In this — 
World-Soul are the generative principles (Ad yo.) of sensible 
nature. These are but a reflection of the archetypes, exist- 
ing eternally in the Novs. The world of ‘sense has reality 
only in so far as it bears the mark of its ideal archetype. 
Plotinus rejects dualism; for him spirit is the only reality. 
We shall see that this differs from Augustine’s theory in 
several important respects; nevertheless, there is in the 
idea of the archetypes and the formative principles the 
germ of the latter’s system. 


While the influence of Plato was thus being extended by 
Plotinus and his followers, that of Aristotle was gradually 
disappearing. His works, particularly his Logic, were still 
accepted texts at Alexandria and to a lesser extent at 
Athens, but in the Western world they were scarcely 
known. Augustine makes but three allusions to them 
throughout his writings and it seems probable that the only 
work of the Stagyrite with which he was at all familiar 
was the Categories which he read in his twentieth year.” 
In the De Civitate Dei, he refers to Aristotle as “vir 
excellentis ingenit et eloquii,” but ““Platoni quidem impar.’”? 





‘Burgh: The Legacy of the Ancient World, 286. 
~Gonf.ilV, cc, XVI. : cS 
* De Civ. Dei, VIL et OX ay 


bo 


The Greek Fathers, Basil and Gregory, had studied the 
works of the master at Athens and accepted him as their 
guide. The former had made a thorough investigation of 
the natural science of the Greeks and their various cos- 
mogonies and had embodied his results in his work on the 
Hexaemeron. St. Ambrose of Milan had modeled his own 
treatise on the creation after that of Basil, and as Augus- 
tine was undoubtedly familiar with the works of the Bishop 
of Milan, it is probable that in this indirect way he became 
acquainted with the cosmological theories of Aristotle. 

With the decline of Greek philosophy there was a corre- 
sponding lessening of interest in the natural sciences. Aris- 
totle had formulated principles of scientific investigation - 
and his pupil, Theophrastus, had applied them in his re- 
markable studies on plants. Dioscorides, a surgeon under 
Nero, and Gallen, physician to the Emperor, Marcus Aure- 
lius, had both made advances in the field of medicine. Since 
they wrote in Greek, their work did not have among the 
Latins the influence which was exerted by the work of 
Pliny the Elder (23-79). His was a vast but unscientific 
compilation of fact and fiction which was nevertheless for 
a long time the recognized Natural History of Latin 
scholars. At the time of Augustine, the interest of learned 
men was so absorbed by philosophical and theological prob- 
lems that little attention was given to natural science. They 
learned and accepted the natural lore that had been handed 
down largely through the work of Pliny but made no effort 
to verify or extend it. 

St. Augustine had great respect for the science of nature 
and insisted that interpreters of the Scriptures should 
attribute nothing to Revelation which was contrary to the 
proved teachings of natural scientists. Martin describes 
his. attitude toward the natural sciences thus: “Saint Au- 
gustin ne tourna jamais expressément son effort vers 
étude de la physique et de l’histoire. I] se contenta de 
S’initier 4 ceeque les hommes de son temps savaient de l’une 
et de l’autre. I] n’acquit donc jamais des connaissances 
curieuses de savant, et jamais non plus, il ne fut dominé 
par la préoccupation de découvrir les secrets du monde 





*The Development of the Sciences, Chap. VI, Biology by Woodruff. 
3 


extérieur. Mais lorsque les savants avaient pour eux 
Yexpérience, il entendait qu’on ne leur opposat ni une 
autorité, ni des principes; il voyait aussi que la science 
n’atteint pas le fond méme des choses; et infin, il aurait été 
merveilleusement en état de bien juger toutes les découvertes 
ou toutes les nouveautes scientifiques, et de seconder en 
philosophie le progrés de la science.’’® 

A review of the scientific doctrines of Aristotle which 
were current in Augustine’s time reveals the fact that many 
of the principles which have entered into the discussion of 
modern evolutionary problems were known to the Greek 
master and his predecessors. In the writings of the 
Stagyrite, we find clearly expressed the principle of grada- 
tion in nature, viz., that nature proceeds from the imper- 
fect to the perfect. This probably was confined to the de- 
velopment of the individual, and it is very unlikely that 
the idea of the development of more perfect forms from 
less perfect forms were included. The Aristotelian prin- 
ciple of potentia and actus is likewise involved, particularly 
in the theories proposed by the geneticists. It is a meta- 
physical principle explaining the progress of continuity due 
to certain potentialities which under the proper influences 
become actual. The modern problem of adaptation, whether 
due to purpose or chance, is likewise discussed by Aristotle 
who decides quite definitely in favor of purposive adapta- 
tion. Evolutionism generally considers man as the final 
product in a series of transformations. Aristotle’s view. 
was, given the gradations in nature, man stands at the 
head and all the inferior forms are for his service. The 
clash between Darwinism and Geneticism was foreshadowed 
by a difference of opinion between Empedocles and Aris- 
totle. The former contended that survival depended on 
the animal’s ability to adjust itself to its surroundings; the 
latter held that the principle of perfection was within the 
organism. , 

It will be found that many of these principles are used 
by Augustine in his system. For him, too, the progress 
of nature is a continuous development from what is poten- 


* Martin: St. Augustin, p. 281. 
* De Coelo, I, 4, 271A, 3 


tial to what is actual. This progress is from the imperfect 
to the perfect in virtue of an internal principle. Man also 
is the most perfect being and all things else are for him 
while he is for God. Just how much of this Augustine 
derived from Aristotle it is impossible to say, since some 
of these ideas are contained in other Greek cosmogonies. 
Naturally, in his conception of God, of creation and of the 
relation of creatures to the Creator, Augustine is far supe- 
rior to any of the Greeks. 

Even though Augustine has come down to us as a theo- 
logian rather than as a philosopher because of the fact that 
his efforts were devoted almost exclusively to the service 
of Christianity, nevertheless if an enduring and patient 
search for the truth marks the philosopher, then indeed 
the Bishop of Hippo was one. From his nineteenth year, 
when the burning words of Cicero fired his soul, until the 
end of his life his one great passion was to know the truth. 
When in the course of his development he reached the con- 
viction that God was the source and measure of all truth, 
and that his own most important duty was to learn the 
relationship which he had with that God, the motive power 
of his life became the desire to know God and himself. 
“Deum et animam cupio scire,” he cries in his Soliloquies, 
“Nithilne plus? Nihil omnino. Deus, semper idem, noverim 
me, noverim te.”’ Regarding the effect produced on his 
mind by the reading of the MHortensius, he _ says: 
“Ego ab usque undevigesimo anno aetatis meae, postquam 
in schola rhetoris librum illum Ciceronis, qui Hortensisus 
vocatur, accepi, tanto amore philosophiae succensus sum, 
ut statim ad eam transferre meditarer.”? He acknowledges 
too that it was this same book that led him to God: “Tile 
vero liber mutavit affectum meum et ad te ipsum, domine, 
mutavit preces meas et vota ac desideria mea fecit alia.’ 
We shall see this same philosophical spirit pervading all 
his words. 


2. THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTINE 
If Augustine’s philosophical attitude was inspired by the 
* Soliloquia, Lib. I, c. II, and Lib. II, c. IV. 


*De Beata Vita, c. I 
° Conf. Lib. III, c. IV. 


Hortensius, the content of his system was the result of two 
different influences, Christianity and Platonism. He tells 
us in his Confessions that he first learned to know and love 
the name of Christ from his mother,!® and as long as he 
remained at home this Christian influence was dominant. 
However, at Madaura and even more so at Carthage, pagan 
teachers and corrupt morals gradually weakened the faith 
that was in him. As Boyer remarks, pagan teaching drove 
Christianity from his mind, and sensual love drove it from 
his heart.11 Still it was a latent reverence for the name 
of Christ that kept him from turning completely to the 
pagan Greek philosophy when his interest was aroused 
therein by the reading of the Hortensius.’? As a sort of 
compromise he turned to Manichaeism, attracted by its 
promise to provide the knowledge for which he longed. He 
never submitted to it entirely and after nine years, disap- 
pointed in his hopes, he rejected it. It seemed to him better 
than the others, but that was all. “Et ieram per vias pravas 
superstitione sacrilega,’ he writes, “non quidam certus in 
ea sed quast praeponens eam ceteris.’* Discouraged by the 
failure of Manichaeism, he sought refuge for a time in the 
partial skepticism of the Academies.** Still there remained 
in him the confident hope that truth was attainable, and 
when he arrived at Milan and listened to Ambrose that 
hope was revived. 

It seems certain in spite of the arguments of Harnack 
and others (cfr. n. 2) that Augustine’s submission to the 
Church preceded his adoption of Platonism. Convinced of 
the legitimacy of the Church’s authority he submitted unre- 
servedly to her teaching. Afterwards his philosophic atti- 
tude led him to seek an explanation for the doctrines of the 
Church in the light of Platonic principles. Montgomery 
says: “He tells us in the Dialogue Contra Acad., III, 48, he 
had already made the decision to believe, on the grounds of 
authority. The question which remained—the question 
raised by the Academic Skepticism with which we find him 





* Conf. Lib. I, c. XI. 

“ Boyer: La Formation de St. Augustin, p. 30. 
~~ Gont, Lib ALI ear, 

* Conf. Lib. VIII, c. VII. 

TAG Gala Dea oreo ok 


still wrestling earnestly in the Dialogues—was whether a 
purely intellectual certainty could be reached. The deter- 
mination to believe stood fast, but the restless intellect 
ceaselessly endeavored to reach the same conclusions along 
its own lines.’®> Augustine understood clearly the relation 
between reason and authority. His attitude is summed up 
in the conclusion of the work against the Academics. “Nulla 
autem dubium est gemino pondere nos impellt ad discendum, 
auctoritatis atque rationis. Mihi autem certum est nusquam 
prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere: non enim 
reperio valentiorem. Quod autem subtilissima ratione 
persequendum est; ita enim jam sum affectus, ut quid sit 
verum, non credendo solum sed etiam intelligendo appre- 
hendere impatienter desiderem; apud Platonicos me interim 
quod sacris nostris non repugnet reperturum esse confido.”’° 
After personally enduring the agony of doubt for many 
years and observing the contradictory opinions and endless 
disputes of those philosophers who depended only on rea- 
son, Augustine sought the sure refuge of competent author- 
ity to attain the truth. Having found the truth, he sought 
to grasp it with his intellect. This is the principle expressed 
by the Scholastics in the phrase credo ut intelligam. 
However, he realized fully the importance of reason. 
While in acquiring knowledge we accept things first on 
authority, still in fact reason comes first. ‘“‘Ad discendum 
item necessario dupliciter ducimur, auctoritate atque 
ratione. Tempore auctoritas, re autem ratio prior est.’’!7 
Before accepting anything on authority, we determine by 
reason whether the authority is credible. “Quis non videat, 
prius esse cogitare quam credere? Nullus quippe. credit 
aliquid, nist prius cogitaverit esse credendum.’’'® With 
Christianity and Platonism as his authorities, Augustine 
set himself to the task of working out a system of philoso- 
phy. Since the former was divine and the latter human, 
in case of conflict, the human had to give way to the divine. 
He accepted the principles of Platonism in so far as they 


*W. Montgomery: St. Augustine, Aspects of His Life and 
Thought, p. 64. 

* Contra Acad. III, XX. 

™ De Ordine, Lib. II, c. IX. 

* De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, c. II. 


7 


could be reconciled with Christianity and rejected those 
that could not. 

Janet and Seailles mention six important principles in 
Augustine’s system which are common to Christianity and 
to Platonism.’® They are: 1. The world is the work of 
God’s goodness; 2. Time is the image of eternity; 3. The 
world and time began at the same moment; prior to the 
existence of the world there was no time; 4. Evil is some- 
thing negative, the negation of good; 5. Man’s greatest 
happiness is found in union with God; 6. Happiness is the 
reward of virtue; misery, that of vice. Evil comes from 
man. God permits it and in His providence can turn it 
into good. On the other hand, Augustine rejected as con- 
trary to Christian philosophy the Platonic doctrine regard- 
ing the nature of God and His relation to man; the origin 
of the soul and its union with the body; the destiny of the 
soul; creation and the origin and purpose of the world.”° 


It is certain that Augustine held Platonic philosophy in 
the highest esteem. His terminology and many of his theo- 
ries even taken in whole or in part from it.”! Still its influ- 
ence has probably been exaggerated. As he grew older he 
turned more and more away from the pagan philosophers 
and to the Scriptures.’? , In his Retractationes he admits 
that his praise for Plato and his followers was excessive.?? 
As early as the year 390, in his defense of the true religion, 
he says that Plato’s writing is more pleasing than persua- 
sive.°* While the great Bishop is philosophical in thought, 
still it is true that he never made a clear-cut distinction 
between philosophy and theology. It remained for the 
Scholastics of the thirteenth century to accomplish this 
task. 


Such then were the attitude and the influences under 
which Augustine attempted to work out the problems that 
confronted him. These problems can be reduced to three 
heads: 1. What is the first cause of all beings that are 


” Histoire de La Phil., p. 820. 

“ Nourrisson: Philosophie de St. Augustin, vol. 1, Dp. Gee 
*“ Contra Acad. Lib. III, e. XVIII. 

* Conf. Lib: VII, ¢. XXI- 

* Retract. Lib. I, c. I. 

* De Vera Relig. Lib. I, c. II. 


8 


included in nature? 2. What is the source of knowledge 
and of truth? 38. What is the highest good and the purpose 
of life? This division was of special interest to him be- 
cause he saw in it an image of the Trinity, the answers to 
the questions being reducible to the one object, God. Since 
God can be known only in the soul, the ultimate aim of 
philosophy for him was to know God and the soul.** How- 
ever, taking the questions separately the first is of special 
importance in this study. It is Augustine’s answer to the 
question of the origin and development of the world and its 
beings, found in his interpretation of the first chapters of 
Genesis, that we have attempted to set forth in the follow- 
ing pages. His interest in this question will be discussed 
separately. 

In regard to the possibility of acquiring knowledge, Au- 
gustine denied the assertion of the Academy that only 
probability could be attained and held that certitude is 
possible.2® Man acquires knowledge in two ways, through 
the data of the senses and by introspection. He considered 
the senses trustworthy and he held that the mind passing 
from the evidence of the senses to its causes would ulti- 
mately arrive at the source of truth in God.** By introspec- 
tion he did not mean immediate intuition of God in the 
sense of the Ontologists, but a study of our intellectual 
processes as revealing the certainty of our existence and 
ultimately that of God.** All things exist according to 
plans present from all eternity in the mind of God. These 
he called rationes aeternae, rationes causales or rationes 
primordiales. The last two terms are also applied by him 
to these plans implanted by God in nature. However, he 
makes a sharp distinction between these two kinds of exist- 
ence. Man by his senses or intellect perceives these plans 
as they exist in things but not as they exist in God, as the 
Ontologists hold. There is evidence here of Platonic influ- 
ence, but Augustine’s conception of the origin and function 


” De Civitate Dei, Lib. XI, c.XXV. 


* Cfr. Turner: History of Philosophy, p. 226 ff.; also Ueberwegs: 
Geschichte der ‘Philosophie, vol. II, p. 157. 


™ De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. IV, c. XXXII. 
* De Vera Relig., c. XXXIX ff. 


9 


of the ideas is quite different from that of Plato.*® As God 
is the cause of all things and the source of all truth, so too 
He is the highest Good. Man’s greatest happiness is to 
know God and for that he is destined. He must so live here 
that he may attain that happiness hereafter. Virtue is the 
art of living rightly.*° 

We have seen that one of the three divisions of Augus- 
tine’s philosophy deals with the problem of the cause of the 
beings that comprise nature. The question of the cause in 
itself did not offer him much difficulty. The consideration 
of the world had led him to the unchangeable truth, God. 
The imperfection of the one compared with the absolute 
perfection of the other had brought him to the conviction 
' that the world and God were distinct and that the former 
was dependent for its existence upon the latter. His Chris- 
tian and Platonic influences revealed to him the idea of 
creation and he readily accepted the truth that God made 
all things out of nothing. For him there was no possibility 
of emanation, or of eternal matter. The origin of the world 
did not mean the formation of the world out of preexisting 
matter, but the making of something out of nothing. At 
this point, however, his difficulties began. The questions, 
how did God create the world, what was its original form 
and how did it reach its present form, perplexed him for 
many years. 


3. AUGUSTINE’S INTEREST IN GENESIS 


In the fourth century, interest in the natural sciences 
was at a low ebb. Since the time of Aristotle very little 
progress had been made in the investigation of natural 
facts. On the other hand, it was an age of religious contro- 
versy due largely to the rapid spread of Christianity. With 
this went a keen interest in the Bible. Consequently it was 
rather in the Scriptures than in nature that an answer was 
sought to the questions proposed above. The first two 
chapters of Genesis became the textbook of Cosmology for 
the Fathers and their antagonists. St. Augustine was in 
this respect true to the spirit of his age. He was not 





| n Boyer: L’Idée de Vérité; Conclusion, p. 253. 
* Martin: St. Augustin, p. 234 seq. 


a) 


particularly interested in science but he respected it and 
throughout his work he shows that he was well acquainted 
with the scientific theories of his day.** He was, however, 
intensely interested in the creation account in Genesis. He 
tells us in his Confessions how he pondered over the mean- 
ing of the “days” and how he prayed for enlightenment on 
this subject. “Audiam et intelligam, quomodo in principio 
fecisti caelum et terram. Scripsit hoc Moyses, scripsit et 
abut, transwt hinc a te ad te neque nunc ante me est. Nam 
si esset, tenerem eum et rogarem eum et per te obsecrarem, 
ut mihi ista panderet, et praeberem aures corporis mei sonis 
erumpentibus ex ore ejus.”*? Even in the City of God, 
written at a much later period, he still complains of the 
difficulty he has in understanding the “days.”** 

The first work in which Augustine treats ex professo of 
these chapters of Genesis is the De Genesi Contra Mani- 
chaeos. It was written in the year 389, but two years after 
his Baptism and while he was living with his friends in his 
solitude near Tagaste. The purpose of it was to defend 
the Scriptures, particularly the Old Testament, against the 
charges of the Manichaeans. He refers to it thus in the 
Retractationes: “Isti tamen duo libri apertissime adversus 
eos editi sunt in defensionem veteris legis, quam vehementi 
studio vesam erroris oppugnant.’”** Ambrose had shown 
the young rhetorician the possibility of giving to many of 
the passages of the Old Law a spiritual or symbolical mean- 
ing. This manner of interpretation allowed wider scope to 
his natural literary tendency, and he uses it almost exclu- 
sively in this work against the Manichaeans. He tells us 
that at this time he did not dare to give a literal explana- 
tion. “Cum de Genesi duos libros contra Manichaeos con- 
didissem; quoniam secundum allegoricam significationem 
Scripturae verba tractaveram, non ausus naturalium rerum 
tanta secreta ad litteram exponere, —.’*® This work con- 
sequently is not of great importance in our present study. 

Four years later, in the year 393, Augustine made his 


COs Tab. Vc:-V. 
ll ore Bl he. @ PR ee AaB 
rob CenibsvAl ¢.: V1, 
“ Retract. Lib. I, c. X. 
=] bec.Lib: I, c. XVIII. 


11 


first attempt to give a literal interpretation of Genesis. He 
soon realized that he was not yet ready for the task and 
abandoned it. ‘“Volwi,’ he says, “experiri in hoc quoque 
negotiosissimo ac difficillimo opere quid valerem; sed in 
Scripturis exponendis tirocinium meum sub tanta sarcinae 
mole succubuit.’** When the unfinished work came into 
his hands at a later period he decided to destroy it, but 
afterwards changed his mind and ordered that it be included 
in his works under the title De Genesi Ad Litteram Imper- 
fectus, liber unus., in order that it might be an “index— 
non inutilis rudimentorum meorum in enucleandis atque 
scrutandis divinis eloquiis.’** Since a subsequent attempt, 
made almost ten years later, was successful, Augustine 
makes no effort to correct or defend this incomplete book, 
simply referring his reader to the latter work. The liber 
imperfectus is of importance, therefore, only in showing 
the development of Augustine’s thought. 

The next discussion of this subject is found in the last 
three books of his Confessions, published about the year 
400. There are numerous references to Moses and Genesis 
throughout this work, but in Books XI to XIII he considers 
these chapters exclusively. “A primo usque ad decimum de 
me scripti sunt: in tribus caeteris, de Scripturis sanctis.’’** 
The reason for including this discussion in this work is not 
at first obvious, but Gibb and Montgomery suggest that: 
“Having described in Book X his religious and moral con- 
dition at the time of writing, Augustine next proceeds to 
outline what might be called, in modern phraseology, his 
‘theological position.’ To do so in the form of an exposition 
of Gen. I was quite in accordance with the customs of the 
time.’*® There is in this treatment a mingling of the alle- 
gorical and literal interpretations and it is animated by the 
same mystical spirit which pervades the whole work. 

The matured opinions of Augustine on the meaning of 
Genesis, the result of years of serious thought, are found 
in the twelve books of the De Genesi ad Litteram. He began 


eal Sy 5 ‘Lib. 1 yc AB 


” The Confessions of Augustine, by Gibb and Montgomery Intro. 
to Bk. XI. 


12 


this in 401 and did not complete it until 415. In it he 
abandons the allegorical interpretation and tries to give 
the literal meaning of the words. In the following pages 
I have attempted an exposition and explanation of his con- 
clusions expressed in this work. The author’s narration 
covers the history of Genesis from the beginning to the 
expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise. It is most 
thoroughly done, every possible point at issue being con- 
sidered. As the Admonitio in the Benedictine edition of 
Augustine’s works says: “Non praeterit ullum apicem, nihil 
quod non omni ratione verset penitiusque rimetur.”’** His 
purpose is to show that there is nothing in this history that 
is not literally true, nothing that is contrary to reason or to 
nature. Here and there his exuberant spirit has led him 
into discussions that seem unnecessary, as for instance, in 
the second book, where he refers to the Genethliaci,** or in 
the fourth, to the perfection of the number six, etc. The 
twelfth book is a discussion of the heavenly paradise and of 
the vision of St. Paul. 

While there is much in the work that is original there is 
no doubt that Augustine was influenced by previous inter- 
pretations of the Fathers, especially those of the Greek 
Fathers, St. Gregory and St. Basil.*#? However, Augustine’s 
exposition far surpasses that of the other Fathers. Zahm, 
comparing Gregory and Augustine, says: “But wonderful 
as were the scientific intuitions of St. Gregory of Nyssa, 
they were eclipsed by those of the illustrious Latin Doctor, 
EMA URIStINeL cL) But, distinguished as he (Gregory) 
was among the exegetists of his day, and notwithstanding 
the fact that he was facile princeps among the intellectual 
giants of his time and race, the Bishop of Nyssa had neither 
the genius nor the erudition nor the comprehensiveness 
of view that we admire in the prelate of Hippo.’’** In our 
present study, therefore, the De Genesi ad Literam is by 
far the most important of all Augustine’s works. 

In the De Civitate Dei, Augustine again returns to his 


* Admonitio, De Gen. ad Lit., Benedictine Edition, edition by 
Migne. 

“De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. II, c. XVII. 

“Dorlodot: Darwinism and Catholic Thought, p. 80. 

“Zahm: Bible, Science and Faith, p. 70. 


13 


= 


favorite subject of Genesis. In the eleventh Book, where 
he begins his discussion of the two cities, he devotes several 
chapters to the Mosaic account of the creation.** In it he 
answers the objections against the theory of creation based 
on a conception of the previous existence of time and space. 
He also goes into the meaning of days and an explanation 
of light. In the following Book he speaks of the origin and 
unity of the human race and the duration of the world.*® 
There are also several chapters important for our study in 
the third Book of the De Trinitate, where Augustine gives 
an explanation of miracles and incidentally makes clear his 
distinction between the ordinary providence of God and the 
extraordinary. This involves, too, his doctrine on the 
operation of secondary causes.** The Retractationes, con- 
taining Augustine’s final comments on his own works, are 
of course important. It is noteworthy that in reviewing 
the De Genesi ad Litteram the aged doctor makes only a 
few very minor corrections, showing that the opinions 
expressed there were retained to the end of his life.*’ 
Thus if there are disputes regarding the doctrines of 
Augustine, they are not caused by lack of evidence. Besides 
the many lengthy discussions just mentioned there are 
references to some phase or other of this problem in many 
of his minor works and in several of his letters. In fact 
the very abundance of the matter may be a hindrance rather 
than a help. At times the searcher in these works finds 
himself engulfed, not knowing how to bring order in it all. 
It is only by a thorough acquaintance with the mind and 
style of the doctor that one is able to understand his doc- 
trines and present them clearly. There is much difference 
between the style and method of Augustine and that of 
Thomas Aquinas. The former lacks the precise terminology, 
the orderly method and the simple construction of the latter. 
In the writings of the rhetorician, we find a frequent use 
of the antithetic construction*® to secure emphasis; word 
plays are numerous—“Modo et modo non habebant 


“ De Civitate: Det, Lib, XI, cc. IV; V, VI, VIE: Tx eee 
~ Lib, XII, ce. IV, V, X, XIDOXTITO XV, © XT OX Reece 
“De Trimt. Lib. III, ec. IV-X. 

“ Retract. Lib. II, c. XXIV. 

“De Gen ad Lit., Lib. VI, c. VI. 


14 


modum’’*—and his use of the metaphor is one of the most 
striking features of his style. Montgomery calls attention 
to expressions that have a truly modern ring. ‘One had 
supposed that the phrase ‘swelled head’ was a piece of very 
‘modern slang, but it is difficult not to think of it when you 
read, ‘nimis inflata facies claudebat oculos meos,’ and the 
additional touch suggesting why this condition should result 
in blindness has a value of its own.”®® The richness and 
variety of his wording and phraseology adds beauty indeed 
to his language, but it also makes it the more difficult to 
understand and the interpreter who depends upon isolated 
words or sentences is very apt to get the wrong impression. 
Extensive reading and serious reflection are necessary for 
the student who would obtain a correct understanding of 
Augustine’s thought and principles. 

The conclusions attributed to Augustine in the following 
pages are for the most part those which he himself derived 
from his consideration of the Scriptures. It will be well, 
therefore, to explain briefly his attitude towards the re- 
vealed writings and his principles of interpretation. First 
of all he believed that careful study was a necessary pre- 
requisite for anyone who would understand and explain 
Scripture. He reminds those who boasted that they could 
do this without such instruction, that it was from human 
teachers that they themselves learned to read.*! This 
instruction ought to embrace the languages in which the 
Scripture is written, Hebrew and Greek. A general knowl- 
edge of history with which the events narrated in the Bible 
can be related, an acquaintance with the conditions sur- 
rounding the sacred writer for a correct understanding of 
allusions, references, etc., were likewise essential.°? The 
proper object of exegesis is to discover what the author 
actually meant.°® In this respect he is not as strict as 
modern critics demand. He says, for instance: ‘‘While, 
therefore, every one endeavors to understand the Scrip- 
tures in the sense intended by him who wrote them, what 


” Conf. VIII, XII. 

*° Montgomery: St. Augustine, p. 29. 
* De Doct. Christ. Prol. 4. 

PaLbid. Lib. Li, c, uix. 

“Conf. Lib. XII, c. XVIII. 


15 


harm is it if he understands something that is true, even 
if the author intended some other truth?’®+ Obscure pas- 
sages are to be explained in the light of others whose 
meaning is plainer.®® He is fond of allegorisation, but he 
insists that the allegorical sense must be based on the 
literal sense.°* Comparing the truths of Scripture with 
the facts of science, he insists there can be no contradiction 
between them. He advises theologians to be careful not to 
assert as certain that which is uncertain®’ and assures them 
that it can be shown that whatever is demonstrated to be 
true from nature is not contrary to the Scriptures; on the 
other hand, we can show or readily believe to be false any- 
thing that is contrary to our faith, for God would not 
deceive us by false teaching.®** ‘Miracles, he holds, are pos- 
sible and consistent with God’s plans, but we are not to 
look for them in the ordinary course of nature.*® 


* Tbid. 
* De Doct. Christ., Lib. Il, ce. XIV. 
°° Sermo II, ec. VI. 
™ De Gen ad Int., opus imperfectum, Lib. IX, ec. XXX. 
°° De Gen. ad Lit., Lib ee Al, 
Sy LG bdbes byes XVII. This point is discussed more at length 
in chapter V of ‘this work. 


— 
Cc 


CHAPTER II 
THE THEORY OF THE RATIONES SEMINALES 
1. BEFORE THE TIME OF ST. AUGUSTINE 


St. Augustine was not the first to use the term Ratio 
Seminalis. It is found in earlier Latin writers and also in 
its literal equivalent in Greek philosophies. The theory 
itself in modified forms goes back to a very early date. It 
Survived and was used in various Ways even up to recent 
times. In this chapter an effort will be made to trace its 
history both as a preparation for the particular study of 
St. Augustine and to show its subsequent importance. 

From the very beginning men have observed the action 
and reaction going on in things round about them. They 
have experienced likewise the influence of conflicting forces 
within themselves and the possibility of exerting their own 
powers upon things outside of themselves. The effort to 
explain these forces and their reciprocal action, the problem 
of changing and becoming, has ever been the basis of 
philosophy. The relation of these activities with ourselves 
and a supreme being or beings has likewise been involved 
in this problem. The earlier pagan philosophies attempted 
a solution of the difficulty by identifying this activity with 
God and thus they fell into pantheism. Later when Chris- 
tianity was introduced, it opposed monism and taught that 
God and the world are really distinct, though it is by God’s 
power that the world is kept in existence and that activity 
is possible. We have, therefore, two explanations of imma- 
nent action. The first, the pantheistic explanation, is called 
absolute immanence; the second, the christian explanation, 
is called relative immanence. The defenders of both opin- 
ions have had recourse to the rationes seminales.* 

The earliest Greek philosophers of whom we have record 
attributed the origin of things to water, air or fire. They 


*Cfr. Thamiry: De Rationibus Seminalibus, p. 9. 
17 


endowed the material element with a kind of life and thus 
their system is called Hylozoism. Thales, about 620 B. C., 
is said to have taught that the beginning of all things was 
water and that the earth is floating on water. Anaximines, 
in the succeeding century, held that air is the source of 
everything. The air is God, he said, and is immense, infi- 
nite and always in motion.2, Empedocles was the first to 
speak of the four elements, earth, air, fire and water. The 
constant motion of these, induced by love and hate, is the 
cause of all things that exist. We have evidence here of 
the conception of a germinal development. Anaxagoras, 
circ. 500 B. C., rejected the idea of the four elements and 
taught that there was an infinite number of prime sub- 
stances, which were eternal, but ‘of themselves inert. Their 
movement was caused and controlled by Nois, a thinking 
rational essence. He calls these primary substances, seeds, 
Srépuara. This is, as far as we know, the first instance of 
the use of this word. The exact nature of the Nois is inde- 
termined and this system can hardly be called a dualism. 
According to Heraclitus, the development of things is due 
to an eternal fire, which produces everything under the 
influence of a law of number.*? Democritus is important 
in our study. He taught that matter is composed of atoms, 
from the continuous motion of which all things result. The 
movement of these atoms is not due to chance but is accord- 
ing to a plan or reason (ex ratione, éy Néyou).* Thus far 
then we have a nucleus of the theory of the ratio seminalis 
Anaxagoras called the constitutive elements of matter 
semina, or seeds, and now Democritus suggests that these 
elementary substances are influenced in their activity by a 
power outside of themselves. At this time the Sophists - 
held up the progress of philosophic thought and by their 
contradictory opinions and skepticism caused the utmost 
confusion. 


A reaction against the materialism of the Physicists was 
introduced by Socrates. He turned his attention to the 


* Cicero: De Natura Deorum, I, 10. 

*Cfr. Janet et Seailles: Hist. de la Phil., p. 714. 

are L. Mabilleau: Hist. de la Phil. Atomistique, liv. II, c. IV, 
p. 39-50. 


18 


principles of knowledge as a basis for morality. His dis- 
ciple, Plato, carried on the investigations started by his 
master, and developed a system which is very important 
for us because of the influence which it had in the forma- 
tion of St. Augustine. Plato thought that concepts or ideas 
were entirely separate from matter and in them the truth 
was to be found. The idea is the element of reality in 
things, immutable and everlasting. It alone possesses 
reality, the reality of being and the reality of knowledge. 
The ideas are active, efficient causes. For every concrete 
being there is a corresponding idea. The phenomenon par- 
takes of the idea but in so far as it is part non-being, it is 
imperfect. Matter, according to Plato, is a negation; it 
exists objectively, but still lacks reality. The world is the 
result of the union of ideas. It was brought into existence 
by God and endowed with a world-soul or Nois all phenom- 
ena being fashioned by the Creator according to the eternal 
idea or prototype. Since matter was eternal this formation 
of the world was not an act of creation, strictly speaking, 
but an organization. The world of phenomena developed 
out of chaos according to an intelligent design and for a 
definite purpose. God or the supreme Idea is distinct from 
the world which He organizes, though at times Plato seems 
to identify God with the world-soul. Thus we have in the 
Platonic system an indefinite dualism which is to find its 
perfection in Aristotle.® 

Aristotle denied the existence of Plato’s world of ideas 
and taught that the essence of things is within the indi- 
vidual itself, not outside of it. This essence is the form 
or ratio which completes matter in its being and is the 
source of its activity. It is the efficient cause of all its 
phenomena, the immanent principle which perfects the pure 
potency of the prime matter, by reducing it to actuality. 
- There is in the matter a natural aptitude for its form. 
Thamiry points out that there is in this system of Aristotle 
a certain concept of the rationes seminales.® First, he says, 
there is, according to the Stagyrite, a certain inherent pro- 
pensity in the matter for the form by which it is perfected; 


°Turner: Hist. of Phil., p. 98 seq. 
*Thamiry: De Rationibus Seminalibus, p. 14. 


19 


while the form itself is latent in the potentia of the matter 
after the manner of a germ. For in the Aristotelian system 
the latent form does not require an external efficient cause 
to make it actual but has within itself the active power to 
effect the transition. God, the pure act, is conscious only 
of Himself, but He attracts things to Himself and thus 
there is in all things a natural inclination to become act. 
This is the meaning of the statement, “Ens immobile movet, 
quatenus est amoris objectum.”’ The movement from 
potency to act is the result of an internal development called 
forth by this attraction towards the supreme Being. Thus 
the theory of Actus and Potentia, which runs through the 
whole of the philosophy of Aristotle, implies the existence 
of latent active and passive powers which are to evolve 
under the influence of an external attraction. This is in 
reality a theory of the rationes seminales. 


The third and final phase in the development of the theory 
is found in the doctrine of the Stoics. They were heirs to 
the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle which, as we have 
seen, contained the nucleus of the theory of the rationes 
seminales. They rejected the dualism of Aristotle and re- 
vived the doctrine of Heraclitus of a principle of fire. For 
them nothing existed but matter. However, adapting the 
thought of Aristotle, they distinguished between active 
matter, or the principle of fire, and passive matter. The 
fire is the soul of the world and exists in passive matter. 
They called this soul of the world the seed (semen) of the 
universe. In it were contained the reasons or plans 
(yédor) of all changes and the germs as it were of all future 
forms (ozépyara) which were to evolve according to the 
laws of the universal Reason. They were the rationes 
seminales (yédou oréppatixo.) by which the universal reason 
or Fire produced all things. Fire or God, as the principle 
of activity, informs and moves matter, which is the prin- 
ciple of passivity. Thus the theory of the rationes semi- 
nales is used to explain a doctrine of absolute immanence.? 


" Metaph., Lib. XI, edit. Bekker, p. 1072. 


8 ONcia olov eis onépua 6 rip Cleanthes. cfr. Bauemker: Das Problem der 
Materie, p. 354. 


*Thamiry: De Rationibus Seminalibus, p. 15. 


20 


The doctrine of the Stoics flourished in Rome for some 
time, but in Alexandria a group of Jews were trying to 
reconcile the teachings of the Bible with the philosophy of 
the Greeks. Their leader was Philo. He retains the word 
Logos because of its use in the New Testament as the Word 
of God and also because of the Stoic phrase Aé you oréppartixor. 
We see here the first evidence of Christian influence in the 
interpretation of the rationes seminales. Thamiry shows 
how under this new influence the theory was extended to 
embrace the intellectual and supernatural order, but since 
we are interested in it as a cosmological explanation only, 
we shall confine ourselves to its use in that field.*° 

Before tracing the theory of the rationes seminales in 
the writings of the Fathers, it will be well to mention its 
use in Neo-Platonism, since this system undoubtedly influ- 
enced Augustine. The foremost exponent of this revival 
of Plato’s doctrines was Plotinus. He lived in the third 
century after Christ but Christianity exercised very little 
influence over him. He sought to reconcile the doctrines 
of Plato, Aristotle and Zeno with the Oriental religions. 
He starts with the notion of God, whom he describes as the 
One. By a process of emanation from the One, there came 
into existence the Nous (Nois) or intelligence, and from 
the Nous came the world-soul (Wvy7). The world-soul gave 
rise to certain forces (Adyo. oréppatixo.) or rationes semi- 
nales. These combine with matter to form the material 
phenomena. They constitute the substantial form of sen- 
sible bodies. As the Nous is the image of the One, and the 
World-soul the image of the Nous, so these substantial 
forms are the images of the ideas emanating as active 
forces from the world-soul. Here then is a fully developed 
theory of the rationes seminales. 

The early Alexandrine Fathers held the doctrine of 
simultaneous creation. According to them the world came 
into being in an instant just as it is today and consequently 
in their system there was no room for a development from 
potentiality to act. For the same reason there is no men- 
tion of the theory of the rationes seminales, at least not in 
their cosmological teaching. St. Justin, however, speaks 





Sel nemiry?. Op. cit... p. 18; 
21 


of “Verbi semina’ with reference to the elements of truth 
found in the pagan philosophies. The Latin writer Ter- 
tullian uses the phrase “quasi rationes seminales’’” for the 
natural virtues with which God has endowed man. It is 
in St. Basil and St. Gregory that we find the theory used 
in an interpretation of the Mosaic account of creation. 


The theory of simultaneous creation of the Alexandrine 
school aroused the opposition of the schools of Antioch, 
Edessa and Caesarea. The leaders of these schools were 
respectively, St. John Chrysostom, St. Ephrem and St. 
Basil. From the extreme allegorism of the teachers of 
Alexandria they went to the opposite extreme of litteralism, 
in their interpretations of Genesis. Creation was extended, 
not simultaneously; the “days” were periods of twenty-four 
hours such as we know.!? On the first day God created 
prime matter out of nothing and on the following days He 
formed out of this preexisting matter all the things men- 
tioned by Moses. St. Basil held that on these days God 
did not form the various beings actually, but imparted to 
the original matter the power and the duty to generate 
them.'* In this sense we have a theory corresponding to 
the rationes seminales. It is, however, no longer a theory 
of absolute immanence but of relative immanence only. 
God and the world are distinct. The divine Creator made 
the world out of nothing and endowed it with powers to 
develop the various forms that later appeared. He did not, 
however, abandon the world after creating it, but by His 
divine providence keeps it in existence and supports its 
activity. The rationes seminales thus become instrumental 


causes only since it is by the power of God they work out 
their effects. 


St. Gregory of Nyssa undertook to defend the teenie 
of his brother, St. Basil. Although not so brilliant he was 


“Cf. II Apolog. edit. Otto, cap. VIII. 

““Ke alia parte intellectuales et morales hominis virtutes quasi 
rationes seminales, ad rationum idealium exemplar, nobis a divino 
Verbo inditas habent.” Contra Mare., c. I, n. 10. 

“Cfr. Zahm: Bible, Science and Faith, p. 52; also Dorlodot: Dar- 
winism and Catholic Thought, p. 71. 

“ Dorlodot: Op. cit., p. 78. 


“St. Basil: Sermon on Providence. No. XXII, Mi PP. Gurt, 
XXXI. mbes a 


22 


a deeper thinker than his brother and soon realized the 
difficulties involved in the theory of extended creation and 
the solar day. Consequently, he fell back on the earlier 
opinion of simultaneous creation, adapting it to meet the 
objections of his opponents. According to him, God created 
all things at once. In the original condition there was only 


a formless and heterogeneous mass Ww’ ° ‘OoWeVver, con- 
tained potentially or virtual!v al) mentioned by 
Moses int © narration of th ds Jot describes 
his theory ae ha atic), dus anew . creative act 
as a kind ot ulse by which wu. f€ the world 


upon its evolution, which is to result 11. une production of 
all those things which constitute it at the present time— 
namely, the heaven, ether, stars, fire, air, sea, animals, and 
plants. All these things were contained virtually in the 
formless and homogeneous mass which was the immediate 
effect of creation, but none of these things then possessed 
actual existence.’*® Gregory calls the active powers with 
which God endowed original matter ozépparixo. duvapers.27 
In origin and purpose they are the same as the rationes 
seminales of St. Augustine, the Greek word évvdues empha- 
sizing the idea of power, while the Latin, rationes, that of 
design. The Greek Father insists that these inherent 
powers, acting under the laws of nature, in accordance with 
the divine command, resulted in all the varied forms which 
we see on the earth today. This, however, is possible only 
through the concurrence of God’s power. Of themselves 
the seminal powers are not able to bring about these effects; 
they are but the permanent instruments which God uses to 
effect His design.1® In this system of St. Gregory we have 
a fully developed theory of the rationes seminales inter- 
preted in accordance with Christian principles. 


St. Augustine, searching and praying for an explanation 
of the Mosaic account of creation, grasped the possibilities 
of the theory of the rationes seminales and applied the 
powers of his intellect to its development. As we shall see 


* Dorlodot: Darwinism and Catholic Thought, p. 74. 

“St. Gregory: Homilies on the Xexameron, Migne, P. G. t. XLIV, 
col. 77. 

* Dorlodot: Op. cit., p. 120. 


23 


later, he took the Ideas of Plato and attributed to them 
eternal existence in the mind of God. He made a real dis- 
tinction between the eternal reasons and their physical 
existence as seminal reasons in matter. In explaining the 
production of the latter he made use of the Alexandrine 
theory of the different grades of existence: 1, in the Word 
of God; 2, in the elements of the world, where they were 
created at the beginning; 3, in the first individuals of the 
various classes of beings, e. g., this plant or this animal; 
4, in the seed produced by these plants and animals. From 
the Stoic déyos orépuarktos he derived the term ratio semi- 
nalis. To the whole he added the Christian doctrines of 
creation and divine administration. It is impossible to say 
whether Augustine derived the’ various elements of his 
system immediately from their respective sources. It seems 
that he was not well versed in Greek and knew nothing of 
Hebrew and consequently he would depend largely upon 
Latin translations and commentaries. St. Ambrose was an 
admirer of St. Gregory of Nyssa and no doubt the future 
Bishop of Hippo was much influenced in his attitude by 
the Bishop of Milan, and thus indirectly by the Bishop of 
Nyssa. In the following chapters I have attempted to ex- 
plain in detail the cosmological system which Augustine 
worked out under these several influences. 


2. AFTER THE TIME OF ST. AUGUSTINE 


The references made to the theory of the rationes semi- 
nales by Catholic writers after the time of St. Augustine 
are for the most part interpretations of his doctrine. The 
most important of these, especially St. Thomas Aquinas, 
are quoted in the succeeding chapters and consequently 
need not be discussed here. In regard to the interpreta- 
tions, Dorlodot says that he was not able “‘to find a single 
Christian writer previous to the Scholastic period who 
opposes the theory, or who endeavours to regard the 
rationes seminales of St. Augustine simply as material or 
passive powers.”!® From the time of the introduction of 
the Aristotelian principles in the thirteenth century, there 





” Ibid, p. 68. 
24 


is a tendency either to disagree with the doctrines of St. 
Augustine regarding the origin of things or, in an effort to 
reconcile the two, to depart from the traditional interpre- 
tation. The differences were not based on Scriptural exe- 
gesis but on current scientific thought, especially that con- 
cerning the generating power of the sun and the stars, an 
opinion derived from Aristotle.2° The explanation of Duns 
Scotus, in which he denies the active power of a seed and 
likewise of the ratio seminalis,*! is based, as Cajetan points 
out, on the failure to make a distinction between a transi- 
tory and a permanent instrument.?? Father Coakley, 
O.S.A., in his article in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record, 
quotes a number of mediaeval theologians who defended 
the traditional interpretation of St. Augustine against some 
of their contemporary opponents.?? Renewed interest in 
the theory of St. Augustine has been awakened by the wide- 
spread attention given to the evolutionary hypothesis dur- 
ing the last half century. The varied opinions attributed 
to him by the antagonists and protagonists of this hypothe- 
sis are discussed in the following pages. 

Outside the ranks of Scholasticism the theory of the 
Rationes Seminales has had quite a different history. 
Writers to whom the doctrines of Christianity were un- 
known or unwelcome, fell back on the pagan theories of the 
ancient Greeks, with their belief in absolute immanence. 
In the fourth and fifth centuries the Neoplatonic concepts 
were carried to Western Europe from Egypt.24 The same 
thoughts appear again in the philosophy of John Scotus 
Eriugena in the ninth century. The primordial causes or 
types of all things were contained in the Word of God. 
The being of the creatures is the being of God, which is of 
course pantheism. This inclination to identify God and 
the world is found in some of the Scholastics, for instance, 
Abelard—‘“‘Spiritum esse animam mundv’?>=—and David of 
Dinant, whom St. Thomas severely condemns.”® 


Et bO. Dy: 
* Joan. Duns Scotus, Lib. IJ, Sent. dist. XVII, 

* Cajetan: Comment. in I St. Thomas, q. Oxi, ‘aed 
* Trish Ecc. Rec., 4-S, Vol. V, p. 342. 

* Funk, Hist. de TEglise, trad. Hemmer, I. p. 115-128. 
* Cfr, Denz. no. 312. 
* Sum, toa, 1V,.art.8. 


25 


The establishment of the Platonic Academy at Florence 
in the fifteenth century revived the doctrine of ideas and 
one of its leaders, Marsilius Ficinus, in commenting on the 
works of Plato and Plotinus, gives a truly Platonic view 
of the rationes seminales. Giordano Bruno presents a 
somewhat similar view with his doctrine of the living 
monads which existing in matter are the cause of all reality 
in nature.2*. Bruno’s influence is evident in the teaching of 
Spinoza. With him the world is but an expression of the 
attributes of the divine essence. For everything that exists 
there is a corresponding idea which is the soul of the thing. 
These are not part of the divine substance but inhere in 
it. God, manifesting himself through these attributes, 
is the natura naturans, while the world is the natura 
natura naturata.2® These modes or attributes are endowed 
‘ with reason and evolve under the power inherent in them. 
We have here a theory quite consonant with that of the 
rationes seminales. Leibnitz placed the essence of things 
in monads, or simple substances. Their action is entirely 
immanent, since neither substance nor accident can enter 
a monad from without. In this respect they differ from 
the rationes seminales, which did admit the action of an 
etxernal agent. Each monad, however, does not differ in 
essence from God. It is endowed with reason and with 
certain latent possibilities which it strives to realize. The 
monads are conceived in much the same sense as the Ad ya 
orépuatixo. Of the Stoics. They participate in the divine 
being just as do the rationes seminales of the Greeks in the 
Anima Mundi. 

The Idealism of the seventeenth century turned the at- 
tention of thinkers to the problems of the intellectual and 
ontological order and away from the cosmological. The 
theory of the rationes seminales is used to explain the 
process of knowing, for instance, in the a priori forms of 
Kant. Since the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, 
in the middle of the last century, there has been a revival 
of interest in the problems of natural development. Unlike 
the movements of the past, this interest has concerned 


“Turner: Hist. of Phil., p. 429. 
Patel Cuek(s. seek 


ova) 
“VU 


itself with the immediate facts of development and their 
explanation rather than with the question of origin and 
ultimate causes. It is true that there has been much philoso- 
phizing on the subject, but the dominant aim has been to 
get at the facts and their immediate causes. Consequently 
we do not find much evidence of a theory of the rationes 
seminales. Some Catholic scientists have used the theory, 
as explained by St. Augustine, to justify their adherence 
to the hypothesis of evolution.*® The recently developed 
science of Genetics has brought forth an explanation of 
observed facts which has much in common with the ancient 
theory. This is discussed more fully in the chapter on 
Evolution. 

With this outline of the history and the various concep- 
tions of the theory of the rationes seminales, we are ready 
to make a detailed study of the meaning and application of 
the theory in the cosmological system of St. Augustine. 


”In strictly Catholic circles there is one man who has made a very 
skillful attempt to develop this theory as an apologetic weapon in 
the service of the Church. He is the Rev. Dr. Joseph Edward 
Thamiry of the University of Lille, France. In 1905, he published 
a thesis, entitled “De Rationibus Seminalibus,” in which he explains 
the, distinction between the pagan and the Christian application of 
the theory and shows how the latter may be used to defend the 
theological and philosophical teaching of the Church. In 1922, he 
published another volume, “De l’Influence,” in which he studies the 
problems of reciprocal action in the fields of psychology, metaphysics 
and pedagogy, gives the different solutions that have been proposed, 
and finally his own solution based on the old theory of the rationes 
seminales. In both books he has a brief but thorough discussion of 
St. Augustine’s understanding and use of this theory. 


27 


CHAPTER III 
THE NATURE OF THE RATIONES SEMINALES 


St. Augustine, as we have seen, searching for the true 
meaning of the Genesiac account of the creation, saw in 
the theory of the rationes seminales a possible explanation 
of that mysterious story. He undoubtedly was aware of 
the use which St. Gregory had made of it for the same 
purpose. While not satisfied with the interpretation given 
by the Bishop of Nyssa, he evidently felt that the fault was ~ 
not in the theory but in his exegesis. Consequently he set 
himself to the task of subjecting the first three chapters 
of Genesis to a very critical study in the light of the same 
theory. The results of that study are found, as we know, 
in the De Genesi ad Litteram. 

What, then, did Augustine mean by the rationes semi- 
nales? What was their nature? ‘Whence did they come? 
It is evident that the correct answer to these questions will 
give us the key to an understanding of his cosmological 
theories. In this chapter an attempt will be made to answer 
only the first question. Modern writers have not tried to 
define accurately the exact nature of the rationes seminales. 
Were they seeds such as we know today? Were they germ 
cells? Molecules or atoms? Were they living or not? Were 
they corporeal at all? These questions have come again 
and again to the minds of those who have seen the refer- 
ences to St. Augustine in the modern treatises on Evolution. 

The question as to the origin of the world and its primal 
condition, of the meaning of the “days’”’ of Genesis, of the 
order and manner of the appearance of creatures upon the 
earth, will be left over for succeeding chapters. They are 
separate problems and in the system of St. Augustine at 
least they demand separate treatment. This cannot be done 
until we have decided upon some meaning of the rationes 
seminales. No attempt will be made to find English equiva- 
lents for these terms until their nature has been discussed. 


28 


1. THE USE OF THE TERMS 


It is evident that the words rationes seminales are not 
used in their literal meaning. Ratio is from reor, ratus, 
to reckon or calculate, and means a reckoning or calcula- 
tion. From this it was applied to the faculty of the mind 
which is capable of reckoning or calculating, namely, the 
reason. It is this sense which Augustine had in mind when 
he wrote: ‘Ratio est mentis motio, ea quae discuntur dis- 
tinguendi et connectendi potens.”: Ratio, then, refers to 
something spiritual and cannot be applied literally to a 
material thing. St. Thomas explains in the Summa how 
the word is used. He first reminds us that according to St. 
Augustine the powers included under the terms rationes 
seminales may exist in different ways: first, in the Word 
of God, as ideal reasons; secondly, in the elements of the 
earth, as universal causes; thirdly, in those things which 
came forth from the universal causes in the course of time, 
as in this plant or this animal; fourthly, in the seeds which 
are produced by these plants and animals. “Hujusmodi 
autem virtutes activae et passivae in multiplict ordine con- 
siderart possunt: nam primo quidem, ut Augustinus dicit 
6 super Gen. ad Lit. (cap. 10) sunt principaliter et origi- 
naliter in ipso verbo Dei, secundum rationes ideales. 
Secundo vero sunt in elementis mundi, sicut in universalibus 
causis. Tertio vero modo sunt in tis, quae ex universalibus 
causis secundum successiones temporum producuntur, sicut 
in hac planta, et in hoc animali, tanquam particularibus 
causis. Quarto modo sunt in seminibus, quae ex animalibus, 
et plantis producuntur.”’? Now, says St. Thomas, in so far 
as these powers are in corporeal matter, they cannot strictly 
be called rationes, but in so far as they are derived from 
the ideal reasons of God, they may be so called: “— ets? 
non possunt dict rationes secundum quod sunt in materia 
corporali: possunt tamen dici rationes per comparationem 
ad suam originem, secundum quod deducuntur a rationibus 
idealibus.’’® 

Again in his Commentary on the Sentences, he says that 


* De Ordine II, 11. 
* Summa, I, CXV, 1. 
* Ibid. ; 


29 


these powers may be called rationes because in them there 
is realized the plan and intention of the divine intelligence 
just as in an artificial product the purpose of the worker 
finds expression: “Hujusmodi virtutes activae in natura 
dicuntur rationes non quod sint in materia per modum 
intentionis, sed quia ab arte divina producuntur, et manet 
in eis ordo et directio intellectus divini, sicut in re arti- 
ficiata manet directio artificis in finem determinatum.””* 
St. Thomas, by these words, clearly indicates how the word 
rationes is used in referring to natural powers existing in 
matter. An architect thinks out a plan for a house, makes 
a blueprint of it, and the house is built accordingly. The 
plan formulated in the mind of the architect is realized in 
the house. In so far then we,might call that house the 
reason, ratio, of the architect. So, by analogy, the designs 
which preexisted in the divine intelligence found their 
realization in nature and similarly we call them rationes. 
There is, however, a distinction between the two, as we 
shall see later. 
_ These powers are called seminal not because they were 
corporal seeds such as we can observe but because from 
them, as from seeds, all living things were to come. ‘“‘— et 
dicuntur seminales—quia rerum individuis primo creatis 
hujusmodi collatae sunt, per opera sex dierum, ut ex ‘eis 
quasi ex quibusdam seminibus producerentur et multipli- 
carentur res naturales.’”’> Moreover they were to produce 
forms similar to themselves as seeds do “— formae autem 
naturales sibi similes producere possunt; et ideo proprie- 
tatem seminis habent, et seminales dici possunt.’’® St. 
Augustine says there is a similarity between these causes 
and seeds, but that they are prior to all seeds. “Datur 
quidem de seminibus ad hance rem nonnulla similitudo, 
propter illa quae in eis futura conserta sunt; verumtamen 
ante omnia visibilia semina sunt illae causae.’’? 

Having seen the reasons for the use of the terms rationes 
seminales it will be helpful to point out other expressions 


*In II Sent. Dist. XVIII, q. 1, art. 2. 
° Ibid. 

* Ibid. ts 

“De Gen. ad Lit. VI, ec. VI. > 


30 


which Augustine uses in a similar sense. The words rationes 
ideales are used with reference to the plans as they existed 
in the mind of God. These are also called rationes primor- 
diales and are thus explained by St. Thomas: “F'ormae 
autem rerum secundum quod in arte divina existunt, 
primordiales esse dicuntur.”* The more common expres- 
sion, rationes causales, is used either for the rationes ideales 
or the rationes seminales. This is evident from the clear 
words of the angelic Doctor: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod 
ex verbis Augustini de hujusmodi rationibus seminalibus 
loquentis satis accipi potest, quod ipsae rationes seminales 
sunt etiam rationes causales; sicut et semen est quaedam 
causa; — sed tamen rationes ideales possunt dict causales, 
non autem proprie loquendo seminales.”® The reason why 
the rationes seminales cannot be called ideales is of course 
because they are the physical powers existing in matter, 
the effect of the rationes ideales but differing from these as 
matter from spirit. Other expressions used are illis insitis 
rationibus, numerosae rationes, semina futurorum, primis 
rerum causis, omnum futurorum causae. Some of these 
will be quoted again when the exact nature of the rationes 
seminales is being discussed. The purpose in calling atten- 
tion to them here is merely to show that the terms rationes 
seminales were not used exclusively by St. Augustine to 
- indicate a certain idea but with his usual richness in lan- 
guage and imagery he presents the same thought to us 
in many ways. It is to be noted, however, that there are 
three words which Augustine uses in some form to indicate 
the powers—originally.placed in the earth, viz., rationes, 
causae and semina. We have now to determine, if possible, 
just what these powers were which he so designated. 


2. THE PHYSICAL FORM OF THE RATIONES SEMINALES 


The first question that arises in determining the nature 
of the rationes seminales is: did they have real physical 
existence or not? The answer is of course in the affirma- 
tive. Augustine says clearly that just as the seed contains 


Sin Il Sent. 1. c. 
* Summa, I, CXV, 2. 


ol 


invisibly everything which later appears in the tree, so the 
earth possessed everything which was to appear in the 
course of time.1® These original causes were in the earth. 
“__ equsales illae rationes quas mundo indidit,’ says Au- 
gustine,'? and St. Thomas adds no less clearly, “— tune 
terrae datam esse virtutem germinativam.’’? Since all 
interpreters answer this question in this same way, the 
point need not be discussed further. 


Since the rationes seminales were physical and since. 
Augustine at times calls them semina, the theory has been 
proposed that they were seeds. Suarez seems to have held 
this opinion. In his Tractate on the Work of the Six Days, 
he seeks to disprove the general theory of Augustine re- 
garding the manner in which plants and animals came into 
being, by showing that the theory of original seed was 
contrary to Scripture and contrary to nature. ‘“‘Accedit 
praeterea,”’ he says, “‘specialis ratio in animalibus quia non 
possunt in semine produci.”*® And again: “Ergo facta 
sunt hoc tertio die, non ut semina, sed ut fructus, vel saltem 
in herba, sicut ad litteram narrantur facta —.”'* But evi- 
dently he had heard of a contrary interpretation for he 
adds: “Quod si fortasse quis dicat, per virtutem illam seu 
potentiam non intelligere Augustinum hujusmodi semina 
plantarum, sed aliam peculiarem virtutem terrae ad germi- 
nandum inditam: hoc eadem facilitate, qua dictum fuerit, 
rejiciendum est, quia neque in Scriptura habet fundamen- 
tum, neque ipse Augustinus hoc declarat, neque secundum 
naturas rerum explicari potest, qualis illa virtus sit.” It 
is probably well to add here by way of explanation that 
Suarez writes only of semina plantarum, because he is 
treating of the origin of plants on the third day. 


Before criticizing the seed interpretation of Suarez, 
another explanation of a modern author will be considered. 
Father Patrick F. Coakley, O.S.A., in an article entitled: 


* De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. V, ¢. XXIII. 
ee LAID Late ve 
¥ De ‘Pot. IV, 2. 
“ De Opere Sex Dierum, II, VII, 2. 
PyADIC. NOSo tid a 
** Ibid. 


32 


“Was St. Augustine an Evolutionist?” calls the <» tiones 
seminales germs or cells.1®° Is it possible that by the ra- 
tiones seminales, Augustine meant what our modern biolo- 
gists call germ cells? The germ cells are those which are 
capable of reproducing themselves and are to be distin- 
guished from somatic cells which have no reproductive 
power. We know now that all biological continuity is 
effected by cell division. It is through the cell that repro- 
duction takes place, that physical inheritance is transmitted 
and physical development brought about. Of course, St. 
Augustine knew nothing of cell life, but would not these 
germ cells correspond to the rationes seminales ? 

It can be shown that neither seeds nor germ cells fit in 
with Augustine’s conception of the rationes seminales. 
Both are actual definite forms of living beings. A seed, in 
the modern sense, is defined as a “young plant that is sup- 
plied with a certain amount of food and that has temporarily 
stopped growing.” Germ cells are the structural units of 
a living body, which are capable of reproduction. It is true 
that St. Augustine gave to the term seed a much wider 
meaning than do present day biologists. He applied the 
term to those germ cells which function in reproduction. 
However, it is quite evident that he did not mean seed, 
either in its narrow or its wider signification, when he 
developed his theory of the rationes seminales. He tells 
again and again that in that primitive condition beings did 
not exist actually but potentially. He compares them to 
seeds but he tells us plainly that they are not seeds. Ac- 
cording to his theory, man also came into being at the same 
time as other living beings but like them only casually. 
In answer to an objection against this theory, he clearly 
states his position: “Sed rursus, si dixero non ita fuisse 
hominem in illa prima rerum conditione, qua creavit Deus 
omnia simil, sicuti est non tantum perfectae aetatis homo, 
sed ne infans quidem, nec tantum infans, sed ne puerperium 
quidem in utero matris, nec tantum hoc, sed nec semen 
quidem visibile hominis; putabit omnino non fuisse.’’® 


* Trish Ecc. Rec. 4-S, Vol. V (1898), p. 342. 
“ Curtis: Nature and Development of Plants, p. 127. 
* De Gen. ad Lit. VI, VI. 


3d 


Then after proving that man did exist at the beginning 
but in a different way than when he appeared as man upon 
the earth, he asks and answers wherein the difference con- 
sisted. “Quaeret,”’ he writes, “ex me quomodo. Respon- 
debo, postea visibiliter, sicut species humanae constitutionis 
nota nobis est; non tamen parentibus generantibus, sed ille 
de limo, illa de costa ejus. Quaeret tum quomodo. Respon- 
debo, invisibiliter, potentialiter, causaliter, quomodo fiunt 
futura non facta.” He realizes the difficulty of under- 
standing this, for immediately he adds: “Hic forte non 
intelliget.” And in an effort to make himself clearer, he 
continues: “Subtrahuntur enim ei cuncta quae novit, usque 
ad ipsam semininum corpulentiam. Neque enim vel tale 
aliquid homo iam erat, cum in prima illa sex dierum condi- 
tione factus erat. Datur quidem de seminibus, ad hance rem 
nonnulla similitudo, propter ila quae in eis futura conserta 
sunt; verumtamen ante omnia visibilia semina sunt illae 
causae.’’° From these statements there can be no doubt 
that Augustine did not mean seed nor germ cells by his 
rationes seminales. The word corpulentia means in late 
Latin corporeity, or the state of having a body. This Au- 
gustine expressly denies to the seminal reasons. He does 
-not by this deny that they are physical but that they have 
a definite proper bodily form. They resemble seeds- not 
because of their form but because of the potentialities con- 
tained in them. Lest it be said that Augustine here is 
_referring to the body of man only and not to plants or 
animals, it can easily be shown that as far as original con- 
dition is concerned he makes no distinction. All living 
things, plants, animals and man, were created potentially, 
cauSsally.?? 

St. Thomas likewise makes it evident that he does not 
attribute to the rationes seminales any distinct proper 
forms. He draws a contrast between the manner in which 
they exist in the rationes seminales and that which they 
have later. “Alia vero dicuntur esse producta in rationibus 
seminalibus tantum, ut animalia, plantae et homines; quae 
omnia postmodum in naturis propriis producta sunt.’’?2 

* Thid. 

* Tbhid. 


Se Abids GeV; 
nt6.r Ob Ui: LV58. 2) 


Seeds and germ cells have their proper natures. Charles 
Boyer, answering a question proposed by himself regarding 
the precise manner of existence of the rationes seminales, 
says: “Il ne s’agit pas de concevoir ces raisons comme des 
germes proprement dits, distincts, constitués a part, visi- 
bles comme tels: elles ne ressemblent aux germes que par 
leur puissance d’avenir.’’?? Dorlodot, referring to the pas- 
sage wherein Augustine speaks of the creation of birds on 
the fifth day, says: “In this passage St. Augustine clearly 
denies that the subject containing the rationes seminales 
were, according to his hypothesis, created ova or seeds.’’* 
The passages quoted are sufficient evidence to show that 
by his rationes seminales Augustine did not mean cells, or 
any special created forms. 


3. THE POTENTIALITY OF THE RATIONES SEMINALES 


We have seen thus far, first that the rationes seminales 
had physical existence in matter, and second, that this 
existence was not in the form of separate, distinct entities, 
as seeds, germ cells or ova. All living things were there, 
butin potentia, not in actu, as St. Thomas asserts, or as 
St. Augustine puts it: “Quomodo fiunt futura non facta.” 
But then the question arises, in what did this potentiality 
consist? This is the crux of the whole matter. Given the 
correct answer and we have a key to the cosmological sys- 
tem of St. Augustine. But it is a question not easily 
answered and one that even in St. Thomas’ time gave rise 
to conflicting opinions. In his Commentary on the Sen- 
tences he writes: “Ipsae enim virtutes in materia positae, 
per quas naturales effectus consequuntur, rationes semi- 
nales dicuntur. Sed quid sint secundum rem rationes semi- 
nales, a diversis diversimode assignatur.”’?> That the differ- 
ence of opinion has persisted to modern times is evident 
from the discussion carried on in the Irish Ecclesiastical 
Record between Father Phillip Burton, C.M., and Father 
P. F. Coakley, O.S.A.,2° and by such conflicting statements 
as are found in the recent works of Father Henry Woods, 


* Boyer: L’Idée de Vérité, p. 129. 

*Dorlodot: Darwinism and Catholic Thought, p. 83. 
Seiminp, 11 Sent... Dist... XVIII,.q. I, a. 2 

* Trish Ecc. Rec. 4-S, Vol. V (1899). 


35 


S.J., and Canon Dorlodot.2?. What these variant statements 
and opinions are we shall see shortly. 

St. Thomas, in the article mentioned above,” gives three 
opinions which were current in his time. These shall be 
used as the basis of our discussion. The first is derived 
from the Aristotelian distinction between genus and species. 
According to its proponents, a specific form is not received 
in matter except by means of a generic form. Thus, they 
said, it is a different form which makes fire, fire, than that 
which makes fire a body. This incomplete generic form, 
they said, is called the ratio seminalis. “Alii dicunt quod 
forma speciei non recipitur in materia nist mediante forma 
generis; adeo quod est alia forma numero per quam ignis 
est ignis et per quam ignis est' corpus. Illa ergo forma 
generalis incompleta ratio seminalis dicitur; quia propter 
talem formam inest materiae quaedam inclinatio ad recipi- 
endum formas specificas.”*® This theory Thomas promptly 
rejects, first, because the distinction between the generic 
and the specific form is a mental one only, since in fact 
every form gives substantial being and since the same 
thing cannot have a double substantial being, an additional 
form must be considered accidental. Secondly, this theory 
does not agree with that of Augustine in as much as an 
incomplete general form would not necessarily be followed 
by a special form. The possibility of it would be there but 
not the necessity as Augustine held. The interpretation 
thus refuted was maintained by a school of Realists whose 
basic principle was that the distinction between the generic 
form and the specific form had existence in reality and not 
merely in the mind, as was maintained by Aristotle and 
after him by Aquinas. 

The second opinion mentioned by St. Thomas is that the 
rationes seminales are the incomplete powers preexisting 
in matter. According to Aristotle, its defenders argued, all 
forms are derived from the potentiality of matter, and 
therefore these forms must have preexisted incompletely 
in matter. They are incomplete because they are not per- 


“Henry Woods, 8.J.: Augustine and Evolution; Canon Dorlodot: 
Darwinism and Catholic 'Thought. 


"in Lab. Il Sent, Dist. (AVI obras: 
36 


fect in their being and have not the power of acting in 
themselves. ‘“Ideo alii dicunt quod cum omnes formae, 
secundum Philosophum (de Generi Animal, lib. 2, cap. 3), 
de potentia materiae educantur, oportet ipsas formas prae- 
existere in materia incomplete, secundum quandam quasi 
inchoationem,; et quia non sunt in esse suo perfectae, non 
habent perfectam virtutem agendi, sed incompletam; .. . 
Has ergo virtutes incompletas in materia praeexistentes, 
rationes seminales dicunt, quia sunt secundum esse com- 
pletum in materia, sicut virtus formativa in semine.’’?? But 
this explanation does not satisfy Thomas either, for imme- 
diately he adds: “Hoc autem verum non videtur,” and he 
gives as his reason: “quia quamvis formae educantur de 
potentia materiae, illa tamen potentia materiae non est 
activa sed passiva.’”*® According to this theory the rationes 
seminales are only the incomplete forms which may be de- 
rived from the potentiality of matter. We may illustrate 
it thus: Clay has within itself the possibility of being 
formed into a statue, a flower pot, a ball, a brick, etc. The 
forms of these various things may be derived from the 
potentiality of the clay. However, the clay was entirely 
passive, it was suitable to receive these forms; there was 
an habilitas or inchoatio formae, as St. Thomas says. So 
they said in the beginning matter alone existed but there 
was in matter the potentiality of all the beings that exist 
in the world today. The forms of these beings existed 
potentially in matter and these potential forms were the 
_rationes seminales of Augustine. 

St. Thomas insists that under the term rationes semi- 
nales are included both active and passive powers. ‘“‘Ad 
quartum dicendum, quod sub rationibus seminalibus com- 
prehenduntur tam virtutes activae quam etiam passivae, 

.’%1 When it is said that they were put in matter, it 
is not to be understood as pure matter, materia prima, 
which has only passive potentiality; they are said to be in 
matter as complete forms are said to be in matter. “Ad 
secundum dicendum, quod rationes seminales dicuntur 

*Thid. stat 

*° Thid. 

#1]. c. ad 4um. 


37 


materiae inditae, non quia sint intelligendae praeexistere 
in materia ante adventum formae completae, quasi perti- 
nentes ad essentiam materiae, vel ad rationem ejus, secun- 
dum quod est materia, sed per modum quo etiam formae 
completae in materia esse dicuntur.”*? In fact the rationes 
seminales are strictly applied to active powers only and it 
is by analogy that they are extended to the passive ones. 
In every natural change there are two elements, the active 
and the passive, the movens and the motum. Thus in gener- 
ation, he says, the male element is the active one and the 
female element is passive** and therefore only the male 
element can be properly called semen, but by a certain 
extension of the term, the female element, menstruum, is 
also called a semen, even though it is passive. In the same 
manner we extend the name rationes seminales to include 
both the active and the passive powers in nature.** This is 
the third opinion mentioned by St. Thomas and the one 
that he accepts. 

The question of the active powers of the rationes semi- 
nales is one that deserves further consideration. In spite 
of the clear words of St. Thomas there are writers today 
who deny that the rationes seminales as understood by St. 
Augustine possessed any active powers. In the discussion 
carried on in the pages of the Irish Ecclesiastical Record 
between Fathers Phillip Burton, C.M., and Patrick F. Coak- 
ley, O.S.A., the former made this statement: “It is clear 
from this and many other passages that, in the first crea- 
tion, his (Augustine’s) rationes causales are not material 
entities, but reside in matter as mere modes; as modorum 
rationes; as formabilitas; as potentia in a passive sense, as 
rationes incorporaliter corporeis rebus intextae; as causa, 
but only like a material or a pattern. He gives them no 
activity, no power to pass from the first creation to the 
second except by the immediate action of the creator.’’®® 
He repeats this statement a little later in the same article. 
Quite recently Father Woods has published a defense of 


“ This was an opinion, commonly held in the Middle Ages. 


SL sead Qin. 
34 66 


halt ; sicut et in generatione animal is semen extento nomine 
dicitur non solum sperma, sed etiam menstruum.” 1. ¢c. ad 4um. 
*Trish Ecc. Rec. 4-S, Vol. V, p. 105. 


38 





the same interpretation. He writes: “The only active 
potency in the earth as such was that of the elementary 
forms, quite inadequate to the production of the varied life 
of the vegetative and sensitive creature. Indeed, this was 
so obvious that, though St. Augustine recognizes the exist- 
ence of such forms, since prime matter could not exist 
uninformed, he nevertheless ignores them in discussing 
the seminal reasons as the term of the first creation, put- 
ting these, as we see, in prime matter as a pure passive 
potency.’** And in the following chapter he says: “In 
themselves the seminal reasons, regarding primordial ori- 
gins,. natural generation, miracles indifferently, are but 
passive determinations of passive potency to be actuated 
according to the requirements of each.’’*’ In the same 
paragraph he calls them “positive determinants of passive 
potency.” What he seems to say is that the rationes semi- 
nales did nothing more than to reduce the universal indif- 
ferent potentiality of matter to a positive definite potenti- 
ality to receive the particular form determined by God. 
He expressly denies that they are active forces.** 

We have seen that Father Burton’s statement that the 
rationes seminales are not separate entities is correct. His 
references to a first and second creation will be discussed 
in the next chapter where Augustine’s theory of creation 
is investigated. The opinion maintained both by Father 
Burton and by Father Woods that the rationes seminales 
were purely passive must be considered here. The quota- 
tion from the Angelic Doctor giving his answer to those 
who held the passive theory in his day has already been 
cited. We will go now directly to the pages of St. Augustine 
and see whether this theory can be substantiated. The 
evidence is easily found and it is wholly against the purely 
passive interpretation. 

In the third book on the Trinity, Augustine devotes a 
chapter to an explanation of the manner in which magi- 
clans performed their magic arts. In accordance with the 
scientists of his day, he believed that these magicians were 


* Henry Woods, S.J.: Augustine and Evolution, p. 57. 
EA SR oa 


* On pages 46 and 47, he gives a summary of his opinions. 
39 


able to bring forth frogs and serpents from inanimate 
matter. His purpose is to show that these men were no 
more the creators of these things than the farmer is of 
/ the corn which he raises on his land. Both make use of the 
natural powers which God implanted in nature at the begin- 
ning. Just as there is in the seed, in the ground and in 
the sun and rain, the powers necessary to produce the crop 
of corn, so too there is in nature the occult reasons which 
made it possible for the magicians to produce their results. 
“Omnium quippe rerum quae corporaliter visibiliterque 
nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in istis corporeis mundi 
hujus elementis latent.’*® Now God has permitted that 
these powers and elements should obey the wicked as well 
as the good. “Nam et damnatis iniquis etiam in metallo 
servit aqua et ignis et terra, ut faciant quod volunt, sed 
quantum sinitur.’*? Lest it be doubted that these forces 
in the elements of the earth are the same as the rationes 
seminales in which all things existed potentially in the 
beginning, we have the explicit statement of Augustine 
that it was because of this force existing in the elements 
that plants and animals came forth from the land and the 
water without the ordinary process of generation. “Alia 
sunt enim haec jam conspicua oculis nostris ex fructibus et 
anvmantibus, alia vero illa occulta istorum seminum semina, 
unde jubente Creatore produxit aqua prima natatilia et 
volatilia, terra autem prima sui generis germina, et prima 
sui generis animalia.’’** Even if we cannot see these hidden 
seeds in the elements our reason forces us to believe that 
they are there, otherwise we could not explain how these 
things came without generation. “Jam vero hujus etiam 
grant semen quamvis oculis videre nequeamus ratione 
tamen conjicere possumus: quia nisi talis aliqua vis esset in 
istis elementis, non plerumque nascerentur ex terra quae 
1bi seminata non essent; nec animalia tam multa nulla 
marium feminarumque commixtione praecedente, sive in 
terra sive in aqua, quae tamen crescunt et coeundo alia 
pariunt, cum illa nullis coeuntibus parentibus orta sint.’’# 


“Ibid. 
“ Ibid. 


De Trinitate, Lib. III, c. VIII. 
bid 


40 


Woods gives clearly the import of these and other state- 
ments in the same chapter: “Here, then, St. Augustine 
seems to assert an active potency of seminal reasons, not 
only as they are contained in plants, seeds and other visible 
agencies, but also inasmuch as they are hidden in the ele- 
ments of the earth. These seminal reasons are of the same 
kind as those which were terminated in the first animals 
by creation. They are those which were left over from 
_the work of creation, and need only. a due temperance of | 
_things to burst into existence. They produce from the 
earth what is not sown. They are the origin of animals, 
which, existing without antecedent sexual union, neverthe- 
less by sexual union reproduce their kind. They are a 
force, the seed of seeds, even the seed itself of those ani- 
mals which do not by sexual union conceive the seed of their 
young.’’** The author attempts to discredit this apparent 
meaning first by the apriori argument: “In the supposition, 
then, of some contradiction between the two, De Trinitate 
should be interpreted by the teaching of De Genesi ad 
Litteram, rather than the reverse,” because in the latter 
the “seminal reasons are discussed formally and exhaust- 
ively” while in the former “they enter to be touched upon 
but briefly and incidentally.’** Since, according to his 
interpretation, in the latter the rationes seminales are 
merely passive, he concludes that a similar meaning must 
be attributed to them here. This he proceeds to do by 
maintaining that in the production of plants and animals, 
whether in the first instance or later through the instru- 
mentality of the Angels, good or bad, the active principle 
is the Divine Word. “The active principle of production is 
the Divine Word, the ministry of angels is instrumental 
only, commanded if they are good, permitted if they are 
bad. They collect the matter determined by seminal rea- 
sons to this particular effect at this determined time. They 
mix it in suitable proportions, they provide the suitable 
temperature, as do the generating agents in ordinary gen- | 
eration. But God works the effect in the extraordinary 
way. The active potency of the seminal reason is absent: 


* Augustine and. Evolution, p. 108. 
pyle fon ope 


41 


the passive potency only of determined matter is there.’’* 
He substantiates this opinion partly at least by Augustine’s 
use of the word “created” in the passage from which the 
above quotations are taken.*® We shall see later that Au- 
gustine several times uses the word in a broad sense to 
mean natural development of the rationes seminales from 
potency to act.‘? It is in that sense that he uses it here. 
The statement of Father Woods that the interpretation 
of the De Trinitate must not contradict that of the De 
Genesi ad Litteram can be accepted as true. Regardless 
of their relative importance it would be absurd to hold that 
Augustine presents contradictory views regarding the 
rationes seminales in the two works. We can accept the 
literal meaning which, as Father Woods admits, the words 
of the De Trinitate seem to convey and show that it is in 
perfect agreement with the teaching in the De Genesi ad 
Litteram. In the ninth book of the latter work, the author 
is considering the origin of the first woman and in doing 
so he repeats his general theory regarding the origin of all 
things, thus: “Omnis iste naturae usitatissimus cursus 
habet quasdam naturales leges suas, secundum quas et 
spiritus vitae, qui creatura est, habet quosdam appetitus 
suos determinatos quodammodo, quos etiam mala voluntas 
non possit excedere. Ht elementa mundi hujus corporet 
habent definitam vim qualitatemque suam, quid de quo 
fiert possit vel non possit. Ex his velut primordiis rerum, 
omnia quae gignuntur, suo quoque tempore exortus proces- 
susque sumunt, finesque et decessiones sui cujusque gen- 
eris.’*® This passage directly confirms the opinion that 
Augustine attributes active powers to the rationes semi- 
nales and agrees perfectly with the literal meaning of the 
quotations from the De Trinitate. Here again he says there 
are certain powers in the elements from which all things 
are to develop according to natural laws. That this usual 
development is the effect of the rationes seminales is clear 
from a statement which immediately follows in which 
Augustine explains certain miracles by saying that God has 


a Ash Oe). ck Os 

ee Ca Dat LOO. 

“Cfr. p. 64. 

“ De Gen ad Lit., Lib. IX, ec; XVII. 


4° 


it in His power to produce effects other than those called 
for by the rationes seminales. “Super hunc autem moium 
cursumque werum naturalem, potestas Creatoris habet 
apud se posse de his omnibus facere aliud, quam eorum 
quasi seminales rationes habent, . . .’’* 

Woods says that the production of the first plants and 
animals from the rationes seminales was due to the direct 
intervention of God, the extraordinary way, whereas it 
seems quite clear from the words just quoted that the 
development of these seminal reasons is the ordinary way 
and only when God wishes to produce other effects does He 
directly intervene in the extraordinary way, as for instance 
when He makes a dry stick bloom and bring forth fruit or 
when a woman sterile in her youth brings forth a child 
in her old age. In these cases the rationes seminales were 
passive; they possessed the possibility of receiving these 
effects but the active force necessary to produce them was 
only in God. In the ordinary cases St. Augustine definitely 
places the active powers in the rationes seminales as cre- 
ated by God at the beginning. 

The commentators, with the exceptions mentioned above, 
concur in this interpretation of St. Augustine. We have 
already given one quotation from St. Thomas (n. 31) in 
which he explicitly attributes active and passive powers to 
the rationes seminales. Similar statements can be found 
in the Summa, and in the De Potentia he indicates 
the result of these powers by such expressions as “—tune 
terrae datam esse virtutem germinativam ad producendum 
plantas opere propagationis ;—’’* “—plantae tune fuerunt 
productae non in actu, sed secundum rationes causales 
tantum, quia data fuit virtus terrae producendi illas—.’’® 
More of these might easily be given but these indicate the 
mind of the doctor so clearly that others are unnecessary. 

Suarez understood Augustine in the same way. In quot- 
ing the proofs used by St. Augustine to support his theory, 
he says: “Secundo confirmari potest, quia verbum illud 
‘germinet terra’ optime exponitur potestative, ut sic dicam, 

* Tbid. 

° Summa, I, gq. CXV, a. 2. 


* De Pot. q. IV, a. 2, ad 28um. 
? Thid. 


43 


id est, accipiat terra vim germinandi.”** To this assertion 
he responds thus: “—tamen ex verbis adjunctis manifeste 
constare Deum non tantum dedisse terrae virtutem germi- 
nandi, sed etiam illam statim germinare fecisse, vel ipsum 
virtute sua herbam et plantas in ea produxisse.’”’*+ He ad- 
mits that in the beginning God gave to the earth the power 
of germinating plants, but whereas Augustine held that 
this power was bestowed potentialiter, he contends that 
God produced in the earth the plants and animals, endowed 
with the power of reproducing themselves. 

With the exception of Fathers Burton and Woods, men- 
tioned above, all modern interpreters agree in attributing 
active powers to the rationes seminales. St. George Mivart 
in his scholarly work, The Genesis of Species, says: “Now 
St. Augustine insists in a very remarkable manner on the 
merely derivative sense in which God’s creation of organic 
forms is to be understood; that is, that. God created them 
by conferring on the material world the power to evolve 
them under suitable conditions.”®*> Father Coakley is even 
more explicit: “‘As the first terms of the different series of 
created beings were not created in the enjoyment of their 
maximum of protection, but in germs, ‘quasi in grano,’ these 
germs must not be looked at as ‘destitute, both of internal 
and external reaction,’** unless we are to predicate similar 
mortality of that with which they are compared, the 
embryo of the tree, a perfect center of vital forces.”*’ The 
Rev. P. M. Northcote has this clear comment on Augustine, 
De Trint. III, 16: “From this quotation it may be clearly 
seen that St. Augustine holds that when God created the 
material universe, He placed in it active energies, which . 
are the secondary causes under himself, the First Cause, 
for the production of all things that come into existence.’’®® 

One of the best treatments of the theory of rationes 
seminales is that by Edouard Thamiry, Dean of the Fac- 
ulty of Theology, of the University of Lille, France, in his 


* Tract. de Opere Sex Dierum, Lib. II, ec. I. 
Pe Ls aciCat LW 
* Mivart: The Genesis of Species, p. 281. 
* This is quoted from Father Burton’s article in the same volume. 
“Irish Ecc. Rec. 4-S, Vol. V, p. 351. 
*“ Rev. P. M. Northcote: The Idea of Development, p. 29. 


44 


recent work, entitled “De L’Influence.” He is very clear 
in his interpretation of Augustine. After showing how 
the Fathers adapted the Stoic theory of seminal powers he» 
adds: “C’est sous cet aspect qu’a travers les livres de/ 
Plotin et de ses disciples, Saint Augustin envisage d’abord 
le probleme. Seulement il distingue nettement les raisons 
idéales et causales, qui sont dans le Verbe divin, d’avec les 
raisons séminales, qui résident dans la matiére et sont des 
puissance passives et actives d’ot decoulent les effets natu- 
rales des étres.’*® The author makes two statements here: 
first, that Augustine clearly distinguished between the ideal 
reasons in the mind of God and their counterpart, the semi- 
nal reasons in matter; second, that these were the powers 
both active and passive from which natural effects were to 
flow. The rationes seminales existed in matter and were 
the powers which resulted in the natural activity of beings. 
One more authority must be quoted. Canon Dorlodot, di- 
rector of- the Geological Institute at Louvain University, 
commenting on Augustine, De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. IV, ec. 
XXXII, “Alioguin st rerum naturales—oriri et perfict 
possunt,” says: “In this passage, St. Augustine clearly 
denies that the subjects containing the rationes causales 
were, according to his hypothesis, created ova or seeds. It 
was rather inorganic matter, and in the particular case of 
the birds the ‘humid element’—i. e., water. Evidently, also, 
the powers referred to are active ones, since they are identi- 
fied with the powers of development situated in an ovum.’’®° 

Summing up the evidence for and against what I might 
call the activity theory of the rationes seminales, it seems 
clear that the arguments are overwhelmingly in favor of 
the theory. It is difficult to understand how any other 
interpretation can be given to the words of Augustine him- 
self. Then the clear words of St. Thomas, supported by 
Suarez and a long line of modern writers, from Mivart to 
Dorlodot, put the question beyond a doubt. Those who 
defended the passive interpretation did so because of some 
false notions, e. g., the early Scholastics, by their theory of 
the generic forms, and Duns Scotus by his failure to deter- 


“ Edouard Thamiary: De I’Influence, p. 202. 
* Dorlodot: Darwinism and Catholic Thought, p. 83. 


45 


mine properly the nature of secondary instruments or 
causes. In our time, Fathers Burton and Woods have been 
led by their antagonism to evolution. Augustine undoubt- 
edly attributed active powers to the rationes seminales. 


A. THE MANNER IN WHICH FUTURE BEINGS ARE CONTAINED 
IN THE Rationes Seminales 


The statement by Dorlodot, quoted above (n. 60), sums 
up accurately the present stage of our investigation into 
the nature of the rationes seminales. Two facts have been 
ascertained: 1, that the subject containing the rationes 
seminales is inorganic matter and not created ova, cells or 
seeds; and 2, that the powers referred to are both active 
and passive. There are two other questions that must be 
answered before this phase of our study can be said to be 
complete. The first is: how were these rationes seminales 
contained in the inorganic matter; and the second, were 
they determined exactly for each being that was later to 
appear or were they more or less general and the particular 
form of their development left to external circumstances? 
The answers to these questions, especially the latter, assume 
great importance in view of their bearing on the question 
of evolution. The nature of these answers will go a long 
way in determining whether the proponents of the evolu- 
tionary hypothesis are justified in appealing to the author- 
ity of St. Augustine to confirm their theory, as has so often 
been done. 


In attempting a solution of the difficulties proposed, it 
must be recalled that the age of Augustine was not one of 
scientific investigation and that Augustine himself was not 
a scientist but a theologian. As he tells us himself, his 
desire was to know God and himself: “Deum et animam 
scire cuptio.”*t Nevertheless he did not condemn a knowl- 
edge of the theories of the pagan philosophers and of the 
natural facts as evil, as did some of his contemporaries, but 
he values them only in so far as they help him to achieve 
his purpose. He accepted the current scientific theories of 
his time provided they were not irreconcilable with the 


* Soliloquia, I, 2. 
46 


teachings of the Scriptures. Two of these are important 
for our present study, that the material world was com- 
posed of four elements—earth, air, fire and water—and 
that lower animals were generated spontaneously from 
inorganic matter and from decaying flesh. Both of these 
are rejected today but they were accepted as facts by the 
most learned men from the time of the ancient Greek 
Physicists until comparatively recent times. In the De Gen. 
ad Lit. he clearly indicates his belief in the theory of the 
four elements. He expends some effort in proving that the 
Scripture though not expressly mentioning the element air 
nevertheless does imply its existence. He also shows how 
the five senses can be referred to the four elements. ‘“Jdeo 
autem caloris privatione, cum corpus nimie frigescit 
obtundi sensum, quia notus pigrescit, qui ex calore inest 
corport dum ignis aerem, et aer humida, et humor terrena 
quaeque afficit, subtilioribus scilicet crassiora penetranti- 
bus.”*? He is equally explicit in regard to spontaneous 
generation: “Nam pleraque eorum aut de vivorum corporum 
vitiis, vel purgamentis vel exhalationibus aut cadaverum 
tabe gignuntur; quaedam etiam de corruptione lignorum et 
herbarum, quaedam de corruptionibus fructuum.’® It is 
in the light of these two theories that we must seek an 
answer to the questions proposed. 

Augustine knew nothing of the chemical elements familiar 
to scientists at present; he did not have our atomic and 
molecular theories to assist him; electricity, steam and 
explosives were as yet unknown quantities. It would be 
absurd, therefore, to expect to find in Augustine an expla-~ 
nation of natural phenomena, couched in modern scientific 
terminology or exactness. Of this much we are already 
certain, that in Augustine’s opinion the rationes seminales 
were real active powers contained somehow in the primitive 
elements. Now were these powers distributed equally in 
the four elements or were they confined to certain ones 
only? Again were the powers in one element capable of 
acting independently of those in the other elements or was 
cooperation or interaction necessary? These are the ques- 
tions that we must ask Augustine to answer. 

? De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. III, c. IV. 


Snes tb Liivc.. XIV. 
47 


In regard to the first there is no dispute. Augustine 
very definitely puts the rationes seminales in only two of 
the elements, namely, earth and water. More than that, 
he specifies which beings | had their origin in the one and 
which in the other. In the following passage he outlines 
the order of creation through the six days “non intervallis 
temporum,” as he says, “sed connexione causarum.”** He 
assigns the work of the third, fifth, and sixth days thus: 
“Tertio, species maris et terrae, atque in terra potentiahter, 
ut ita dicam, natura herbarum atque lignorum. Sic enm 
terra ad Dei verbum ea produxit, antequam exorta essent, 
accipiens omnes numeros eorum quos per tempora exsereret 
secundum suum genus. . . . Quinto, aquarum natura, 

produxit ad Der verbum indigenas suas omnia 
eee natatilia et volatilia;.et haec potentialiter in nume- 
ros, qui per congruos temporum motus exsererentur. Sexto, 
terrestria similiter animalia, tamquam ex ultimo elemento 
mundi ultima; nthilominus potentialiter quorum numeros 
tempus postea visibiliter explicaret.”** No attempt will be 
made here to explain Augustine’s use of the days, or his 
theory with regard to the appearance of things. The pas- 
sage is quoted merely to show his opinion that all living 
beings were contained potentially either in the water or in 
the earth; the flying and swimming things in the former; 
plants, trees and animals in the latter. Later in the same 
book he explains that his doctrine about the simultaneity 
of creation pertains not only to the inorganic world, “sed 
etiam illa quae aqua et terra produxit potentialitern atque 
causaliter.”’*> Many other similar statements can be found 
in Augustine’s works. In them all he states explicitly that 
all living things are to come forth either from the earth or 
the water and this of course is because of the rationes 
seminales placed in them at the beginning. 

The second question proposed was whether these powers 
were able to act independently or whether the cooperation 
of an external agent was necessary. If the external agent 
was necessary, was this agent purely natural or an inter- 


eriLiss Lak De AV tC ne 
gd ae ae. Up 
iss ls LV Ce oe LL Ls 


48 


vention of God? We have seen that Father Burton and 
Father Woods held that divine intervention was required. 
Still Augustine’s answer to this question seems to the writer 
to be quite clear and definite. These seminal powers do 
not act independently but are dependent upon external 
natural conditions. When I say natural conditions, I do 
not mean that Augustine denied the necessity of divine 
providence. Again and again he states that not only the 
activity but the very existence of all things is impossible 
without divine support. His doctrine on this subject will 
be discussed in the succeeding chapter. All that is meant 
here is that no special act or interference of God is required 
to induce the seminal powers to act. Neither does this 
theory of the necessity of a cooperating agent militate in 
any way against the doctrine that the seminal powers are 
active. Hydrogen and oxygen certainly have within them- 
selves the active power to unite and form water. Still this 
chemical change will not take place unless these elements 
are subjected to a certain degree of heat. Nor can it be 
said that the heat there causes the change for it might be 
applied to any other substances without effecting such re- 
sults. The heat is necessary but only to assist the active 
powers already contained in the elements. So too with the 
rationes seminales, the extrinsic conditions are necessary 
but only to induce the activity, not to determine its direc- 
tion. 

The principal evidence for Augustine’s stand on this 
question is taken from the same chapter of the De Trinitate 
as quoted above (nn. 44-47) to prove the activity of the 
seminal reasons. The general theme is the miracles and he 
is attempting to distinguish true miracles from false. 
Among the latter he numbers the deeds of the magicians, 
and he explains at some length how the magical arts are 
practiced. It is in this explanation that his principles of 
natural causes are indicated. His argument may be briefly 
stated thus: The elements of the earth have definite powers 
which in the ordinary course of events follow certain laws. 
The evil spirits having a more intimate knowledge of these 
powers and their laws can use them to produce results 
which are beyond our possibilities. These evil spirits, there- 


49 


fore, are not to be considered the creators of things nor 
miracle workers since they are but making use of natural 
agents. He presents the argument in several ways; for 
instance: “Nec ideo putandum est istis transgressoribus 
angelis ad nutum servire hance visibihum rerum materiam, 
sed Deo potius, a quo haec potestas datur, quantum in sub- 
limi et spirituali sede incommutabilis judicat. Nam et 
damnatis iniquis etiam in metallo servit aqua et ignis et 
terra, ut faciant inde quod volunt, sed quantum sinitur. 
Nec sane creatores illi mali angeli dicendi sunt, quia per 
illos magi resistentes famulo Dei ranas et serpentes 
fecerunt: non enim ipsi eas creaverunt. Omnium quippe 
rerum quaedam semina in istis corporeis mundi hujus ele- 
mentis latent.’’®* There is here a manipulation of the forces 
placed in matter by God, to produce effects existing poten- 
tially therein, just as the chemist mixes his elements in 
certain quantities and under certain conditions to bring 
about desired results. Both produce their results by arti- 
ficially fixing the conditions necessary for the latent forces 
to act. 

There is another passage in the same chapter which is 
even more convincing. “Invisibilium enim seminum crea- 
tor, ipse creator est omnium rerum: quoniam quaecumque 
nascendo ad oculos nostros exeunt, ex occultis seminibus 
accipiunt progrediendi promordia, et incrementa debitae 
magnitudinis distinctionesque formarum ab originalibus 
tanquam regulis sumunt. Sicut ergo nec parentes dicimus 
creatores hominum, nec agricolas creatores frugum, quam- 
vis eorum extrinsecus adhibitis motibus ista creandi Dei 
virtus interius operetur: ita non solum malos, sed nec bonos 
Angelos fas est putare creatores, si pro subtilitate sui sensus 
et corporis, semina rerum istarum nobis occultiora noverunt 
et ea per congruas temperationes elementorum latenter 
spargunt, atque ita gignendarum rerum et accelerandorum 
incrementorum praebent occasiones.’’*® Notice that the 
source of all things are the invisible seminal powers; their 
development is according to “originalibus regulis” or natu- 
ral laws. Moreover, all artificial cultivation is made pos- 


“ De 'Trinit., Lib, III, ¢. VIII. 
* Tbid. 


sible only through these powers and laws and by controlling 
the conditions under which these laws operate, their develop- 
ment can be regulated. . This seems to me clear proof of 
Augustine’s conviction that the rationes seminales depend 
for their development upon natural causes. 

However, since this point is so important and there are 
other passages so directly covering the issue, I think it well 
to give them here. Contrasting original creation with later 
development, he says: ‘“‘Aliud est enim ex intimo ac summo 
causarum cardine condere atque adminstrare creaturam, 
quod qui facit, solus creator est Deus: aliud autem pro dis- 
tributis ab illo viribus et facultatibus aliquam operationem 
forinsecus admoveret tunc vel tune, sic vel sic exeat quod 
creatur. Ista quippe originaliter ac promordialiter im 
quadam textura elementorum cuncta jam creata sunt; sed 
acceptis opportunitatibus prodeunt.’’*® God created these 
powers and distributed them in the elements at the begin- 
ning and when the right opportunity presents itself they 
come forth. But he goes even further and says that the 
conditions necessary to induce the hidden causes to come 
forth may be arranged artificially: ‘“Adhibentes autem 
forinsecus accedentes causas, quae tametst non sunt natu- 
rales, tamen secundum naturam adhibentur, ut ea quae 
secreto naturae sint abdita continentur, erumpant et foris 
creentur quodam modo explicando mensuras et numeros et 
pondera sua, quae in occulto acceperunt ab illo qui omnia in - 
mensura et numero et pondere disposuit.’” The word 
“creentur’” is clearly used in the wider sense referred to 
above (n. 47), meaning the unfolding of the measures, 
numbers and weights of the hidden causes. 

Thomas Aquinas certainly understood the rationes semi- - 
nales to be secondary causes acting according to natural 
laws and producing their effects by mutual interaction. 
Treating of the necessity of the opus distinctionis he says: 
“Natura in operibus sex dierum taliter instituta est, ut 
naturae principia tune condita in se subsisterent, et quod 
ex eis alia propagari possent per mutuam actionem et pas- 
sionem; et ideo oportutt eis tunc esse, conferri et virtutes 


ea LsiKy Car bes 
® Tbid. 


51 


activas et passivas, quas Augustinus vocat rationes semi- 
nales quibus ex eis effectus, consequentes producerentur.””™ 
These principles of nature having existence in themselves 
are such that other things are to develop from them through 
their mutual reactions. | 

It has been established that the rationes seminales are 
definite active and passive powers inherent in earth and 
water; that these powers are stirred into action by the 
influence of external agents, which however are purely — 
natural; that this process is carried out through laws which 
likewise are natural in as much as they proceed from the 
very nature of the elements. St. Augustine, with the limited 
scientific knowledge available in his day, could go no fur- 
ther in his explanation. Today scientific development 
makes it possible to peer more closely into the secrets of 
nature, and from the facts there observed we can under- 
stand even better than Augustine the nature of the rationes 
seminales. 

Modern science reveals to us in many ways the fact that 
there is in all bodies an active principle. Resistance, sub- 
stantial changes, chemical affinity, production of crystals, 
emission of rays, all are experimental proof of the existence 
of directive force inherent in substances. We might take 
anyone of these to illustrate the theory of rationes semi- 
nales but probably an example from chemical affinity will 
be most easily understood. For instance, sodium and 
chlorine have an affinity for each other which is evident by 
the readiness with which they unite to form the common 
compound salt. There is in these two elements not merely 
the possibility of becoming salt but a positive tendency, a 
determination, a predisposition to effect this result. This 
predisposition, common to both, establishes a certain pro- 
portion between them and gives them an aptitudo ad simili- 
tudinem accipiendam.”? Consequently if these two are 
brought together there is an immediate and spontaneous 
movement resulting in a union of the two elements in a 
new substance with its own distinctive properties. Now 


"In II Sent. Dist. XIII, q. I, art. 1. For St. Thomas’ distinction. 
between the opus creationis, opus distinctionis and opus ornatus see 
the article just quoted and Summa I, q. LXVIUI, art I. 


*Thamiry: De Rationibus Seminalibus, p. 83. 


52 


this propensity inclining the energies inherent in the atoms 
of these elements to a specific end and the capability of the 
subject matter of receiving this change is called the ratio 
seminalis. . 

It can be shown that this explanation agrees with the 
scholastic principles of matter and form. As noted above, 
the rationes seminales do not exist in matter without form, 
but only in a complete being composed of matter and form. 
“Rationes seminales non sunt intelligendae praeexistere in 
materia ante adventum formae.’? They determine or indi- 
viduate the specific powers of this complete being and con- 
stitute that potentia materiae from which new forms are 
educed. In every substantial change there is a change of 
forms, the old form being lost and a new form assumed. 
New forms.are educed from matter in the manner in which 
they are potentially contained therein. St. Thomas says: 
“Actum extrahi de potentia materiae nihil aliud est quam 
aliquid fiert in actu quod erat in potentia.”’’* The matter 
then, which is only passive, concurs in the production of 
new forms, in so far as it has an intrinsic aptitude to re- 
ceive such a new form. But matter does not exist except 
in union with some form. Therefore in a concrete being 
there are active powers, bound up in the forms which like- 
wise concur in the production of new forms. Thus in the 
example of chemical change given above, we had first the 
elements with their subject matter and the forms of sodium 
and chlorine respectively. In the second stage we had the 
subject matter of these two united with the new form of 
salt. Now in this change the subject matter of each ele- 
ment concurred in so far as it possessed an intrinstic apti- 
tude to receive this form of salt. But the subject matter 
in the first condition did not exist alone, but in union with 
the forms of sodium and chlorine and therefore the active 
powers contained in these forms also concurred in the pro- 
duction of the new form of salt.. Thus we see how the 
principles of matter and form afford a basis for the active 
and passive powers which constitute the rationes seminales 
and together with them an explanation of substantial 


Puy sent, Dist AVITI, ‘q!i1;-a; 2; ad 2um. 
spum. Le G0, a.°2,.ad 2um. 


53 


change. With the help of these principles and the illustra- 
tion, we can understand better that the rationes seminales 
comprise the inherent aptitude residing in the potentiality 
of matter to sustain specified forms and the active powers 
intrinsic to the form united with this matter and likewise 
determined towards a particular end. Thus the first of the 
questions proposed on page 46 is answered. 


The second of the two questions asked above, v2z., were 
the rationes seminales determined exactly for each being 
that was later to appear or were they more or less general 
and the particular form of their development left to external 
circumstances, remains to be answered. In the foregoing 
discussion reference was made to inorganic bodies only and 
their powers. Still we know that according to the theory 
of St. Augustine all living things were contained potentially 
in these rationes seminales or powers of corporate matter. 
The question here is whether just as the substance salt is 
contained specifically in the potentialities of sodium and 
chlorine, so the various living beings were so determined in 
the rationes seminales. The present purpose is only to de- 
termine the nature of the seminal powers and not their 
manner of development. Hence whatever the answer to the 
present question be, the discussion of the order of appear- 
ance of the various forms must be reserved for the next 
chapter. For even if there was a definite ratio seminalis 
for each thing that was later to appear, there would still be 
the possibility of this ratio seminalis developing immedi- 
_ ately into its proper form or mediately through intervening 
forms. 


A thorough examination of the various statements of 
Augustine, bearing on this point, makes it certain that it 
was his opinion that all the potentialities and causes of all 
things that were later to appear were fixed in the begin- 
ning not merely generically but specifically, in other words, 
that the rationes seminales were determined exactly for all 
future beings. We have seen that by the rationes seminales 
are meant the natural powers, resulting from the nature 
of original elements. Now when we say that they were 
fixed for all future beings, we do not mean that God had 
separated out small groups of these elements, each to 


54 


) 


develop its own proper being. We mean that these powers 
were there in matter, capable of producing the various 
effects that we now see and that God had commanded, as it 
were, these powers to produce definitely these effects. We 
might illustrate our meaning by the example of a contractor 
who undertakes to build a house. He has on the ground 
where the building is to be erected all the material that is 
to be used in its construction. He obtains skilled workmen, 
gives them his plans and orders them to use this material 
in such a way that the desired house will result. With the 
same material he might have had any other of a number 
of different kinds of houses built; but having given this 
one plan to the workingmen, with orders to build accord- 
ingly, only that one definitely planned house will be erected. 
‘Now, mutatis mutandis, that is what happened in the be- 
ginning of the world. The material was there with its 
definite qualities; God, the divine contractor, had His plans 
very definitely in His mind from all eternity. But here 
there is a difference. Instead of giving these plans to 
artisans and ordering them to carry them out, He consigned 
these plans, by His almighty power, directly to the physical 
elements and put into them the necessity of working out by 
themselves the definite results which He desired. The 
rationes seminales thus become the permanent instruments 
of the Creator in the production of living things. Cajetan 
points out the distinction between a temporary instrument 
and a permanent instrument. The former is like a chisel 
in the production of a statue. It does nothing of itself but 
needs the immediate action of the artist to be effective. The 
latter is more like a clock which when started keeps on 
going without the intervention of the maker. This one 
shares permanently in the power derived from the agent; 
that one for a time only.*®> Both are nevertheless. instru- 
ments, because as Dorlodot says: “Every created thing is 
by its very nature an instrument of God.’’’® ‘The seminal 
reasons, aS we have seen, need not the immediate interven- 
tion of God, but work out their effects by power given to 
them in the beginning. 

* Comment. on Summa, I, q. CXVIII, a. I: See also Dorlodot: 


Darwinism and Catholic Thought, p. 119. 
aon. cit, pe, 121; 


55 


There are many passages in which Augustine clearly 
indicates his belief that the various beings which later 
developed were determined definitely from the beginning. 
In the third book of the De Genesi ad Lit. he asks why the 
words secundum genus are said of certain creatures but 
not of man and after giving several possible solutions, he 
finally concludes thus: ‘“‘Potest enim nunc fortasse sufficere, 
propterea de homine non dictum esse, ‘secundum genus,’ 
quia unus fiebat, de quo etiam femina facta est. Non enim 
multa genera hominum sicut herbarum, lignorum, pis- 
cium, volatilium, serpentium, pecorum, bestiarum: ut sic 
diceretur generatim, ut inter se similia atque ad unam 
originem seminis pertinentia distingueretur a caeteris.’’™? 
Augustine here does not merely contrast the unity of man’s 
origin with the multiplicity, shown by the different classes 
which he enumerates, but with the many varieties found in 
each of these classes, with the multa genera herbarum, 
lignorum, etc. He is plainly speaking of the work of the 
six days and says that at that time all these different species 
were definitely fixed. The word genera is not used in the 
technical sense which modern biologists have adopted, but 
simply to indicate classes. 

Further evidence of this opinion is to be found in Book 
IV. The author is discussing whether all things were 
established at once or in the course of time: “Numquid— 
simul omnia facta sunt? annon potius per intervalla tem- 
porum secundum praefinitos dies?’’. He concludes, as we 
know, in favor of the first alternative. ‘“‘Qua propter quam 
facilis ei efficacissimus motus est tam facile Deus condidit 
omnia; quoniam per illam (1. e., Saptentiam Dei) sunt con- 
dita.’ Then he adds these significant words which seem 
to the writer to cover the point at issue: “—wut hoc quod 
nune videmus temporalibus intervallis ea moveri ad pera- 
genda quae suo cuique generi competunt, ex illis insitis 
rationibus veniat, quas tanquam seminaliter sparsit Deus 
in ictu condendi.”** The Latin here is not easy, the quod 
clause being explanatory, not relative, and the meaning 
this: “So that the fact that we now see these things moving 


"De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. III, c. XII. 
® De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. IV, c. XXIII. 


56 


themselves—moveri is used reflexively—through intervals 
of time to develop that which is proper to each one’s nature, 
comes from these implanted powers which, etc.—’ There 
are two statements: 1, that things develop those character- 
istics which are proper to each one’s own nature; 2, that 
this fact is due to the principles or seminal reasons which 
God put there in the beginning. That beings develop true 
to their own forms is due to the powers God gave them at 
the beginning. 

Many other statements can be given which imply Augus- 
tine’s belief in the original specification of the rationes 
seminales. A few of these will be given here with only a 
word of comment. In explaining the work of creation as 
manifested to’ us in the six days, he says that on the third 
day there was produced, “natura herbarum atque lignorum 
—, accipiens omnes numeros eorum quos per tempora ex- 
sereret secundum suum genus’; and on the fifth day, ‘“‘omnia 
natatilia et volatilia; et haec potentialiter in numeris qui 
per congruos temporum motus exsererentur”’; and on the 
sixth day, “terrestria animalia—potentialiter, quorum 
numeros tempus postea visibiliter explicaret.’’® The repe- 
tition of the word “numbers” is intended to emphasize the 
completeness of.each day’s creation with all its varieties. 
Later he explains what this completeness entails: ‘“consum- 
mata quidem quia nihil habent illa in naturis propriis, 
quibus suorum temporum cursus agunt, quod non in istis 
causaliter factum sit.”’®° Again he tells us that the elements 
have “‘definitam vim qualitatemque suam” determining the 
possibilities of each. From these “primordiis rerum’ all 
things arising in time, “processusque sumunt, finesque et 
decessiones sui cujusque generis.”*+ In view of all this 
evidence the question asked above, viz., were the rationes 
seminales determined exactly for each being that was later 
to appear, must be answered in the affirmative. The crea- 
tor’s plans included the particular form of each being that 
was to come. He put into the primitive elements the power 
of producing future beings and the plans according to 
which these beings were to be produced. 

soli A a i ona 


1 ¢., Lib. VI, c> XI. 
Hive. Tab. 1x, ¢, XVII. 


57 


This brings to an end our discussion of the nature of the 
rationes seminales. We began with an inquiry into the 
use of the terms and found that they are called rationes 
because they are derived from the ideal reasons existing 
in the mind of the Creator, and seminales because these 
potentialities are wrapped up in the earth as the potentiali- 
ties of the mature being are wrapped up in its seed. Our 
study next led us to the conclusion that the rationes semi- 
nales had physical existence but not as separate entities, 
as cells, ova, or seeds. We then learned from St. Thomas 
that there were three opinions in his day regarding the 
rationes seminales. According to the first, they were the 
generic forms, existing before and distinct from the specific 
forms. The second considered them to be the potentialities 
preexisting in prime matter prior to its union with forms. 
Both of these opinions Thomas rejects, the first because the 
distinction between the generic and specific forms is not . 
real but mental, and the second because it makes the semi- 
nal reasons passive only whereas they are both active and 
passive. The third opinion is the one he accepts and the 
one that is defended in this work, v22., the rationes seminales 
are the active and passive powers existing in corporal 
matter. Since this opinion has been questioned even in our 
day, greater attention was given to it and proofs alleged 
from St. Augustine, medieval and modern writers. We 
then explained that these powers remained latent until, 
stimulated by external natural conditions, their potentiality 
was reduced to act according to natural law. This activity 
of inherent powers was further illustrated by an example 
of chemical affinity, wherein it was shown how the active 
and passive powers were contained in the chemical elements 
of sodium and chlorine and the contribution of each in pro- 
ducing the form of salt. This explanation was considered 
in the light of the scholastic principles of matter and form 
and its agreement was noted. Finally it was brought out 
that the particular forms of all future living beings were 
definitely fixed in the vationes seminales from the begin- 
ning. 

What then are the rationes seminales? At the beginning 
of this chapter we stated that no attempt would be made 
to define them until their nature had been definitely estab- 

58 


lished. Trusting that this has been accomplished, we look 
for a definition embodying our determinations and find one 
ready made in a work of St. Thomas. It is in the Summa 
where the Angelic Doctor discusses the action of bodies. 
He says: “Et ideo Augustinus omnes virtutes activas et 
passivas, quae sunt principia generationum, et motuum 
naturalium, seminales rationes vocat.’’** 

This passage is translated by the Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province thus: ‘‘Therefore Augustine fittingly 
gave the name of seminal virtues (seminales rationes) to 
all those active and passive virtues which are the principles 
of natural generation and movement.’’** There is just one 
word in this translation that I would change. The “‘virtues”’ 
does not seem to me to convey the true meaning as well as 
the word “powers.” Accordingly I would give this as a 
fitting definition of the rationes seminales, according to the 
concept of Augustine: “Those active and passive powers 
which are the principles of natural generation and move- 
ment.” 


* Summa, I, q. CXV, art. 2. 
° The Summa of St. Thomas Aquinas, Part I, third number, q. 
CXV. Article 2. 


59 


CHAPTER IV 


THE RATIONES SEMINALES—THEIR ORIGIN AND 
DEVELOPMENT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE 
TO MAN 1 


1. AUGUSTINE’S CONCEPTION OF CREATION 


In this chapter it is our purpose to answer the questions 
left over from the preceding chapter. In general they are: 
1. Whence did these rationes seminales come, and when 
did they enter into the elements; 2. what was the order 
and method of their development; and, 3. how do they ex- 
plain the origin of man. It is, of course, St. Augustine’s 
answer to these questions that we are seeking. 

In regard to the origin of the ratzones seminales it must 
be borne in mind that in answering this question Augustine 
is really giving his interpretation of the “days” of Genests. 
_ As pointed out before, he had for his purpose the explana- 
tion of the Scriptures in a way that was consistent with 
the text and at the same time would merit the respectful 
consideration of the scientists of his day.t Augustine’s 
answer to the question how did the rationes seminales come 
into existence is definite and indisputable. God created 
them. His belief in the creation of all things is so clear 
that it does not need proof here. But how did God create 
things? Did the act of creation extend over periods of 
time, or was it completed instantly? When this act was 
completed, what form did things have? 

Augustine is answering this question, as the others, by 
the authority of the Sacred Text. His keen mind has noted 
that some things contained therein are to be taken literally, 
while others only figuratively. In the opening chapter of 
the De Gen. ad Lit. he says: “In narratione ergo rerum 
factarum quaeritur utrum omnia secundum figuratum 
tantummodo intellectum accipiantur, an etiam secundum 





*De Gen. ad Lat., Lib. I, c. XIX. 
60 


fidem rerum gestarum asserenda et defendenda sint. Nam 
non esse accipienda figuraliter, nullus Christianus dicere 
audebit.”? With this in mind he seeks to determine whether 
we should give a figurative meaning to the “days,” as used 
by the sacred writer. After pointing out the impossibility 
of accepting the literal translation, he proceeds to give us 
what he thinks is the correct meaning of the creation ac- 
count. His explanation may be summed up as follows: 
1. God created all things, inanimate and animate, organic 
and inorganic, at one moment by a single act of His will. 
2. At the beginning some things existed actually with the 
form that they have today; others only potentially. In the 
former were the four elements, earth, air, fire and water, 
and the Angels; in the latter class were all living things 
that were later to appear upon the earth. 38. These living 
things were to develop from potentiality to act when the 
right conditions came about. We shall take each of these 
points in order. 

The first point is that the act of creation did not extend 
over a period of time but was completed in its entirety 
in a single instant. In the fifth book of the De Gen. ad Lit. 
he sums up his conclusions regarding the work of creation 
thus: “Sicut autem in ipso grano invisibiliter erant omnia 
simul quae per tempora in arborem surgerent, ita ipse 
mundus cogitandus est cum Deus simul omnia creavit, 
habuisse simul omnia quae in illo et cum illo facta sunt, 
quando factus est dies: non solum coelum cum. sole et luna 
et sideribus, quorum species manet motu rotabili, et terram 
et abyssos, quae velut inconstantes motus patiuntur, atque 
inferius adjuncta partem alteram mundo conferant; sed 
etiam illa quae aqua et terra produxit potentialiter atque 
causaliter, priusquam per temporum moras ita exorirentur, 
quomodo nobis jam nota sunt in eis operibus, quae Deus 
usque nunc operator.”* Here Augustine compares the earth 
to a seed, saying that just as everything which later de- 
velops in the tree was contained in the seed, so at the time 
when God made everything at once, the earth had every- 
thing which was made actually or potentially. There were 


Rr ae 
* De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. X, c. XXXIII. 


61 


the heavens with the sun, moon and stars and the land and 
sea, but also those things which the land and sea produced 
in the course of time. 


It is clear that Augustine meant to include everything: 
the celestial firmament, the land and sea and all things 
which came forth from them. All these were there at that 
moment when God created everything at once. In the next 
paragraph, going back to the text of Scripture, he explains 
that God did not act then as he does now, but “zllo modo quo 
creavit omnia simul, senarioque dierum numero consum- 
mavit, cum diem quem fecit, eis quae fecit, sexies praesen- 
tavit, non alternante spatio temporaliter, sed ordinata 
cognitione causaliter.”’* All things were made at once but 
were presented to men as it were in six phases, not in 
intervals of time but in the order in which they were known 
causally. After that first act, there was nothing else 
created: “Unde nullam ulterius creaturam instituens, sed 
ea quae omnia simul fecit, administratorio actu gubernans 
et movens.”> The divine Providence continued to watch 
and guide that which He had created at once. 


The important point here is that in Augustine’s system 
there is but one creation, that moment at the beginning ot 
time when God created all things simultaneously. As men- 
tioned before, Father Burton, C.M., refers to a first and 
second creation, while Father Woods, S.J., holds that ac- 
cording to Augustine, creation in God is one simple act of 
absolute simplicity; while in creatures it “consists formally 
in the creation of matter with its passive potency deter- 
mined primarily and directly to those creatures which 
without antecedent seed were, in obedience to the creative 
word, to come into existence in their various kinds; while 
adequately it includes the successive appearances of each 
_of its kind at its appointed time.’® There are two phases, 
as it were, in the act of creation: the first is that by which 
matter with its seminal reasons came into existence, and 
_ the second, by which individuals of each species pass from 
potency to act. According to his interpretation the seminal 


Ti ADs Vai 6," ALL, 
* Ibid. 
* Augustine and Evolution, p. 45. 


62 


reasons are purely passive potencies which require the crea- 
tive word of God to become act. The work of administration 
begins with the first individuals of each kind. Here too, he 
says, is Augustine’s use of the plural tempora or times. 
It is because ‘each individual creature has its own indi- 
vidual time having its appointed place in the universal time 
of this coexisting order of creation.’”’ The point at issue 
is precisely this: did Augustine extend the work of crea- 
tion to include the transition of creatures from potentiality 
to actuality, from the seminal reasons to the living indi- 
viduals. As implied in our previous discussion on the 
nature of the rationes seminales, our answer to this ques- 
tion is in the negative. The work of creation, from the 
viewpoint of creatures as well as that of God, was com- 
pleted at that instant when God made everything simul- 
taneously. The fulfillment of the seminal reasons in indi- 
viduals was not the completion of the creative act but a 
natural development of the inherent powers in matter 
under the same administrative activity of God as that 
which sustains and supports all natural movement today. 
In the fifth book of the De Genesi ad Lit., Augustine is 
explaining Genesis, II, 5: “And every plant of the field, 
. before it sprung up in the earth and every herb of the 
ground before it grew,” and he points out that these were 
created causally in the earth or ground at the beginning 
when God made everything. ‘“Causaliter ergo tunc dictum 
est produxisse terram herbam et lignum, id est, producendi 
accepisse virtutem.”® Then considering the statement that 
God planted Paradise, he says quite explicitly that in doing 
so God did not add anything to creation but by His admin- 
istration that which He had made before came to its perfec- 
tion. “Nam utique postea plantavit Deus paradisum juxta 
orientem, et ejecit 1bi de terra omne lignum speciosum ad 
aspectum, et bonum ad escam (Gen. II, 8, 9): nec tamen 
dicendum est eum aliquid tunc addidisse creaturae, quod 
ante non fecerat, quod velut illi perfectioni, qua omnia bona 
valde sexto die consummavit, post esse addendum: sed quia 
jam omnes naturae fruticum atque lignorum in prima con- 


PASCO. OD: 
* De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. V, c. IV. 


63 


ditione factae fuerint, a qua conditione Deus requievit, 
movens deinde administransque per temporales cursus illa 
ipsa qua condidit, et a quibus conditis requievit, non solum 
tune plantavit paradisum, sed etiam nunc omnia quae 
nascuntur.”’® Nothing is to be added after the first creation 
but thereafter the administration is to become effective 
through the course of time. Augustine is clearly referring 
here to the first appearance of trees in the garden of Para- 
dise and says that this appearance is not a creation but a 
development under the administration of God while time 
was going on, per temporales cursus. 

This administration is the same as God exercises today. 
“__-sed etiam illa quae aqua et terra produait potentialiter 
atque causaliter, priusquam per temporum moras ita exori- 
rentur, quomodo nobis jam nota sunt in eis operibus, quae 
Deus usque nunc operatur.’’® Again, speaking of God’s 
rest on the seventh day, the says: “Potest etiam intelligr 
Deum requievisse a condendis generibus creaturae, quia 
ultra jam non condidit aliqua genera nova: deinceps autem 
usque nunc et ultra operari eorumdem generum administra- 
tionem, quae tunc instituta sunt." It is only by doing 
violence to the text that one can make the act of creation 
extend to the actual appearance of the creature on earth 
and limit the work of administration by such appearance. 
A careful and unbiased reading of these texts must bring 
the conviction that Augustine held that it was by exactly 
the same providence whereby living things reproduce 
themselves today that they were able to come forth from 
the rationes seminales in the earth to their individual com- 
pleteness. As the tree was potentially in the seed so all 
living things were potentially in the earth and the same 
divine cooperation which enables the tree to come forth 
from the seed, enabled all things to come forth from the 
earth. 

Before leaving this subject, something must be said 
about Augustine’s conception of time. We know that in his 
opinion, time began with creation and that no intervals 
of time elapsed during the creative act. But Woods says: 

ath Pee AD. Pa. @ BES 

te leC yt dalDsc Lia Om ds 


64 


“He (Augustine) saw the creature in its seminal reasons 
created in the roots of times; the creature tending to its 
existence in its own moment of time; the creature existing 
in its kind in the progressive course of time.’ According 
to this author the creative act was not completed in the 
individual until its appearance on earth. He then explains 
that no time intervened in the creative act because for this 
individual time did not begin before this appearance. But 
we have seen that the words of St. Augustine do not allow 
an extension of the creative act until the individual’s actual 
appearance and consequently this explanation of the time 
- of each individual is likewise without foundation. He says 
time began with creatures. ‘“Factae itaque creaturae moit- 
bus coeperunt currere tempora; unde ante creaturam frus- 
tra tempora requruntur, quasi possint inveniri tempora 
ante tempora.”'* We are not to consider ‘time as if it were 
not a creature, when it.is really the movement of creatures. » 
“__ecym sit creaturae motus ex alio in aliud.’’*+ God’s activ- 
ity in the days of Genesis was not the same as it is now. 
Now He acts in time: from His actions then, time began. 
“Quapropter cum primam conditionem creaturarum cogi- 
tamus, a quibus operibus suis Deus in septimo die requievit; 
nec illos dies sicut istos solares, nec ipsam operationem ita 
cogitare debemus, quemadmodum nune aliquid Deus opera- 
tur in tempore: sed quemadmodum operatus est unde inci- 
perent tempora, quemadmodum operatus est omnia simul.’’!® 
The prima conditio rerum is that which existed at the be- 
ginning when God created all things at once. After that 
He rested, i. e., there was no further creation. With that 
prime condition time(s) began. God has since adminis- 
tered in time the things then created. Woods lays stress 
on the use of the plural form, times, “in radicibus . . . tem- 
porum,’**® but here Augustine uses the same form for the 
beginning of time at the first moment of creation, ‘‘wnde 
inciperent tempora,’ showing thereby that the use of the 
plural form has no special significance or at least that the 


* Woods: Augustine and Evolution, p. 34. 
% De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. V, c. V. 

Lid, 

* Tbid. 

* Woods: Augustine and Evol::tion, p, 34. 


65 


phrase “in the roots of times” may refer to that moment 
when all things were created simultaneously. Moreover 
Augustine says that the living things developed from that 
prime condition “per temporales cursus’: (n. 9), “per tem- 
porum moras” (n. 10), which expressions can only indicate 
that time was going on for the things appearing. Augus- 
tine in using the plural form means merely periods of time, 
the intervals which elapsed between the creation of things 
potentially and their appearance on earth. It is the same 
mode of expression that Cicero uses when he says ‘‘longis 
temporibus ante,’!”? or “id certis temporibus futurum.’’ 
The Latin idiom requires the use of the plural form in some 
instances where the English uses the singular. The cele- 
brated Latin scholar, Robert Ogilvie, gives such an example: 
““Homeri incerta sunt tempora,”’ which he translates: “‘The 
time of Homer is uncertain.”!® It would seem then that 
Augustine’s use of the plural, “times,” rather disproves 
Father Woods’ theory than confirms it. 

That St. Thomas understood the teachings of Augustine 
in this way is quite evident. It must be remembered that 
the question is whether the work of creation in the indi- 
vidual being can be extended to its actual appearance on 
earth. The Angelic Doctor in discussing the question: 
“Utrum materiae formatio tota simul fuerit an succes- 
sive,’?° makes this statement: “Augustinus vult (lib. V, 
super Gen., Cap. XII et XIV) in ipso creationis principio 
quasdam res per species suas distinctas, fuisse productas in 
natura propria. ... . . Alia vero dicuntur esse producta 
in rationibus seminalibus tantum, ut animalia, plantae et 
homines; quae omnia postmodum in naturis propriis pro- 
ducta sunt illo opere quo post senarium illorum dierum 
numerum Deus naturam prius conditam administrat.’* 
Here Thomas is clearly interpreting Augustine; he is refer- 
ring to the moment of creation, and he says distinctly that 
at that moment some things were created in their proper 
forms, others in the rationes seminales; that the latter were 


* Cie: Reb, 2, 34; 5: 

Ls Oe Lark 23. 

cn Ogilvie- Souter : Horae Latinae, p. 281. 
eeLIO Ot Gia Visthc es 

Le ho meus 


66 


to be produced in their proper forms through the admin- 
istration of God. That administration began with the com- 
pletion of the work of the six days and included therefore 
the development of the rationes seminales from potency to 
act. In the same article he says expressly that the work of 
the six days was completed in an instant: ‘““Nam omnia opera 
sex dierum in eodem instants temporis simul sunt facta vel 
in actu vel in potentia.”?? He gives no hint of a first and 
second creation or of a formal and adequate creation. For 
him there was the simultaneous creation of all things and 
then the administration of all things in time. In his Com- 
mentary on the Sentences, he compares this opinion of St. 
Augustine with that of some of the other Fathers, and 
evaluates them thus: “Haec quidem positio (Gregori, et 
al.) est communior, et magis consona videtur litterae quan- 
tum ad superficiem; sed prior est rationabilior et magis ab 
irrisione infidelium sacram Scripturam defendens ... et 
haec opinio plus mihi placet.’”’?? Neither opinion is of faith 
and to Aquinas that of St. Augustine is more acceptable 
than the other.” 

Albertus Magnus, the teacher of St. Thomas, likewise 
notices this difference of opinion.?> He explains Augus- 
tine’s opinion thus: “Quod Augustinus super Genesim 
pluribus modis nititur ostendere, dicens elementa quatuor 
ita formata sicut modo apparent ab initio exstitisse, et 
coelum sideribus ornatum fuisse.i ..Quaenam vero non 
formaliter, sed materialiter tunc facta fuisse, quae post per 
temporis accessum formaliter distincta sunt: ut herbae, 
arbores, et forte animalia. Omnia ergo in ipso temporis 
initio facta esse dicunt: sed quaedam formaliter et secun- 
dum species quas habere cernimus, ut majores mundr 
partes: quaedam vero materialiter tantum.’”’®® The teacher 
and the pupil are in agreement in their interpretation of 
their common master. All things were created at once; but 
trees, herbs and even animals became formally distinct only 


* Tbhid. 

“In Iib. It Sent. Dist. XII, q. 1, a. 2. 

*In the Summa, I, a. LXXILV, ey 2, Thomas attempts to show 
that as regards the production of things, ‘there is not much difference 
between the two opinions. 

* In Lib. II Sent. Dist. XV, a. 6. 

** Ibid. 


67 


after a lapse of time. Augustine’s use of the plural “times” 
elicited no comment from either of them. 


Suarez, likewise, speaks about the simultaneous theory 
of creation but makes no limits or divisions in the effect 
upon creatures. He says: “D. Augustinus in hac sententia 
fuisse videtur ut totus hic mundus, ut coelis, elementis, et 
mixtis constat, simul in principio fuerit creatus: et conse- 
quenter quod aqua, terra ceteraque elementa in ea disposi- 
tione facta fuerint quad ad usum, generationem et conser- 
vationem mixtorum necessaria sunt. . . . De locis autem 
elementorum et de dispositione mundi, prout nunc est sine 
dubio sensit in primo instanti ita fuisse creatum.”?’ Later, 
in discussing why St. Augustine held that plants were pro- 
duced potentially, he adds: “Nam Augustinus in eam sen- 
tentiam inductus est, quia omnia istorum dierum opera in 
eodem puncto creationis simul credidit fuisse facta.”** Here 
again we have creation occurring in an instant without 
reference to a further possible explanation of the term. 


Modern authors have arrayed themselves on both sides 
of the question. We have seen Father Burton’s interpreta- 
tion of a first and second creation; also Father Woods’ 
extension of the act of creation to the moment of the 
appearance of the individual being. Both of these inter- 
pretations are without foundation. Of those who support 
the theory of absolute simultaneous creation, only the most 
important will be mentioned here. The biologist, Father 
Erich Wasmann, S.J., says: “Even to St. Augustine it 
seemed a more exalted conception and one more in keeping 
with the omnipotence and wisdom of an infinite Creator, 
to believe that God created matter by one act of creation, 
and then allowed the whole universe to develop automati- 
cally by means of the laws which He imposed upon the 
nature of matter.’’*® Professor Thamiry explains Augus- 
tine’s theory of creation thus: “Cette evolution s’accomplit 
sous l’impulsion initiale de la cause premiére, qui a commis 
aux raisons séminales, a titre de causes secondes, le soin de 
de conserver et de perfectionner le cosmos. . . . Dieu, en 


* Tract. de Opere Sex Dierum, Lib. I, c. X, 4. 
Sl tCyeenDelds Ceev liees 
*Wasmann: Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution, p. 274. 


68 


effet, a tout créé par un seul acte de sa puissance infinie.*° 
Dorlodot points out that St. Augustine differs from some 
contemporary schools of thought in his doctrine of crea- 
tion and that he distinguishes between creation and the 
later appearance of things on earth. “On this point St. 
Augustine was in agreement with the Fathers of the School 
of Alexandria, and he was also at one with them on main- 
taining that the Six Days of Genesis represented simply 
the very beginning of time, that is to say, the mathematical 
instant when God created matter from nothing. But while 
the Alexandrine Fathers held that from that moment the 
organic as well as the inorganic worlds were essentially 
the same as they are today, St. Augustine abandoned this 
opinion in the case of the organic world, and held that at 
the beginning of things God created living beings only in 
their causes .. and it was only as time went on that the dif- 
ferent organized beings, including the human body, ap- 
peared, or to use his own expression, ‘came forth from their 
causes’ by a natural evolution of inorganic matter.’ 
Creation occurred at the absolute beginning of time; organ- 
ized beings appeared later in time. Charles Boyer, in 
seeking to explain Augustine’s idea of truth, has this con- 
cerning creative truth: “Depuis le repos du septieme jour, 
il ne se produit donc rien de nouveau. Cette affirmation 
est importante dans la cosmologie augustinienne.”’*? ‘Sou- 
tenués, continués et mués par Dieu les virtualités créés au 
commencement produisent au cours des siécles l’histoire 
entiere du monde.’’** ¢ 

These statements from contemporary authors, confirmed 
by the authority of Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas and 
Suarez, all serve to strengthen the conclusions we drew 
from the words of St. Augustine himself and which may 
be summed up thus: 1. All things were created; 2. The 
act of creation was completed in a mathematical instant; 
3. At the moment of, creation some things came into 
being “in propria natura,’ while others, including plants, 
animals and even man, existed only in their causes. 

*° Edouard Thamiry: De l’Influence, p. 203; crf. also De Rationibus 

* Dorlodot: Darwinism and Catholic Thought, pp. 141, 142. 
Seminalibus, p. 75 seq., by the same author. 

* Charles Boyer: L’Idée de Vérité, p. 127. 


EE Og a ee 
69 


2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE Rationes Seminales 


We must now turn our attention to the second point pro- 
posed above (p. 60), namely, the nature of that develop- 
ment under which the rationes seminales passed from 
potency to act. We have already touched upon this ques- 
tion in the discussion regarding the activity of the rationes 
seminales and the nature of the creative act. We have seen 
that according to Fathers Burton and Woods, the seminal 
reasons were passive, having no powers within themselves 
to develop into their proper forms. The first appearance 
of plants, animals and man was immediate creation; subse- 
quent generation is mediate creation. In the former God 
acts directly; in the latter He uses secondary causes. Be- 
tween the former and miracles there is no distinction as far 
as the action of God is concerned. “To God, then, it is 
equally according to nature to create directly, to create | 
indirectly by generation, or to produce miraculously. All _ 
three depend on His almighty power, not upon nature or_ 
natural forces, which of themselves are as unequal to the. 
task of producing wine through the long process of assimi-_ 
lation, growth, maturity, fermentation, as to the taking of — 
the miraculous short cut of Cana or to the producing of _the_ 
first vine from the earth.’** “In themselves the seminal 
reasons, regarding primordial origins, natural generation, 
miracles indifferently, are but passive determinations of 
passive potency to be actuated according to the requirements 
of each. In two modes, therefore, are seminal reasons 
brought to existence, immediately, without any antecedent 
process of generation, and mediately, the effects of that 
process. To the first mode belong the creation of the first_ 
individuals of the species and the miracle. . . . We must 
not omit to note that, as regards the natural process of 
production by generation, St. Augustine does not exclude 
the lower agencies that have in it their instrumental place. 
He takes them for granted and then passes them by as 
having no formal efficiency in the generating of the effect.’’* 
Father Burton says simply: “St. Augustine does not at- 
tribute any activity to his rationes causales; they can pass 


“Woods: Augustine and Evolution, p. 66.. 
ie a.. SDI SGT Oo. 


70 


from the first creation to the second only by the immediate 
action of the Creator.’’*® 

Contrary to all these statements, it is evident that Au- 
gustine did attribute active powers to the rationes seminales 
which enables them to develop into actuality, under the 
immediate influence of external natural conditions. From 
the standpoint of God’s activity there is no distinction be- 
tween the development of the first individuals of each 
species and the generation of those that followed. It is 
true that natural forces are but instrumental causes in the 
production of living beings, but a distinction must be made 
between permanent instrumental causes and temporary 
ones. Father Woods fails to make this distinction. All 
natural generation and movement from that first instant 
when all things were created simultaneously, has been car-. 
ried out under the administrative activity of God. _Obvi- 
ously the solution of this difficulty les in finding out the 
~ exact nature of this administrative activity. 

st. Augustine gives a clear explanation of the difference 
between creative activity and that of administration in the 
De Genesi. He is showing how to reconcile the statement 
that God rested on the seventh day and that saying of 
Christ: “My Father worketh until now and I work.’’*’ He 
explains that the work which God finished in the sixth day 
and from which He rested on the seventh, was. the work 
of creation, but the work which He does now is supporting 
and administering all that He established then. ‘“Proinde 
et quod Dominus ait, ‘Pater meus usque nunc operatur,’ 
continuationem quandam operis ejus, qua universam crea- 
taram continet atque administrat, ostendit.’’** 

Without this support no creature could move or even 
exist: “Unde colligitur quod si hoc opus suum rebus sub- 
traxerit, nec vivemus, nec movebimur, nec erimus.”* All 
natural development depends upon this same _ support. 
“Claret igitur ne uno quidem die cessare Deum ab opere 
regendi quae creavit, ne motus suos naturales quibus 
aguntur atque vegetantur, ut omnino naturae sint, ut in eo 


* Irish Ecc. Record, 4-S, vol. V, p. 107. 
John, V,17 viet 

uve Gen. ad. Dit., Lib. LV, c. XU. > 

* Ibid. 


71 


quod sunt pro suo quaeque genere maneant, illico amitterent, 
et esse aliquid omnino desinerent, si eis subtraheretur 
motus ille Sapientiae Dei, quo disponit omnia suaviter. 
Quapropter sic accipimus Deum requievisse ab omnibus 
operibus suis quae fixit, ut novam naturam ulterius nullam 
conderet; non ut ea quae condiderat, continere et gubernare 
cessaret.”’*° Neither can it be said that Augustine refers 
here only to the creatures which have existence. He is 
explaining the distinction between the work of the six days, 
and His subsequent activity, for he immediately adds: 
“Unde et illud verum est, quod in septimo die requievit 
Deus; et illud, quod usque nunc operatur.”** The six days 
represent the mathematical moment when time began; what 
follows is administration. 

But Augustine seems to have realized that there would be 
some who would doubt his interpretation, for in the follow- 
ing book he says emphatically: ‘‘Sed illud etiam atque etiam 
consideremus utrum possit nobis per omnia constare sen- 
tentia qua dicebamus, aliter operatum Deum omnes crea- 
turas prima conditione, a quibus operibus in die septimo 
requievit, aliter istam earum administrationem, qua usque 
nune operatur: id est, tune omnia simul sine ullis tempo- 
ralium morarum intervallis; nune autem per temporum 
moras, quibus videmus sidera moveri ab ortu ad occasum, 
coelum mutari ab aestate ad hiemem, germina certis dierum 
momentis pullulare, grandescere, virescere, arescere. Ani- 
malia quoque statutis temporum metis et cursibus et con- 
cipt, et perfici, nasci, et per aetates usque in senium — 
mortemque decurrere, et catera hujusmodi temporalia.’’* 
The movements of the stars, the change of seasons, the 
development of plants and animals, all these belong to God’s 
administration. It is true that Augustine does not ex- 
pressly mention the rationes seminales and their develop- 
ment here, but from the statements quoted above (p. 61) 
to show his notion of creation, there can be no doubt 
. that he means to include this development under adminis- 
tration. Moreover it is implied in the quotation just given 
by the words prima conditione. 

* Tbid. 


* Tbid. 
mle ibe Vie: acl. 


72 


Still one might object that since under the divine admin: | 
istration is included all the activity of God from the moment 
of creation, it must include miracles also. But true mira- 
cles imply a direct intervention of God. Therefore the 
development of the rationes seminales even though it is 
effected under God’s administration, might nevertheless be 
due to a direct intervention of God. We grant the force of 
this argument but happily Augustine has told us explicitly 
what he means by miracles and contrary to the opinion of 
Father Woods, it is clear that he does not mean to put the 
first appearance of plants and animals in the same class as 
miracles. I have purposely not included man because as we 
shall see later Augustine thought it probable that man’s 
origin was miraculous. 

In explaining the providence which God exercises over 
creatures, Augustine makes a distinction between natural 
providence and voluntary providence. The first is that 
secret administration of God which manifests itself in 
spontaneous natural movement, while the second is that 
which He accomplishes through the work of man or the 
Angels. “Hinc jam in ipsum mundum, velut in quandam 
magnam arborem rerum, oculus cogitationis attollitur; 
atque in ipso quoque gemina operatione providentiae re- 
peritur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria. Naturalis 
quidem per occultam Dei administrationem, qua etiam lignis 
et herbis dat incrementum; voluntaria vero, per Angelorum 
opera et homium. Secundam illam primam coelestia supe- 
rius ordinari, inferiusque terrestria; luminaria sideraque 
fulgere, diet noctisque vices agitari, aquis terram fundatam 
interlui atque curcumlui, aerem altius superfundi, arbusta 
et animalia concipi et nasci, crescere et senescere, occidere 
et quidquid aliud in rebus interiore naturalique motu 
geritur. In hac autem altera signa dari, doceri et disci, 
agros coli, societates administrari, artes exerceri, et quae- 
que alia sive in superna societate aguntur, sive in hac 
terrena atque mortali, ita ut bonis consulatur et per nes- 
cientes malos.’”’*® Note that in neither case is there a direct 
intervention of God. In both natural forces are being used 
in an ordinary way. In the former they operate spon- 


* De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. VIII, c. IX. 
ie 


~~, 
’ 
U 
' ’ 
7 
‘ / 
y 


taneously; in the latter, they are controlled by the free will 
that God has given to Angels and men. However, both man 
and the Angels can use them to produce only those effects 
which are in accordance with the laws and possibilities 
placed in them by God, at the beginning, and in so far as 
God permits. Such effects are not miraculous. God, it is 
true, is the efficient cause of these effects but the natural 
forces or rationes seminales are permanent instrumental 
causes and when the effects are produced through them in 
the ordinary way, Augustine says clearly, they are not 
miracles.** 

But God may produce natural effects in an extraordinary 
way or effects that go beyond the active powers of matter 
and then we have miracles. As an example of the first, he 
gives the changing of water immediately into wine at Cana. 
It is natural for water to be changed into wine. The ordi- 
nary way, however, is for the moisture to be absorbed out 
of the ground, sent up through the stock and branches and 
finally into the fruit. It is then picked, pressed, the juice 
is allowed to ferment and at last strengthened by age, it 
becomes good to drink. This process is not miraculous. 
But when God eliminates the intervening stages and 
changes water directly into wine, that is the extraordinary 
way, and it is called a miracle.** As an example of the 
second kind of effect he gives the fact that a dead dry rod 
should bloom and bring forth fruit (Num. XVII, 8). The 
active causes existing in the rod were not sufficient to pro- — 
duce this effect and only a cause hidden within God himself, _ 
could account for it. However, there was in the rod the 
passive potentialityto receive this effect. “Super hunc 
autem motum cursumque rerum naturalem, potestas Crea- 
toris habet apud se de his omnibus facere aliud, quam 
eorum quasi seminales rationes habent, non tamen id quod 
non in eis posuit ut de his fiert vel ab ipso possit.”’** But 
Father Woods says (n. 34) that the production of the first 
individuals of each species was of the same nature as the 
miracle. He does not include this development under the 
divine administration but calls it adequate creation. He 

- explains, however, that God’s activity in this case is the 





Say ICU PINIC, Dat LLL ee 
* De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. VI, c. XIII. 
Dilys Oeg LAD. Na eG ew es 


74 


same as that which He exercises in the performance of 
miracles. This view is not supported by the texts from 
Augustine’s works. From these texts we have shown, first, 
that he puts the appearance of the first plants and animals 
under the divine administration and not under creation ;*7 
secondly, that he puts the hidden causes of these plants | 
and animals definitely into matter from the beginning ;*s | 
thirdly, that these causes were both active and passive;*? | 
fourthly, that they developed into being according to natu- — 
ral laws and therefore in the ordinary way.®® It is not 
necessary to repeat these arguments here; instead we can 
directly draw the conclusion that the appearance of the 
first plants and animals was due to that divine providence 
which Augustine calls natural. 

St. Thomas confirms this interpretation of the adminis- 
tration of God and its function in the appearance of the 
first plants and animals. In answer to an objection raised 
against the theory of simultaneous creation, he makes a 
distinction between the opus creationis and the opus ad- 
ministrationis. “Confirmatur etiam hoc ratione; quia in 
illis primis diebus condidit Deus creaturam causaliter vel 
originaliter vel actualiter opere a quo postmodum requievit 
qui tandem postmodum secundum administrationem rerum 
conditarum per opus propagationis usque modo operatur. 
Producere autem plantas in actu ex terra, ad opus propa- 
gationis pertinet; ideo non fuerunt plantae tertia die pro- 
ductae in actu, sed causaliter tantum; post sex vero dies 
fuerunt in actu secundum proprias species et in propria 
natura per opus administrationis productae; et ita ante- 
quam causaliter plantae essent productae nihil fut produc- 
tum, sed simul cum coelo et terra productae sunt; similiter 
pisces, aves et animalia in illis sex diebus causaliter, et non 
actualiter producta sunt.” | 

This clear statement allows of but one interpretation. ©, 
Plants were produced in two ways: causaliter, simultane- | 
ously with the heavens and the earth; and in actu, through | 


ao 
4 


P70, 
* De Pot., q. IV, art. 2, ad 28um. 
75 


propagation. The former is the work of creation, the latter 
of administration. This propagation does not refer to the 
reproduction of plants after the appearance of the first 
plants, propagation from seed, but to the first individuals 
of the species, propagation from the earth. For he says 
distinctly: “producere autem plantas in actu ex terra, ad 
opus propagationis pertinet.” The causes of these, placed 
in the earth, originaliter, were brought out through the 
action of the sun, virtus coelestis, acting upon the earth, 
_in which they were contained. In a similar manner were 
fishes, birds and animals produced. In regard to miracles 
Thomas says that there are some that go beyond the active 
| powers of creatures but not beyond their passive powers 
except those passive powers which are intended to receive 
the particular forms latent in the active powers. “Similiter 
etiam neque praeter virtutes passivas creaturae inditas: 
ut ex ea fieri possit quidquid Deus mandaverit: sed praeter 
virtutes activas naturales, et potentias passivas quae ordi- 
nantur ad hujusmodi virtutes activas, dicuntur fieri mira- 
cula, dum dicitur, quod fiunt praeter rationes seminales.’’** 

Thamiry points out that Martin is wrong when he claims 
that God put into nature the immediate principle of mira- 
cles. “Falso ergo rationum seminalium conceptum inter- 
pretatur J. Martin, qui sic absolute scribit: ‘Dieu a placé 
dans la nature le principe de tout ce qui arrive. I] a donc 
mis au fond des choses le principe du phénoméne naturel, 
et un second principe que est celui du miracle, c’est ce que 
S. Augustin appelle: ‘seminales rationes, Cit. a Revue 
Cath., Aout 1903.” The rationes seminales are indeed the 
principles of natural phenomenon, but not of the miraculous. 
Boyer, too, holds that the development of the rationes 
seminales was according to the ordinary way and confirms 
our interpretation of the miracles. ‘“‘De meme, au premier 
matin du monde, les causes de toute son évolution résidaient 
en lui. Les unes déterminaient par avance quelle nature 
devrait surgir, et de quelle maniére; elles précontenaient 
le cours ordinaire et naturel des choses, celui qui se deroule 
quand les etres soutenus par Dieu, déploient leurs puis- 


* Sum. I, q. CXV, art. 2, ad 4um 
* Thamiry: De Rationibus Seminalibus, p. 90, n. 3. 


76 


sances propres. Ainsi les étres se reproduisent et se suc- 
cédent. Les autres impliquaient uniquement la possibilité 
de certains événements, sans exclure, par elles seules, la 
possibilité des événements contraires, Dieu se reservant 
d’intervenir, au moment voulu, pour diriger le développe- 
ment dans le sans qu’il a éternellement choisi: les événe- 
ments qui arrivent de la sorte permis par les lois du monde , 
mais déterminés par une action spéciale de Dieu, ce sont 

les miracles. Ainsi, Sara, stérile dans sa jeunesse enfanta ” 
dans sa vieillesse.’’** In the first class mentioned by Boyer 
God has put into the natural forces the necessity of work- 
ing out their results according to the laws which govern 
them; in the second he has put there the possibility of 
producing the same effects but has retained within himself 
the determination to produce other results by direct inter- 
vention. These latter are miracles. The evidence pre- 
sented is sufficient to show Augustine’s conception of divine 
administration and of miracles and to prove that the ap- 
pearance of the first plants and animals was included under 
the ordinary natural administration. 


3. THE TIME AND ORDER OF THE APPEARANCE OF ORIGINAL 
FORMS 


We have studied thus far the origin of the rationes semi- 
nales, the manner of their existence at the beginning and 
the nature of their development. The point which must 
next be considered is the order that obtained in this de- 
velopment. We know that according to Augustine there 
was a definite ratio seminalis for each.form that was later 


to appear, but in this process of development did the ratio 


seminalis pass directly into its appointed form or did_it. | 
come up through intermediate forms? Again if these po- | 
tencies developed immediately into their proper forms, did ~ 
they appear on earth in any particular order, for instance, 
the more simple things and then the more complicated, or 
vice versa? It is easy to see what an importance the 
answer to these questions has in the discussion on St. 
Augustine and Evolution. 


* Boyer: LiIdée de Vérité, p. 129. 
77 


The texts already noted to show the condition of things 
at the beginning of the world enable us to state definitely 
that Augustine did not have in mind any series of develop- 
ments which were eventually to make the world fit for 
living things. He says in his explanation of the order. 
represented by Moses in Genesis that the earth was first 
“terra informis’® but that this unformed matter preceded 
the formed in origin but not in time. At the moment of 
creation the world existed in its proper form as we see it 
today. Dorlodot says: “Augustine holds that from the first 
moment of creation, the inorganic world was substantially 
the same as it is today.’”** Since this statement is not dis- 
puted, it will not be necessary to discuss it further. An- 
other point may be accepted here without detailed discussion, 
that is, that Augustine does not specify the time that inter- 
vened between the creation of things casually at the begin- 
ning and their appearance in their proper forms later. 
Their causes were hidden in the elements and in the course 
of time they were to come forth. He repeatedly uses such 
expressions as temporalibus intervallis, in numeros tem- 
porum, per temporum moras, per ordinem temporum, per 
volumina temporum explicandorum, and others. As said 
before, things were to develop from potentiality to act 
when the conditions were favorable but no hint is given as 
to the length of time necessary. “Acceptis opportunitati- 
bus, prodeunt,” says St. Augustine; that is all. 

But the question regarding the manner of their appear- 
ance is more important than that of time. We have seen 
that the cause of each form that was later to appear was 
definitely contained in the rationes seminales. Things did 
not come forth immediately in their proper forms nor have 
those forms undergone any change through subsequent 
generations. Again we must remember that Augustine 
was a theologian and a philosopher, not a natural scientist. 
He accepted the scientific notions of his day. For him 
there was no more evidence of a transformation of species 
than there is to the untrained observer today. The pre- 
sumption is then that Augustine believed that things ap- 


*® De Gen. ad Int., Lib. I, c. XV. 
* Canon Dorlodot: Darwinism and Catholic Thought, p. 82. 


78 


peared with the same forms they had in his day and that 
those forms were constant. I think that a careful study 
of the text will bear out this presumption. In commenting 
on the phrase, “‘according to their kinds,” as used in the 
first chapter of Genesis, Augustine asks why this expres- 
sion is used regarding all other living beings but not of 
man and he answers his own question that it is probable 
that it was so used because whereas there was but one man 
created, there were many kinds of animals: “Potest enim 
nunc fortasse sufficere, propterea de homine non dictum 
esse ‘secundum genus,’ quia unus fiebat, de quo etiam femina 
facta est. Non enim multa genera hominum, sicut herba- 
rum, lignorum, piscium, volatilium, serpentium, pecorum, 
bestiarum: ut sic dictum accipiamus ‘secundum genus’ ac 
si diceretur generatim, ut inter se similia atque ad unum 
originem seminis pertinentia distingueretur a caeteris.’’*' 
By the various classes mentioned Augustine evidently 
meant to include all living things except man. All these 
were included in the original creation, not actually but 
casually. The individuals in each species were to be like 
each other and all in that species were to be traced back to 
one original seed. In a previous question, he suggests even 
more clearly that this is the meaning of “‘secundum genus’’: 
“An quia haec ita exorta sunt ut ex eis alia nascerentur, 
et originis formam successione servarent et ideo dicuntur 
‘secundum genus, propter propagationem prolis, qua per- 
mansura creabantur?’®® He puts this in the form of a 
question but since the statement given above is his answer 
it evidently is his opinion on the matter. The original form 
is to be preserved through successive generations. 

There are several other statements which confirm this 
conclusion. In that summary of his doctrine of natural 
development in the ninth book he writes thus: “Hx his velut 
primordius rerum, omnia quae gignuntur, suo quoque tem- 
pore exortus processusque sumunt, finesque et decessiones 
sui cujusque generis. Unde fit ut de grano tritici non nas- 
catur faba, vel de faba triticum, vel de pecore homo, vel de 
homine pecus.”*® Of course, when he says that a bean will 


De Gen, ad Tat. Libs iit; ‘¢. XIT. 


5 


id. 
® De Gen. ad Lat., Lib. IX, c. XVII. 
79 


not come from a grain of wheat, nor man from an animal, 
he did not have transformation in mind but simply states 
that nature generates consistently. However, with what 
goes before it, I think he implies that the species were con- 
stant. Another argument can be drawn from his compari- 
son of the origin of man with that of other living beings 
in the 12th Book of his City of God. He points out again 
that while man came from one individual, other beings 
began from many. “Nam cum animantes alias solitarias, 
et quodammodo solivagas, id est, quae solitudinem magis 
appetant, sicutt sunt aquilae, mulvi, leones, lupi, et quae- 
cumque sunt; alias congreges instituerit quae congregatae 
atque in gregibus malint vivere, ut sunt columbi, sturmi, 
cervi, damulae, et caetera hujusmodi: utrumque tamen 
genus non ex singulis propagavit, sed plura simul jussit 
existere. Hominem vero—unum ac singulum creavit.’®° 
The word “genus” is not used in a technical sense, but in 
general, for a class or a division. Here the two genera are 
those animals which live alone and those which live in herds. 
In both of these classes, he says, there were many original 
forms. He does not say exactly how many or that the same 
forms existed in his own day but it seems to me that the 
whole tenor of the text indicates that that was his opinion. 
These different texts give us sufficient reason to conclude 
that Augustine believed that things came into being with 
all the variety that they had in his day. He thought this 
was the teaching of Scripture and he had no grounds to 
believe that it conflicted in any way with the scientific 
teaching of his time. Whether or not his general teaching ~ 
regarding the rationes seminales can be fitted into a theory 
of transformism, we shall see in the next chapter. 
Accepting then as proved the statement that there is no 
transformism in the theory of St. Augustine regarding the 
development of plants and animals, we may still ask if 
there is any evidence of the order in which things were to 
appear. Attention is called again to the fact that Augustine 
is interpreting Scripture. His answer, therefore, will be 
that which he finds in the sacred text. In the narration of 
the work of the six days in Genesis, Augustine noted that 


® De Civitate Dei, Lib. XII, c. XXI. , 
80 


on the fifth day, God commanded the waters to “bring forth 
the creeping creatures having life and the fowl that may 
fly over the earth’; and on the sixth day He commanded 
the earth to “bring forth the living creature in its kind, 
cattle and creeping things, and the beasts of the earth.” 
From this Augustine drew two conclusions: 1. Flying and 
swimming things came from the water, while plants and 
animals came from the land; 2. Those beings that came 
from water preceded those from the land. ‘“Ovportebat,” 
he writes, “ctaque ut in creandis habitatoribus inferioris 
hujus mundi partis, quae saepe terra nomine tota commemo- 
ratur, prius producerentur ex aquis animalia, postea vero 
de terra.”*! However, he is speaking here of creation and 
consequently the order referred to is one of origin, not of 
time. ‘‘Non intervallis temporum sed connexione causa- 
rum.’®? The order of the appearance in time is not indi- 
cated in Scripture, and therefore not by Augustine. He 
does not deny that there is a progression in this appearance, 
he simply does not discuss it. We may argue that since 
almost all animals depend for their nourishment upon lower 
forms of life, that it was necessary for the lower and simpler 
forms to come first. Augustine, however, does not make 
use of such an argument. 


When we turn to St. Thomas we find that while he ex- 
pressed a preference for Augustine’s theory of simultaneous 
creation rather than that of successive creation, in treating 
of the production of plants and animals he quotes the two 
interpretations without indicating which he prefers. He 
points out that according to some expositors, plants and 
animals were produced actually on the day indicated in 
Genesis, while according to St. Augustine, they were pro- 
duced only potentially and developed actually through 
subsequent periods under the divine administration. “Ante 
ergo quam orirentur super terram, factae sunt causaliter 
in terra. Confirmatur autem hoc etiam ratione: quia in 
illis primis diebus condidit Deus creaturam originaliter, 
vel causaliter: a quo opere postmodum requievit, opus 
propagationis usque modo operatur: producere autem 


eee rimit. Lil, los. 
"De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. V, c. V. 


81 


plantas ex terra ad opus propagationis pertinet.’”® The 
species came forth perfected from the ground. “Unde sig- 
nanter Scriptura dicit: ‘Germinet terra herbam virentem, 
et facientem semen, quia scilicet sunt productae perfectae 
species plantarum, ex quibus semina aliarum orirentur.’’** 
He takes the constancy of species for granted because he 
writes that even if, as some say, the species began during 
the six days of creation, still the fact that they generate 
constantly is due to divine administration: “Quod ex specie- 
bus primo institutis generatio similium in specie procedat, 
hoc jam pertinet ad rerum administrationem.”’® However, 
he admits the possibility of new species appearing, even as 
an offspring from preexisting species, and points out that 
in such a case the new species preexisted in certain active 
powers. “Species etiam novae, si quae apparent, prae- 
extiterunt in quibusdam activis virtutibus.’*® The word 
“species” is evidently not used in the technical sense in 
which biologists use it today. He gives two examples of 
what he calls new species, the one is the spontaneous gen- 
eration of a new species from decaying matter through 
powers contained in the sun and in the elements, the other 
is the generation of a mule from an ass and a horse. Nei- 
ther of these constitutes a new species in the modern 
scientific sense. 

In regard to the order St. Thomas discusses at length 
creation which is contained in the narration of the six 
days,®*’ but I can find nothing directly concerning the order 
in which things created potentially appeared actually on 
earth. In the explanation of the days, he says that things 
were created according to their dignity, viz., first, the 
spiritual; second, the celestial;** third, the terrestrial or 
lower bodies. Among the latter he enumerates air, earth 
and water. Of these air and water were superior to the 
earth, and therefore they were adorned (ornantur) with 
their own proper objects, before the earth which is the 
lowest form.*® Then among living things, he puts plants 

* Summa, Iq. LXLX, art. 2: 

* Ibid. 


* Tbid. 

rds (Cre AAR ULL AD: | eet OUI 

" De* Pot. q, LV; art.\2,ad)29um: 

“The word “celestial” here refers to the firmament above. 

®In addition to ref. 64, above; confer also Sum. I, q. LXXI. 
82 


as the lowest, then in the ascending order, birds, fishes, 
land animals and finally man. It must be remembered that 
this is a relationship based on nature, not on origin in 
time.”° 


There is one statement which may shed some light on 
his opinion regarding the appearance of things. In treat- 
ing of the work of the fifth day, an objection is made that 
since land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes, 
in as much as there is a greater distinction in the members 
of the former and they beget animals, whereas the others 
lay eggs, they should have been produced before the birds 
and fishes. Thomas answers this objection by saying that 
the order of production of these animals was based upon 
the dignity of the elements that produced them rather than 
on their own proper worth. However, he adds, in genera- 
tion the order does proceed from the less perfect to the 
more perfect. “Ad quintum dicendum, quod productio 
horum animalium ordinatur secundum ordinem corporum, 
quae eis ornantur, magis quam secundum propriam digni- 
tatem: et tamen in via generationis ab imperfectioribus ad 
perfectiora pervenitur.”™ Still it seems probable that 
generation in individuals is meant here rather than the 
development of different classes of animals. 


Modern writers are much divided on the question of 
transformism in St. Augustine. Thamiry, after a thorough 
scientific study, comes to the conclusion that there is no 
transformism in the theory of the rationes seminales. 
“Attamen genuina nostra explicandi ratio, licet de trans- 
formatione loquatur, uti supra innuimus, neque subito 
neque tardo transformismo favet, sed tantum specificas 
energias a creatore tali cellulae inditas ad actum promovert 
docet.”’*? And Boyer says no less definitely: “L’hypothése 
transformiste ne pouvait se presenter a l’esprit d’Augus- 
tin.”*> Father Woods, of course, asserts that each individual 
came forth with its own form, from the ratio seminalis, 
and that that form has remained unchanged,” and Father 


MT hid, 

7? Sum. I, q. LXXI, art. 1, ad 5um. 

@Thamiry: De Rationibus Seminalibus, p. 107. 
® Boyer: L’Idée de Vérité, p. 132 

™ Woods: Augustine and Evolution, p. 79. 


83 


Burton does likewise.7> On the other hand, Northcote boldly 
_defends the possibility of attributing transformism to Au- 
gustine. ‘It is possible, therefore, to conceive, according 
to St. Augustine’s interpretation of Genesis, that a single 
form of plant life, a single form of reptile and bird life, 
and a single form of terrestrial animal life were first cre- 
ated, each containing the ‘rationes seminales’ of all subse- 
\quent variations which branched off from these few forms. 
We might even extend this still further and reduce all 
‘subsequent forms of life to one single primordial form.’’* 
Dr. Zahm, too, seems convinced that Augustine believed 
that things would develop by a gradual evolution from the 
simple to the complex. In his Hvolution and Dogma, he 
says: “God then, according to St. Augustine, created mat- 
ter directly and immediately. On this primordial or ele- 
mentary matter He impressed certain causal reasons, 
rationes causales; that is, He gave it certain powers and 
imposed on it certain laws, in virtue of which it evolved 
into all the myriad forms which we now behold. The saint 
does not tell us by what laws or processes the Creator acted. 
He makes no attempt to determine what are the factors of 
organic development. He limits himself to a general state- 
ment of the fact of evolution, of progress from the simple 
to the complex, from the simple to the heterogeneous, from 
the simple primordial elements to the countless, varied, 
complicated structures of animated nature.’’? We shall 
have more to say about these statements in the next chap- 
ter; here it is sufficient to recall that Augustine does hold 
that the organic world has developed to its present condi- 
tion through the influence of natural causes and laws, but 
his words are wholly against a theory of gradual develop- 
ment through intermediate forms; moreover that whereas 
we might conclude from his theories that it was necessary 
for the simpler forms to come forth first, he himself does 
not explicitly say so. Northcote’s statement is contrary to 
the text of St. Augustine and Zahm is attributing to Augus- 
tine himself a conclusion which may be drawn from the 
saint’s principles.’® 
* Trish Ecc. Rec. 4-S, vol. V, p. 108. 
“Northcote: The Idea of Development, p. 82. 


i Zahm: Evolution and Dogma, p. 283. 
*® This conclusion is limited to a gradual appearance of things. 
84 


4. THE ORIGIN AND APPEARANCE OF MAN 


Augustine attacks the important question of the origin 
of man with great caution. He realized the difficulties at- 
tached thereto because of the distinct nature of man, differ- 
ing essentially from all the lower animals and because of 
the special scriptural account of the formation of Adam 
from the slime of the earth, and the taking of the first 
woman from his side while he was asleep. His first ques- 
tion is whether the first man came into being in the form 
which we now observe, at the beginning when God made 
all things simultaneously or whether he was created caus- 
ally then and appeared actually only in the course of time. 
Is the story of man’s origin to be taken literally or can we 
say that man like all other living things was created poten- 
tially at that moment of time represented by the six days? 

Consistently with his general interpretation, he accepts 
the second alternative. It is beyond doubt, he says, that 
man did not appear actually at the beginning but only in 
the course of time. “Non est dubium hoc quod homo de 
limo terrae finctus est eique formata uxor ex letere, jam 
non ad conditionem qua simul omnia facta sunt, pertinere, 
quibus perfectis requievit Deus; sed ad eam operationem, 
quae fit jam per volumina saeculorum, qua usque nunc 
operatur.’’® In the sentence following this he says that 
the very narration of the events which took place in the 
garden of Paradise indicates that these events belong not 
to the creative activity of God but to that administration 
which was carried on in time. “Huwc accedit quod ipsa etiam 
verba quibus narratur quomodo Deus paradisum planta- 
verit, in eoque hominem quem fecerat collocarit, ad eumque 
adduxerit animalia, quibus nomina imponeret, in quibus cum 
adjutorium simile illi non fuisset inventum, tunc ei mulierem 
costa ejus detracta formaverit, satis nos admonent haec non 
ad illam operationem Dei pertinere, unde requievit in die 
septimo, sed ad istam potius, que per temporum cursus 
usque nunc operatur.’’®° This then is certain, that, accord- 
ing to St. Augustine, man did not come into actual being 
at the beginning of the world but at a subsequent period. 


® De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. VI, c. III. 


© Tbid. 


85 


Neither can it be said, writes the saint, that Adam was 
created at the beginning and Eve at a later period, for both 
were created potentially at the beginning and both came 
forth later in time. ‘Aliter ergo tunc ambo, et nunc aliter 
ambo; tunc scilicet secundum potentiam per. verbum Det 
tanquam seminaltier mundo inditam, cum creavit omnia 
simul, . . .3 nunc autem secundum operationem prae- 
bendam temporibus, qua usque nunc operatur, et oportebat 
jam tempore suo fiert Adam de limo terrae, ejusque 
mulierem ex viri latere.’’®! 

Augustine then attempts to answer the question, how did 
man exist in that primitive condition prior to his appear- 
ance on earth? He first states emphatically that it was 
not as a living being or even as a Seed, but invisibly poten- 
tially, causally: “Sed rursus, si dixero non ita fuisse homi- 
nem in illa prima rerum conditione, qua creavit Deus omnia 
simul, sicut est non tantum perfectae aetatis homo sed ne 
infans quidem, nec tantum infans sed ne puerperium quidem 
in utero matris, nec tantum hoc, sed nec semen quidem visi- 
bile hominis; putabit omnimo non fuisse.’’®? Nevertheless, 
he assures his reader, Scripture will tell us that man was 
created, male and female, from the beginning. “Tunc autem 
factus est homo et masculus et femina: ergo et tunc et 
postea. Neque enim tunc, et non postea; aut vero postea, 
et non tunc: nec alu postea, sed idem ipsi aliter tunc, aliter 
postea. Quaeret ex me, quomodo? Respondebo, postea 
visibiliter, sicut species humanae constitutionis nota nobis 
est; non tamen parentibus generantibus, sed ille de limo, illa 
de costa ejus. Quaeret, tunc quomodo? Respondebo, invisi- 
biliter, potentialiter, causaliter, quomodo fiunt futura non 
facta.”*®* The causal reasons of man, both male and female, 
were placed in matter at the beginning. They did not have 
separate individual existence, nevertheless they were there. 
As Wasmann says, “By means of primordiales causae the 
body of man, like that of every other living creature, was 
based on rationes seminales. The holy doctor does not 
decide how far the causae primoridales and seminales 
rationes effected the preparation of its material.’’* 

~ lees Lab. Vil, oe Vi, 

PC LiLOd SV LL oe Ls 


* Tbid. 
* Wasmann: Modern Biology, p. 438. 
86 


The question of the origin of man’s soul was more diffi- 
cult. Was it created at that moment when God made all 
things at once, or only at the moment it was breathed into 
man’s body? Augustine did not fully convince himself on 
this point. He preferred the opinion that the soul was 
created at the first moment of time and remained hidden 
until in the course of time it was united to the body, made 
out of the slime of the earth. ‘“Credatur ergo si nulla 
Scripturarum auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit, 
hominem ita factum sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani 
ratio causalis in elementis mundi; anima vero jam ipsa 
crearetur, sicut primitus conditus est dies, et creata lateret 
in operibus Det, donec eam quo tempore sufflando, hoc est 
inspirando, formato ex limo corpori insereret.’’*> That this 
theory was beset with difficulty, he candidly acknowledges, 
nevertheless it seemed to him the most plausible. 

Augustine also remained somewhat doubtful regarding 
the form of man’s body at the time of its appearance and 
the determination of that form. He dismisses the sugges- 
tion that God formed the body of man with corporal hands 
as too childish to be entertained or attributed to Scripture. 
Who, he says, is so stupid as not to know that the Scriptural 
words implying corporal action refer merely to God’s 
power? But did Adam come into being in the full vigor 
of his manhood or as an infant in the mother’s womb? In 
answering this question, he explains that the creator of all 
things is independent of time; that just as He changed 
water into wine, eliminating the long intervals in which 
the natural process takes place, so He might make man 
exist full grown, without passing through the usual periods 
of development. In fact the development of all the causal 
reasons took place just as the Creator wished. 

As pointed out before, the design of the Creator might be 
fulfilled in either of two ways. First, it might be embodied 
with the rationes seminales in the very texture of the 
earth; secondly, the possibility of the form might be con- 
tained there and the determination of the form retained 
in the will of God. Thus in the ratio seminalis of man, 
there might have been only the passive possibility of receiv- 





* De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. VII, c. XXIV. 
87 


ing the form of man and the active power and determination 
to develop this form, or only the possibility was there and 
the active cause retained hidden in God. In either case the 
will of God would have inevitably been carried out. ‘Si 
ergo in illis primis rerum causis, quas mundi primitus 
Creator inseruit, non tantum posuit quod de limo formatu- 
rus erat hominem, sed etiam quemadmodum formaturus, 
utrum sicut in matris utero an in forma juvenili; procul 
dubio sic fecit, ut illic praefixerat; neque enim contra dis- 
postionem suam faceret: si autem vim tantum ibi posuit 
possibilitatis, ut homo fieret quoque modo fieret, ut et sic 
et sic posset, id est ut 1d quoque ibi esset quia et sic et sic 
posset; unum autem ipsum modum: quo erat facturus in sua 
voluntate servavit, non mundi constitutioni contexuit: 
manifestum est etiam sic non factum esse hominem contra 
quam erat in illa prima conditione causarum; quia ibi erat 
etiam sic fiert posse, quamvis non ibi erat ita fiert necesse 
esse: hoc enim non erat in conditione creaturae, sed in pla- 
cito Creatoris, cujus voluntas rerum necessitas est.’’** 
Augustine then plainly admits two possibilities in regard 
to the appearance of the first human body. It may have 
been the necessary response to forces placed in the rationes 
seminales at the beginning, or it may have been the object 
of God’s will manifesting itself externally only at the mo- 
ment of its actual appearance. 


We may ask then whether Augustine makes a distinction 
between the development of the lower forms of life from 
their rationes seminales into formal existence and that of 
the body of man. Our answer is in the affirmative in so far 
as he admits that the body of man may have been the result 
of a direct intervention on the part of God. He does not 
say positively that it was so, but he admits it as possible. 
Does he mean then that the rationes seminales were purely 
passive? Here we must make a distinction. There were 
present in the slime of the earth the ordinary active and 
passive powers to produce results natural to it and there 
was in addition to them in that particular slime destined 
to become the body of man the passive power to receive 
this human form, but it did not have the active power to 


* De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. VI,.c. XV. 
88 


produce this result. The active cause of that was in God 
alone. The rod of Aaron possessed the active and passive 
qualities peculiar to it as a rod, but there was not in it the 
active cause to make it bloom and bear fruit. This cause 
was likewise hidden in God though the possibility of re- 
ceiving that effect was in the rod. Therefore in the possi- 
bility that God did directly intervene, the rationes causales 
were only passive in as far as man was concerned, but in 
as far as they refer to the slime they were both active and 
passive. Augustine himself shows clearly that this was his 
meaning by the example he gives of Ezechias (Jsaias, 
XXXVIII, 5). According to the ordinary causes, the time 
came for Ezechias to die, but in answer to his prayer the 
Lord prolonged his life for five years. The causes for this 
prolongation of his life were hidden in God. “Secundum 
aliquas igitur causas inferiores,’ writes Augustine, “jam 
vitam finierat: secundum illas autem quae sunt in voluntate 
et praescientia Dei, qui ex aeternitate noverat quid illo 
tempore facturus erat, tunc erat finiturus vitam quando 
finivit vitam.’’*? The “causae inferiores” were the natural 
active and passive powers or rationes seminales existing 
in the body of the prophet. According to them he was to 
die, but God had within Himself higher powers according 
to which Ezechias was to live five years longer. So, too, 
He had in Himself causes to produce other effects from the 
slime of the earth than those possible to its own natural 
powers. 

This does not imply a change in the will of God for in 
those things out of which He desired to produce extraordi- 
nary effects He put only the possibility of producing their 
ordinary effects but not the necessity of doing so. This 
Augustine brings out clearly in what he says further about 
the body of Adam: “Quapropter, st omnium futurorum 
causae mundo sunt insitae, cum ille factus est dies quando 
Deus creavit omnia simul; non aliter Adam factus est, cum 
de limo formatus est, sicut est credibilius jam perfectae 
virilitatis, quam erat in illis causis, ubt Deus hominem in 
sex dierum operibus fecit. Ibi enim erat non solum ut ita 
fieri posset, verum etiam ut ita eum fieri necesse esset.... 


veel. v1, ic: VL: 
89 


Si autem non omnes causas in creatura primitus condita 
praefixit, sed aliquas in sua voluntate servavit; non sunt 
quidem illae quas in sua voluntate servavit, existarum quas 
creavit necessitate pendentes: non tamen possunt esse con- 
trariae quas in sua voluntate servavit, illis quas ‘sua volun- 
tate instituit.”8§ The two “if” clauses indicate the two 
possibilities, that God put the causes of Adam’s body in. 
the elements at the beginning or that he retained them 
within himself. In either case there was no inconsistency 
in the divine will. He adds in his own pithy way: “Jstas 
ergo sic condidit, ut ex illis esse illud, cujus causae sunt, 
possit; sed non necesse sit: illas autem sic abscondit, ut ex 
eis esse necesse sit hoc, quod ex istis fecit ut esse possit.’’®® 

In the case of the body of Eve, he also states the possi- 
bility of direct intervention as conditional. Nevertheless 
he seems to be much more inclined towards this alternative 
than the other of normal natural development. ‘Quod si 
quaeritur,”’ he writes, “quomodo se habeat causalis illa 
conditio, in qua primum hominem Deus fecit ad imaginem 
ac similitudinem suam (1bi quippe et hoc dictum est, ‘Mas- 
culum et feminam fecit eos,’ Gen. 1, 27) utrum jam illa 
ratio, quam mundi primis operibus concreavit, atque con- 
crevit Deus, id habebat, ut secundum eam jam necesse esset 
ex viri latere feminam fiert; an hoc tantum habebat ut fieri 
posset, ut autem ita fiert necesse esset, non ibit jam con- 
ditum, sed in Deo erat absconditum: si hoc ergo quaeritur, 
dicam quid mihi videatur sine affirmandi temeritate; quod 
tamen cum dixero, fortasse prudenter ista considerantes, 
quos jam christiana fides imbuit, etiam si nunc primitus 
ista cognoscunt, non esse dubttandum judicabunt.”’°° Then 
he goes on to explain more fully what he means by normal 
natural development .and that extraordinary development 
due to causes hidden in God. This has already been pointed 
out and only his concluding sentence will be given here: 
“Habet ergo Deus in seipso absconditas quorumdam facto- 
rum causas, quas rebus conditis non inseruit; easque implet 
non illo opere providentiae, quo naturas substituit ut sint, 
sed illo quo eas administrat ut voluerit, quas ut voluit con- 


© iGo kal ties Vig, Cr os Vs 
* Ibid 


1 >¢., Lib. IX, c. XVII. 
90 


didit.”*®! These are the causes which produce the body of 
the first woman from the side of the first man. They reach 
their fulfillment not by that administration by which God 
supports what is in nature, but by that which is the imme- 
diate result of His own will. He had placed in nature from 
the beginning the possibility of receiving the form of the 
body of Eve, but the determining cause of that body re- 
mained hidden in Himself. “Non habuit hoc prima rerum 
conditio, quando sexto die dictum est, ‘Masculum et femi- 
nam fecit eos’ ut femina omnino sic fieret; sed tantum hoc 
habuit, quia et sic fiert posset, ne contra causas quas volun- 
tate instituit, mutabilt voluntate aliquid fieret. Quid autem 
fieret, ut omnino aliud futurum non esset, absconditum erat 
in Deo, qui universa creavit.”’*? I think the evidence pre- 
sented is sufficient to show that Augustine included the 
bodies of the first man and the first woman in the simul- 
taneous creation of all things at the beginning of time. 
However, he considers it probable that unlike the lower 
forms of life, the potentiality of their bodies was purely 
passive in that there was not in the forces of nature the 
power to produce these bodies, such power being retained 
in God. There was, however, in the elements the possibility 
of receiving these forms through the intervention of the 
divine cause. 


In view of what has been said, it is hardly necessary to 
add here that there is nothing in Augustine’s account of 
the formation of man that could be interpreted as a belief 
that man’s body preexisted in the form of a lower animal 
or that it developed through intermediate stages. He is 
interpreting the Scriptures and he accepts literally the 
statement that man’s body was made out of the slime of the 
earth. Nor is the question as to when man appeared on 
earth answered directly by Augustine. He says simply that 
man was made “suo tempore,” in his own time. Still he 
implies that man was the last of the various classes of 
beings to come forth. This is based on two facts: first, 
that in the order of creation as contained in the narration 
of the six days, man is the last to be mentioned; and 





alee Gs plsiDel dX, C2 XVITI. 
Peep uipetl&, Cc. & VITI. 


91 


secondly, that his actual appearance took place in Paradise 
wherein alli kinds of living things already existed. 

The interpretation given above of Augustine’s theory 
regarding the appearance of man’s body fits in with the 
interpretation given by St. Thomas. In the De Potentia 
and in the Summa he says clearly that the rationes causales 
of the human body were passive and that the active power 
of the Creator was required to produce the body of man. 
“Unde animam primi hominis, quam inquirendo et non 
asserendo dicit simul creatam cum Angelis in actu, non 
pont factam ante sextum diem, licet in ipso sexto die ponat 
factam animam primi hominis in actu, et corpus ejus 
secundum causales rationes: quia Deus impressit virtutem 
passivam terrae, ut per potentiam activam Creatoris posset 
ex ea corpus hominis formari. Et sic anima in actu et 
corpus in potentia passiva in ordine ad potentiam activam 
Dei sunt facta.’’** Again in the Swmma, he explains that a 
thing may exist according to the causal reasons in two 
ways: “Uno modo, secundum potentiam activam et passi- 
vam: ut non solum ex materia praeexistenti fieri possit, sed 
etiam ut aliqua praeexistens creatura hoc facere possit. 
Alio modo, secundum potentiam passivam tantum; ut 
scilicet de materia praeexistenti fiert possit a Deo. Et hoc 
' modo, secundum Augustinum, corpus hominis praeextitit in 
operibus productis secundum causales rationes.”’®® In as 
much as he states elsewhere that the rationes causales are 
both active and passive, I think we may conclude that here 
St. Thomas does not mean that these causal reasons of the 
human body were absolutely passive but only so in regard 
to this particular form. There were active and passive 
powers in the slime of the earth but none capable of pro- 
ducing the body of man. They were able to receive it but 
the divine assistance was required to bring it into existence. 
Thomas does not consider the possibility, mentioned by 
Augustine, that the cause of Adam’s body may have been 
placed in the elements. 

Northcote, convinced that Augustine made no distinction 
between the rationes causales of man and those of lower 


Sgr Bd Bb ear ae BE 


* De Pot., q. IV, art. 2, ad 22um. 
*” Summa, I, q. XCI, art. 2, ad 4um. 


92 


animals, is much perplexed by the interpretation of St. 
Thomas. “It seems to us,’ he writes, “that St. Thomas has 
incorporated the notions of the Bishop of Hippo into his 
theology, not without some misgivings; he appears rather 
inclined to explain away than to fully endorse the opinions 
of the great light of the African Church.’®® He suggests 
that Thomas feared that if we admitted active powers in 
the rationes causales of man, we might conclude that created 
agents could produce the body of man as the magicians did 
frogs. Therefore, he says: “In his anxiety to preclude this 
possibility without altogether impugning the doctrine of 
the greatest of the Fathers, he (St. Thomas) sees no other 
way of obviating the difficulty than by reducing in this 
instance St. Augustine’s vital energies—seminales rationes 
—to passive powers pure and simple.’’®’? He then states his 
own opinion thus: “Now that we have seen human bodies, 
it would be a truism too obvious to be worthy of notice 
from such a man as St. Augustine that matter is passively 
capable of receiving the human form, and if I quote a few 
extracts from his writings, I think it will be abundantly 
clear that his meaning was that the Creator implanted in 
matter active energies capable of evolving a body fitted to 
receive the immaterial form of the human soul as its actu- 
ating principle.’®* He then gives several quotations from 
the De Trinitate and the De Genesi ad Litteram, all of 
which we have used to prove that the rationes seminales 
included active powers but he seems to have overlooked 
those passages in which Augustine evidently makes a pos- 
sible exception of the human body. 

Other modern authors have held likewise that Augustine 
made no distinction between the origin of man and of other 
lower animals. Father Woods asserts: “He (Augustine) 
says distinctly that Adam’s body was not created differently 
from those of other creatures; that Adam was created ac- 
cording to his seminal reasons.’°? Since Woods maintains 
that all causal reasons were purely passive, he could not 
logically make an exception for man’s body. Dorlodot goes 


* Northcote: The Idea of Development, p. 238. 
males Peet. 

we Leas pepo 

* Woods: Augustine and Evolution, p. 75. 


93 


far in the opposite extreme. Not only does he say that, 
according to Augustine, man’s body, like all other living 
beings, has evolved by a natural evolution of inorganic 
matter,’ but he implies that the body was prepared by a 
gradual process through intermediate stages. In a foot- 
note explaining a statement that the appearance of the first 
man did not require a special intervention on the part of 
God, he writes: ‘‘As to the soul of the first man, St. Augus- 
tine, faithful to his principle concerning God’s repose, holds 
also that it was created at the first instant of time. Later 
on, when the body had reached by natural evolution a suit- 
able state of organization, the soul united itself to the body 
by a kind of natural inclination.’°: Concerning the soul, 
Dorlodot’s statement needs to be qualified. Augustine sug- 
gests this theory and holds that it is “tolerabilius’” but no 
more.’ As for the body, there is certainly no authority 
for the statement that it evolved until it had reached “a 
suitable state of organization.” I think that Augustine’s 
belief that the human body passed directly from its poten- 
tial condition in the rationes seminales to its actual form 
is beyond question. Moreover, I hold as equally certain 
that he admitted the possibility of intervention on the part 
of the Creator in the formation of man. This does not 
involve a new creative act, since God made use of existing 
matter, the slime of the earth. Neither does it mean that 
there was any intrinsic impossibility preventing God from 
putting the active cause of man’s body in matter. Augus- 
tine for various reasons held it probable that He did not, 
but instead retained this cause within Himself. It is a 
question of exegesis and Augustine thought that this inter- 
pretation of the formation of man fitted in better with the 
‘scriptural story than any other. In regard to the produc- 
tion of the body of Eve from the side of Adam, direct divine 
intervention is the only explanation which he gives. 

This brings to a conclusion our study of the origin and 
development of the rationes seminales. Summing up the 
results briefly, we may say that Augustine held firmly to 





* Dorlodot: Darwinism and Catholic Thought, p. 142. 
saiord Vid 3a « Phd: 9 


De Gen. ad Lit., Lib VII, c. XXIV. Cfr. also O’Connor: The 
Concept of the Soul according to St. Augustine, p. 70. 


94 


the theory of the creation of all things. The act of creation 
did not extend over a period of time but occurred in a 
mathematical moment. At that moment, all things came 
into existence: some in their proper forms, other only po- 
tentially. Included in the former were the four elements: 
earth, air, fire and water; and in the latter were all living 
things that were to appear in the course of time. Time 
itself began at the moment of creation, for all creatures. 
God made nothing ‘new in time, but by His administration 
supported and directed the things He had created. Under 
this administration, those beings created potentially devel- 
oped into their proper forms, ordinarily, according to the 
laws and powers put into matter at the beginning. In 
extraordinary cases, God retained within Himself the_ 
causes to produce effects beyond the ordinary forces of 
nature or at least beyond the ordinary processes of nature. 
Such results are miracles. The development of the first 
plants and animals occurred in the ordinary way. Augus- 
tine does not tell us in what order things appear but he 
does imply that they passed from their rationes seminales 
directly to their own. ‘proper. forms and that those forms 
are the same as those that existed in his own day. Thus 
he excludes transformism. Man’s body was created poten- 
tially like other beings, at the beginning, but the power to 
bring it to actuality may have been retained in God. The- 
great. Doctor thus allows the possibility of direct divine 
intervention in the formation of the first man. That man 
was the last of all the creatures to appear upon the earth 
is implied but there is no room for the theory that the body 
was prepared by a series of transformations through inter- 
mediate stages. 


CHAPTER V 
ST. AUGUSTINE AND EVOLUTION 


It might seem, in view of what has already been decided 
concerning Augustine’s cosmological theories, that the 
question of his stand on evolution has already been answer- 
ed. If Augustine believed that the first individuals of each 
species developed immediately from the rationes seminales 
and remained constant through succeeding generations, 
how can we even consider the possibility of him being an 
evolutionist? There is, I think, one consideration which 
warrants further discussion of this question. That Augus- 
tine did not explicitly teach evolution, we may accept as 
certain. But is it possible to find in his doctrine any sup- 
port whatsoever for the theory of evolution? If Augustine 
had known the scientific facts available to us today, would 
he have favored the hypothesis of transformism? 

The conflicting opinions held by modern writers on this 
subject seem to the writer additional justification for writ- 
ing this chapter. From the statement of Dorlodot, that 
the theory of absolute natural evolution was formally pro- 
fessed by St. Augustine’ to that of Father Woods that: 
“St. Augustine’s doctrine so understood has nothing that 
in any way favors evolution,” there is a wide range. It 
has become customary for modern defenders of the theory 
of evolution, Catholic and non-Catholic, to appeal to the 
authority of St. Augustine to justify their claims. On the 
other hand the opponents of the theory, from Burton to 
O’Toole, have emphatically denied that there is in Augus- 
tine any hint of evolution. Between these two extremes, I 
think, lies the truth. 


1. MODERN EVOLUTIONISM 


In a discussion of this kind, it is of the utmost impor- 
tance that we have a clear understanding of the meaning 





*Dorlodot: Darwinism and Catholic Thought, p. 87. 
*Henry Woods, S.J.: Augustine and Evolution, p. 4. 


95 


of the terms used. It is doubtful if any word is more fre- 
quently found in scientific and popular discussion, in the 
last half century, than evolution. In the popular mind it 
means almost anything from man’s descent from the 
monkey to the development of dogma. Consequently we 
must first decide what is meant by the theory of evolution. 


Evolution, in a general sense, means a development, a 
series of successive changes by which a thing passes from 
one state to another state, under internal or external influ- 
ences, or both. In a more technical sense, it is the theory 
that the world has reached its present condition only after 
passing through a number of intermediate stages. As ap- 
plied to non-living matter, it is called inorganic evolution. 
According to this theory, the world did not come into exist- 
ence as it is today but in a much simpler state and gradu- 
ally developed to its present form. It is not necessary to 
give here the different theories proposed to explain the 
process by which this came about, since they do not concern 
our present study. Organic evolution, on the other hand, 
has to do with life. Parker, a celebrated defender of the 
theory, defines it thus: “‘The belief that plants and animals 
of particular kinds have descended by gradual modification 
from preexisting plants and animals of very different 
kinds.”* It is in this sense that the term is most commonly 
used today. Two things are to be noted: the hypothesis 
does not pretend to explain the origin of life; nor does it 
seek to determine definitely the number of the original 
forms of life. O’Toole, an opponent of evolutionism, ac- 
cepts a similar definition. According to him, ‘Evolution, 
or transformism, as it is more properly called, may be 
defined as the theory which regards the present species of 
plants and animals as modified descendants of earlier forms 
of life.”* It is true that there are evolutionists who have 
expressed very decided views regarding the origin of life 
and its original form or forms, but the more scientific 
attitude tends to avoid these issues since there is no experi- 
mental evidence on which to base an opinion. 


The theories proposed to explain the origin as well as 


*Parker: What Evolution Is, p. 6. 
*O’Toole: The Case Against Evolution, p. 3. 


97 


the development of creatures may be included under the 
names of Materialistic Evolution and Theistic Evolution. 
According to the latter system, God created the world and 
its original forms and gave to them power to develop into 
the forms existing today. This has been subdivided into 
what Dorlodot calls Absolute Natural Evolution and Mod- 
erate Evolution. The former “attributes the first origin 
of living beings to a natural evolution of inorganic matter, 
which became organized and ultimately living matter by 
the simple action of forces, or better still, of powers in- 
herent in it in days gone by.’ This of course involves the 
theory of the spontaneous generation of living things from 
inorganic matter. Moderate Evolution postulates at least 
one intervention by the creator to account for the origin of 
life, or possibly several interventions for the different forms 
of life. Absolute Evolution denies the necessity of any 
intervention. As far as the power of God is concerned it 
is agreed that either method would be equally possible to 
Him. Materialistic Evolution denies the theory of creation 
and even the existence of a creator and seeks refuge either 
in the eternity of matter or in hopeless ignorance. 

It is evident that a Catholic is free to hold Theistic Evo- 
lution if the evidence seems to him sufficient. If we give 
the Creator His proper place in the origin and support of 
all things there is nothing in the prescribed teaching of the 
Church forbidding us to hold the theory of organic evolu- 
tion. Therefore when we discuss the question of St. Augus- 
tine and Evolution, there is no reflection whatsoever on his 
loyalty to the Church and her doctrines. The principles 
enunciated by the great Father of the Church regarding 
the interpretation of the Scriptures were used by Pope Leo 
XIII in his encyclical, “Providentissimus Deus,’ in which 
he lays down the rules scholars are to observe in their 
interpretation and defense of the Sacred Word.® We are 
safe then in following Augustine and if his words have an 
evolutionary meaning, we may accept them as such without 
in any way detracting from his honorable position in the 
Church. 





°Dorlodot: Darwinism and Catholic Thought, p. 4. 
*Cfr. Dorlodot, 1. c., p. 7, where the author discusses thoroughly 
the Catholic principles of interpretation. 


93 


2. COMPARISON WITH AUGUSTINE’S THEORY 


But what support for the theory of evolution can we find 
in Augustine? All authorities agree that he did not hold 
or profess a belief in inorganic evolution. His assertions 
that the inanimate world came into being in the form that 
we see today are so definite and clear as to remove all possi- 
bility of disagreement regarding their meaning. However, 
I believe that Dorlodot’s statement that Augustine formally 
professed Absolute Natural Evolution is open to serious 
criticism. It is true that Augustine did not postulate a 
divine intervention for the origin of life. Spontaneous 
generation was accepted as a scientific fact by all the learned 
men of his day. It was not contrary to the Scriptures nor 
impossible with God and consequently Augustine accepted 
it without question. Nevertheless, the learned doc- 
tor did admit of a divine intervention in the origin of 
the human body. He considered its origin through natural 
causes possible but the special account of the creation of 
man in the Scriptures led him to suggest, as we have seen,’ 
that God retained within himself the active cause of the 
human body and exercised this directly, by His will, upon 
the passive slime of the earth. In regard to the body of the 
first woman, he accepts the account of its origin from the 
side of Adam and admits divine intervention as the only 
satisfactory explanation. 

Leaving aside, then, the question of man’s origin, and 
confining ourselves to transformism in plants and animals, 
can we find any foundation for this hypothesis in Augus- 
tine’s system? The Bishop’s purpose in treating this whole 
subject was to give an acceptable interpretation of the 
creation account in Genesis. That there is actually no 
transformism in it, has already been stated. But is this to 
be traced to the Scriptures or to the current theories of his 
time? If it can be shown that his opinion was based on an 
erroneous scientific belief and that with this one point cor- 
rected, the theory of transformism would furnish a better 
explanation for his scriptural interpretation, then I think 
there is reason for alleging his authority in confirmation of 


eS ts 
99 


the theory. Briefly, Augustine’s explanation of creation is 
this: all things were created simultaneously in a mathe- 
matical instant and the six days represent this instant so 
presented as to show a causal connection between the ob- 
jects of creation but not a lapse of time. At the moment of 
creation, the earth, sea, heavenly bodies, etc., existed as 
they are today, but the living things, only virtually or 
potentially, in the rationes seminales. After that God cre- 
ated nothing else, but under His administration the crea- 
tures, created potentially at the beginning, developed into 
their proper forms. This work of administration consisted 
in the support of things in existence, of their development 
according to the causes and laws placed in them from the 
beginning or according to causes retained in God and mani- 
fested externally only at the appointed time. The first is 
the ordinary way; the second, the extraordinary or miracu- 
lous way. The living beings that were later to appear on 
the earth were determined specifically from the beginning 
and were to develop according to natural law in the ordi- 
nary way. 

All this Augustine clearly deduced from the revealed 
word. It must be admitted that it sounds evolutionary. 
The world at the beginning contained physical forces which 
were in the course of time to bring forth according to 
natural laws all things which were destined to appear upon 
the earth. But, says Augustine, these things were to de- 
velop, each immediately into its own form and then repro- 
duce itself constantly in that form. This anti-evolutionary 
opinion is, I am convinced, based not on the Scriptures but 
on the current theory of spontaneous generation.® If the 
biogenetic principle, omne vivum e vivo, were known to 
Augustine, he would never have adopted this opinion. This 
conviction is based on his own principles. At the very 
beginning of his work on the book of Genesis, he warns his 
readers of the danger of presenting interpretations which 
~ * Al, Janssens (Scheut) in an article, “De Rationibus Seminalibus,” 
which appeared in the Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses (Jan. 
1926), states that Augustine did not derive life from matter, but 
from the causal reasons, placed by God in matter, and consequently 
that he did not in reality hold the theory of spontaneous generation. 
However, these causal reasons were non-living physical forces and 


life developing from them would be in reality abiogenesis, or spon- 
taneous generation. 


100 


are so contrary to fact that they make scientists ridicule 
the sacred text, and thus cause them to turn away from this 
means of salvation. These are his words: ‘“Plerumque enim 
accidit ut aliquid de terra, de coelo, de caeteris mundi hujus 
elementis, de motu et conversione vel etiam magnitudine et 
intervallis siderum, de certis defectibus solis ac lunae, de 
circuitibus annorum et temporum, de naturis animalium, 
fruticum, lapidum, atque hujusmodi caeteris, etiam non 
christianus ita noverit, ut certissima ratione vel experientia 
teneat. Turpe est autem nimis et perniciosum ac maxime 
cavendum, ut christianum de his rebus quasi secundum 
christianas Litteras loquentem, ita delirare quilibet infidelis 
audiat, ut, quemadmodum dicitur, toto coelo errare con- 
spiciens, risum tenere vix possit. Et non tam molestum 
est, quod errans homo deridetur, sed quod auctores nostri 
ab eis qui foris sunt, talia sensisse creduntur, et cum magno 
eorum exito de quorum salute satagimus, tanquam indocti 
reprehenduntur atque respuuntur.”’® Any person today 
professing the theory that the first individuals of each 
species that now exists sprang from inanimate matter by 
natural law, would certainly bring upon himself the ridicule 
of all learned men and no interpreter of Scripture would 
say that this is a necessary deduction of revealed truth. 
Certainly Augustine would have been the first to condemn 
such an opinion. | 

The second principle on which we based the conviction 
that Augustine would today reject the opinion that the first 
individuals of each species rose immediately from the ele- 
ments of the earth, is that we are not to look for miracles 
in the natural development of living things. In giving his 
explanation of the divine administration, it was pointed 
out that things were to develop according to God’s ordinary 
manner of administration which is to support things as 
they are and not to introduce new causes or methods of 
activity. “—<illo opere providentiae, quo naturas substituit 
ut sint.’’?° Sometimes for special reasons God does inter- 
vene, but this is not according to nature. In the origin of 
things he says we must look for the natural not the miracu- 


* De Gen. ad Lat., Lib. I, c. XIX. 
eee eb LA, Co & VILL, 


101 


lous. “Nune enim quemadmodum Deus instituerit naturas 
rerum, secundum Scripturas ejus nos convenit quaerere; 
non quid in eis vel ex eis ad miraculum potentiae suae velit 
operari.”* St. Thomas, commenting on this passage, 
writes: “In prima autem institutione naturae non quaeritur 
miraculum, sed quid natura rerum habeat, ut August. dicit 
(Lib. II, sup. Gen. ad Lit., cap. 1).”'* He repeats this 
statement in his commentary on the Sentences.? With this 
principle there can be no doubt that Augustine woud not 
have so explained the appearance of plants and animals, 
that a direct intervention of God would be required for 
each species. Since the biogenetic principle has been estab- 
lished, we know that this would he the case in the plan of 
the separate development of each species. 

The theory of transformism, on the other hand, would 
give to the great doctor an explanation of the appearance 
of things, consistent with his interpretation of Genesis and 
with the facts of science. Accepting the fact of creation as 
described by Augustine, we have the world filled with the 
-eauses of things to come. Their coming is to be effected 
by natural law. Since life comes naturally only from life, 
we must postulate a divine intervention for the first living 
form or more probably forms, since some things were to 
come from land and other from water. By the gradual 
development and differentiation of these original forms of 
life, the rationes seminales hidden in nature from the begin- 
ning would in the course of time assume their proper forms. 
That these forms were predetermined from the beginning 
means only that the differentiation would proceed along 
definite lines and not depend upon chance. The scriptural 
authority which Augustine found for the fixity of species in 
the repetition of the words “according to their kinds” could 
easily be invoked in another way. The brave Bishop who 
dared to go contrary to the opinions of his fellow theolo- 
gians in his day would not hesitate to do so today. The 
great designs of God existing in His mind from all eternity 
placed by Him in the world at the beginning would gradu- 
ally find their realization under His natural providence. 

1 se uiaib: LL, ce. ok, 


% Sum. 1, q. LXVII, a. 4, ad 3um. 
dg LE, Sént. Dishektil, Wiis. aa 


102 


Thus would be really fulfilled the conception of Augustine 
to which Wasmann refers when he says: ‘‘Even to St. Au- 
gustine it seemed a more exalted conception, and one more 
in keeping with the omnipotence and wisdom of an infinite 
Creator, to believe that God created matter by one act of 
creation, and then allowed the whole universe to develop 
automatically by means of the laws which He imposed upon 
the nature of matter.‘ 

That Augustine believed that the rationes cioeee ape of 
one being might be contained in the body of another is 
evident from the explanation which he gives of the origin 
of living things from the decaying bodies of dead animals. 
He says this cannot be accounted for “nisi quia inerat jam 
omnibus animatis corporibus vis quaedam naturalis, et 
quast praeseminata, et quodammodo liciata primordia 
futurorum animalium, quae de corruptionibus talium cor- 
porum pro suo quaeque genere ac differentus erant exori- 
tura, per administrationem ineffabilem omnia movente 
incommutabili Creatore.’*® We know now that the vis 
quaedam naturalis could not be the cause of future animals 
unless it itself were living, but there seems to be no reason 
why the promordia futurorum animalium might not de- 
velop through an increasing differentiation in the succeed- 
ing generations of the living form. There can be no objec- 
tion from the principle of causality. As Dorlodot points 
out, “this requires that the perfection of the effect should 
be contained in the totality of its causes. But experience 
proves that the perfection of the effect is never contained 
adequately in the perfection of its created causes. If, then, 
the created cause is able to act, it is not as the sufficient 
cause, but as an instrument of the Creator.’’'* Bearing in 
mind the distinction which Cajetan makes between perma- 
nent and temporary instruments, and considering the 
rationes seminales as permanent instruments of the Crea- 
tor, then the cause of any natural differentiation or mutation 
is sufficiently accounted for. 

Father Thomas J. Livingstone, S.J., in an article in the 
Ecclesiastical Review,” implies that the Fathers were 

* Wasmann: Modern Biology, p. 274. 

* De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. III, c. XIV. 


% Dorlodot: Darwinism and Catholic Thought, p. 118. 
* Amer. Ecc. Rev., vol. 73, p. 374 (October, 1925.) 
1¢3 


familiar with the theory of transformism and deliberately 
rejected it because it was contrary to experience, to Aris- 
totle, and to the Scriptures. First, he says that the Fathers 
must have had a knowledge of evolution to combat certain 
errors, and this knowledge they obtained from Aristotle. 
Then he adds: “Besides this knowledge of evolution in 
general, which we infer the Fathers must have had, it can 
be shown from their own words that they knew also of the 
theory of the transmutation of Species.’® Disregarding 
the knowledge which they must have had, and also the 
arguments from the other Fathers, I will consider only those 
which he derives from St. Augustine. Four quotations are 
offered. The first of these deals with the possibility of the | 
elements being changed into each other.1® Here the Bishop 
proposes the question but does not answer it. The second 
reads: “There are not wanting those who assert that all 
bodies can be changed into all others.’*° The third is to 
the effect that this second statement is credible, but adds 
that the opinion “that any body whatsoever can be con- 
verted into a soul is absurd.’! The fourth is an argument 
against the materiality of the soul. Now, none of 
these statements embody the idea of transformism 
or the transmutation of species as they are understood 
today. The assertion that any body can be changed into 
any other body is a reference to the Manichaen doctrine of 
the transmigration of souls. The question of the change of 
a material body into a spiritual soul is not a problem of 
transformism. Those who include man in the evolutionary 
process do not admit the existence of a spiritual soul, while 
those who admit the spiritual element in man’s nature may 
make the body an object of evolutionary progress, but they 
do not include the soul. In none of these quotations is there 
any reference whatever to the development of plants or 
animals, and I think we can safely say that the idea of 
transformism, in our modern sense, never entered into 
the mind of St. Augustine and I might add that this holds 
true for St. Thomas and Suarez as well. Probably Father 





* Tbid. 

De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. III, ¢. IIT. 
ee.) Gib. Vile xi: 

Ne Lath SVL Gao ce 


104 


» 


Livingstone did not mean to say that transformism, as we 
understand it, was familiar to the Fathers; still, the ordi- 
nary reader will get that impression from his words. Like- 
wise his inference that the Fathers deliberately rejected 
this theory is misleading. 

The Abbe Martin, in his scholarly work on St. Augus- 
tine,?? and Portalie in his article on Augustine, in the 
Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique,?? both assert that 
Augustine declared transformism to be impossible and they 
base their assertions on the text in which he says that the 
elements of this world have definite powers, determining 
what they can do and cannot do, and concludes by writing: 
“Unde fit ut de grano tritici non nascatur faba, vel de faba 
triticum, vel de pecore homo, vel de homine pecus.’’** Boyer 
has a comment on these opinions of Martin and Portalie, 
in which he holds that Augustine was not referring to 
transformism when he wrote this sentence and confirms our 
opinion that this theory never entered Augustine’s mind. 
He writes: “L’Abbé J. Martin et le P. Portalié écrivent que 
St. Augustin a déclaré impossible le transformation des 
especes. Mais le texte qu’ils alleguent celui de la note 
precédénte (de grano tritici non nascitur faba) ne semble 
pas avoir une telle prétention. Saint Augustin n’envis- 
ageait pas les conditions sous lesquelles est présentée la 
doctrine transformiste. Dans les limites de l’expérience 
ordinaire, il est admis per tous, aujourd’hui encore, qu’une 
féve ne sort pas d’un grain de blé. I] nous parait plus juste 
de dire que le docteur d’Hippone n’a pas songé au trans- 
formisme, mais que son systeme fournirait au trans- 
formisme, le cas échéant, une expression philosophique 
rationnelle. Ce dernier point est d’ailleurs noté par l’abbé 
Martin, ibid., p. 314.’2° I think we must agree with the 
statement of Boyer that though St. Augustine does not take 
transformism into consideration, nevertheless his system 
furnishes for this theory “une expression philosophique 
rationnelle.” In the body of his text he has another state- 


2T’Abbe Jules Martin: St. Augustin, p. 314. 

*Le P. Portalie: art. Augustin, du Dict. de Theol. Cathol. Col. 
23538. 

“De Gen. ad Lit., Lib. IX, c. XVII. 

* Boyer: L’Idée de Vérité, p. 1382. 


105 


ment to the same effect: “L’hypothése transformiste ne 
pouvait se présenter a l’esprit d’Augustin: mais on voit 
que, fut-elle vérifée, cette hypothése ne troublerait en rien 
son systéme.’’?° 

In the quotation above (n. 25) Boyer adverts to the fact 
that Abbé Martin agrees with him that the system of Au- 
gustine would furnish an explanation for transformism. 
Since this point is important, I think it worth while to give 
the words of the Abbe.. He says: “Et cepandant si un jour 
VPévolution était chose bien constatée, l’enseignement de 
saint Augustin s’en accomoderait a merveille; alors, en 
effet, il y aurait a dire que l’acte créateur toujours actuel 
produit précisément la transformation des espeéces. Or, 
parlant ainsi de l’acte créateur, on exprime ce qui aux yeux 
de saint Augustin est la doctrine fondamentale toujours 
nécessaire. Mais tout le reste ce n’est que l’histoire du 
monde extérieur; ce n’est que l’expression superficielle du 
fait.’’*’ Although he asserts that Augustine denied the 
possibility of transformism, nevertheless he too realizes 
how wonderfully the doctor’s system might be adapted to 
it. What he says about the creative act producing the 
transformation of species might easily be referred to the 
divine administration as explained above. His distinction 
between the fundamental doctrine of creation and its ex- 
ternal expression fits in well with what has been said about 
the scriptural interpretation and its scientific explanation. 
Thamiry also holds that there is in the doctrine of the 
rationes seminales a basis for the theory of evolution. In 
speaking of the nature of the rationes seminales as ex- 
plained by St. Augustine, he says: “Uno verbo, rationes 
seminales non transformismum quidem, sed in theoria 
descendentiae secundum quid evolutionem ae simul 
ac limitatam nobis demonstrant.’’?® 

One of the earliest of the modern ee to call atten- 
tion to the possibility of harmonizing the doctrine of 
Augustine with the theory of evolution was St. George 
Mivart. In his book, “On the Genesis of Species,” pub- 
lished in 1871, he says: “Now, St. Augustine insists in a 

** Thid. 

*T,’Abbe Jules Martin: St. Augustin, p. 314. 

* Thamiry: De Rationibus Seminalibus, p. 109. 


106 


very remarkable manner on the merely derivative sense in 
which God’s creation of organic forms is to be understood; 
that is, that God created them by conferring on the mate- 
rial world the power to evolve them under suitable condi- 
tions.’ And again: “It is then evident that ancient and 
most venerable theological authorities distinctly assert 
derivative creation, and thus harmonize with all that 
modern science can possibly require.”*® Father J. A. Zahm, 
C.8.C., writing at a slightly later period, emphasizes the 
fact that Augustine lays stress on the operation of natural 
laws. “‘The most remarkable feature,” he says, “of St. Au- 
gustine’s system of exegesis ... is the special stress he lays 
on the operation of natural laws, and the observations he 
makes concerning derivative creation or creation through 
the agency of secondary causes.** . . . He insists on it 
that we should explain the phenomena of the physical world 
in conformity with the nature of things—naturas rerum— 
and not by the constant intervention of miracles, and em- 
phasizes the fact that the Almighty has ‘ordained all things 
in measure and number and weight.’’’*? Although he calls 
Augustine the ‘‘father of theistic evolution,” still he insists 
that the saint knew nothing of modern evolution. “It may 
seem strange to some of my readers to be told that St. 
Augustine was the father of theistic evolution, and yet, 
paradoxical as it may appear, the statement is substan- 
tially true. Of course it is quite evident that he knew 
nothing about evolution as it is now taught.** . . . The 
Fathers and Doctors of the Church were fully abreast with 
the science of their time, and it were folly to expect more 
than this of them... to exact of them a knowledge which 
those who made the pursuit of science a specialty did not 
possess, or to imagine that they should be as far advanced 
in the inductive sciences as those who have had the benefit 
of long centuries of observation and experiment.”** When 
Doctor Zahm, who is evidently amplifying the thought of 
Mivart, attributes to Augustine the doctrine of derivative 


* Mivart: The Genesis of Species, p. 281. 
Ty Livitt.sf Ds 2Oo- 
Zahm: Bible, Science and Faith, p. 78. 


107 


creation, he does not mean thereby transformism but, as 
he says himself, ‘creation through the agency of secondary 
causes.” Augustine’s claim to the title “Father of Evolu- 
tion” 1s based on the principles of exegesis which he defined 
and on his interpretation of Genesis which can be accommo- 
dated as well to the scientific theories of today as to those 
of the fifth century. 

Attention must be called here to the most remarkable 
agreement between the system of St. Augustine and a 
theory proposed a few years ago by one of the foremost 
scientists of our day, Dr. Wm. Bateson. In a report on 
Heredity, read at the Australia meeting of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, he suggests 
that evolution may be not an accumulation of additional 
factors, but an unfolding of possibilities contained within 
the original forms in nature. The following is an extract 
from this report: “Having in view these and other con- 
siderations which might be developed, I feel no reasonable 
doubt that, though we may have to forego a claim to varia- 
tions by addition of factors, yet variation both by loss of 
factors and by fractionation of factors is a genuine phe- 
nomenon of contemporary nature. If, then, we have to 
dispense, as seems likely, with any addition from without 
we must begin seriously to consider whether the course of 
evolution can at all reasonably be represented as an un- 
packing of an original complex which contained within 
itself the whole range of diversity which living things 
present. . . . At first it may seem rank absurdity to 
suppose that the primordial form or forms of protoplasm 
could have contained complexity enough to produce the 
diverse types of life. But is it easier to imagine that these 
powers could have been conveyed by extrinsic conditions ?’’** 
Commenting on this theory and its relation to Augustine, 
Father Husslein says: “It is very interesting to note in this 
connection how the Batesonian theory, described as men- 
delism to the nth power, recalls the Augustinian view, sur- 
prised as its author may be to hear this mentioned. Every 
new evolution, according to him, was contained in the 
original organism. Variations are merely the result of 


* Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1915, p. 372. 
108 


removing something that prevented certain hidden charac- 
teristics from freely manifesting themselves.’** The de- 
velopment of the science of Genetics has turned the atten- 
tion of scholars from the external to the internal factors 
of development. With this is coming a realization that 
evolution may be an “unpacking of an original complex” or, 
as Augustine expressed it: “explicando mensuras et nume- 
ros et pondera sua quae in occulto acceperunt ab illo, qui 
omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuit (Sap. 
XI, 21).’*? Fifteen hundred years have elapsed since the 
keen mind of Augustine elaborated his system and what a 
tribute it is to him that in this twentieth century a scientist 
should propose as something new and daring a theory 
similar to his own. 


3. CONCLUSION 


It is not my intention to prove that the cosmological 
system of St. Augustine is true to reality; neither do I 
accept the theory of transformism as an established scien- 
tific principle. My aim has been to show what the great 
doctor really taught and then to determine in how far it 
favors a doctrine of evolution. In the former two things 
stand out: 1. God created all things at the beginning, the 
elements and heavenly bodies in their proper forms, all 
living things potentially; 2. by His administration He 
supports these things in existence and enables the potential 
beings to become actual in time by the operation of the 
natural laws which He himself imposed upon them. Occa- 
sionally He intervenes and produces effects immediately 
but this is extraordinary and these effects are for that 
reason called miracles. His teaching that the first indi- 
vidual of each species developed immediately from its 
potential condition to its proper form and remained con- 
stant in that form through successive generations, precludes 
any possibility of attributing transformism to him directly. 
Nevertheless his doctrine of the gradual appearance of 
living beings upon the earth through the operation of natu- 
ral laws and secondary causes, constitutes a satisfactory 
 “Husslein: Evolution and Social Progress, p. 100. 

"De Trinitate, Lib. III, c. IX. 

109 


philosophical basis for evolution, and merits for him the 
title of Father of Evolution. As Sir Bertram Windle so 
well says: “To me, at least, it seems as if the language of 
Peter Lombard and of St. Thomas Aquinas, in commenting 
on St. Augustine, makes it clear that the teaching of the 
greatest and most} influential Doctor in the history of the 
Church is quite consonant with any reasonable theory of 
evolution—nay, it is broad and comprehensive enough to 
provide not only for whatever limited degree of evolution 
is yet fairly established, but even for anything that has 
even a remote probability of being proven in the future. 
Nor am I deterred from coming to that conclusion by the 
very obvious criticism that the Saint did not state the doc- 
trine with the clearness with which it is now laid down, 
a thing which no reasonable being would expect him to 
have done.’’?8 
St. Augustine, by his principles of exegesis and their 
application to the story of creation in Genesis, has laid a 
great debt upon all Christian scholars. He has shown the 
theologian the attitude he must take toward science; and 
the scientist how he must approach the truths of revelation. 
Truth cannot contradict truth and therefore the revelation 
in the Scriptures cannot contradict the revelation in nature, 
nor vice versa. The interpreter must not attribute to the 
revealed word, truths which are contrary to the demon- 
strated facts of science, and the scientist must not scoff 
because the true meaning underlying this revealed word 
may be hidden from him. The saint put his principles into 
practice by giving an interpretation of Genesis that is in 
harmony with the text and with natural facts. By his 
distinction between creation and divine administration and 
his explanation of the latter he has shown us how to recon- 
cile the doctrine of God’s constant support and direction 
with the reign of natural law and the operation of secondary 
causes. He has made it clear to us that direct intervention 
on the part of God is extraordinary but not inconsistent. 
By his theory of the rationes seminales we are given a 
philosophical explanation of the action and interaction 
of material bodies, the generation and growth of living 





* Windle: A Century of Scientific Thought, p. 8. 


122 


beings. Evolution, so terrifying to many, becomes in his 
system a wonderful demonstration of God’s wisdom and 
power. Ardent lover of God, he yearned for a knowledge 
of God and His creatures. ‘Sed tu quomodo facis ea,” he 
cries in his Confessions, “quomodo fecisti, Deus, coelum et 
terram?’’*® Animated by this intense love, he was rewarded 
by an insight into the nature of things far more perfect 
than any of his contemporaries. We have tried to look with 
his eyes at the vision which he saw and to reproduce it 
here. If we have erred, we ask his forgiveness; if we have 
seen correctly, we thank him for the truly wonderful pic- 
ture which he has given us of the relation between God 
and His creatures. 


” Confessions, Lib. XI, c. V. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Primary Sources 


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SPECIAL WORKS ON AUGUSTINE 


Battirot, P. Le Catholicisme de Saint Augustin, 2 ed. Paris 1920. 

Boyer, CHartes. L’Idée de Vérité dans la Philosophie de Saint Augustin, 
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GRANDGEORGE, L. St. Augustin et N éo-Platonisme, Paris 1896. 

GRASSMAN. Die Schépfungslehre des Heiligen Augustinus und Darwins, 
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McIntosu, JoHN S. Augustine's Version of Genesis, Chicago 1909. 

Martin, JuLes. Saint Augustin, Paris 1901. 


112 


‘SPECIAL WORKS ON AUGUSTINE (Cont.) 


Montcomery, W. St Augustine, Aspects of His Life and Thought, New 
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Moriarity, P. E. Life of St. Augustine, Bishop, Confessor and Doctor of the 
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MISCELLANEOUS WORKS 


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113 


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ARTICLES IN PERIODIC LITERATURE 


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u 114 


VITA 


Michael John McKeough was born at Green Bay, Wis- 
consin, September 18, 1891. His elementary studies were 
pursued at St. John’s Parochial School in his native city. 
He entered St. Norbert’s College, West De Pere, Wiscon- 
sin, in 1907, where he followed the regular academic and 
college courses, receiving the B.A. degree in 1914. .On 
August 28, 1912, he joined the Norbertine (Premonstra- 
tensian) Order. He was ordained to the priesthood in 1917 
and from July 1918 to July 1919 he served as a Chaplain 
in the United States Army. In the Fall of 1919, he entered 
the Graduate School of the Catholic University of America, 
following courses in Philosophy of the Mind, Social and 
Genetic Psychology and the Philosophy of Evolution under 
the Rt. Rev. E. A. Pace, S.T.D., Ph.D., Industrial Ethics 
under the Rev. John A. Ryan, S.T.D., Introduction to St. 
Thomas and the Psychology of St. Thomas under the Very 
Rev. Ignatius H. Smith, O.P., Ph.D., the Philosophy of 
Education under the Very Rev. Thos. E. Shields, Ph.D., 
School Administration and Management under the Very 
Rev. P. J. McCormick, Ph.D., 8.T.L., History of Philosophy 
under the Rev. J. J. Rolbiecki, Ph.D., Biology under Prof. 
John B. Parker, Ph.D. He received the degree of M.A. 
from the university in 1920. To all who assisted him in 
his work and especially to Monsignor E. A. Pace, under 
whose direction this dissertation was written, he wishes to 
express his sincere gratitude. 





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